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ARTICLE
CONSIDERING THE A.B.A.'S 1908 CANONS OF
ETHICS*
James M. Altman**
INTRODUCTION
Nearly 100 years ago, the American Bar Association ("A.B.A.")
promulgated the first national code of legal ethics in this country.
From its adoption in 1908,' until it was superseded by the A.B.A.'s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") in 1970,2
the Canons of Ethics3 ("Canons") were the authoritative norms
regarding lawyer conduct in the United States.4 By 1910, twenty-two
* This article is part of the Symposium, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward,
begun in Issue 4 of the current volume of the Fordham Law Review. See 71 Fordham
L. Rev. 1181,1181-1668 (2003).
** Partner, Bryan Cave LLP, New York City. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1975 Yale University.
The author is a member of the Commercial Litigation Client Service Group at Bryan
Cave LLP, a national law firm, where, as Co-Leader of its Professional Liability
Team, he practices in the fields of professional liability, professional discipline, and
legal ethics. He would like to thank the library staff at Bryan Cave's New York
office-Solomon Crook, Christine Wierzba, and Roxanne Hamberry - for
extraordinary help in gathering arcane source material; Jean Keller, for typing and re-
typing drafts of this article; and Jay Warren and Ellen Schecter, for their insightful
substantive and editorial comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Discussion Upon Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A Rep. 55-86 (1908).
2. Although adopted at the A.B.A.'s annual meeting on August 12, 1969,
Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and
Objectives, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1970), the Model Code became effective on January
1, 1970. Report of Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A.
Rep. 728, 728 (1969).
3. Although they were often referred to, and popularly known as, the "Canons of
Professional Ethics," see Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of
the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 241 n.7 (1992) [hereinafter, Pearce,
Republican Origins] (citing, e.g., Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 309 (1953)), their
proper title was the "Canons of Ethics." See infra App. The 1908 Canons of Ethics, as
finalized by the Committee and distributed to the A.B.A. Members, is reprinted in an
appendix to this article. All citations herein to the text of the Canons refer to the
appendix.
4. Throughout this article, I use the terms "norm" and "normative" with respect
to lawyer conduct to refer generally to prescriptions about what lawyer conduct
should be. Codes of ethics, such as the Canons, are one type of norm regarding
lawyer conduct; they are not, however, the only type. Indeed, as other scholars have
observed, the nature of the A.B.A.'s norms regarding lawyer conduct has changed in
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state bar associations had adopted them;5 by 1914, thirty-one state bar
associations had adopted the Canons "with little or no change"; 6 and
by 1924, the Canons had been adopted, with minor modifications, by
"almost all of the state and local bar associations of the country. '7
Although ultimately fifteen new Canons were added,' only seven of
the original thirty-two Canons were ever amended and only Canon 27,
which concerned lawyer advertising, was changed substantially.9 The
Canons' sixty year hegemony during most of the twentieth century is
striking, especially when compared to the roughly fifteen-year life of
the A.B.A.'s normative statements regarding lawyer conduct since
then."'
the years since the Canons were adopted. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does The
A.B.A. Promulgate Ethical Rules? 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 686-87, 686 n.257 (1981)
(noting decreasing ethical content in the A.B.A.'s normative statements regarding
lawyer conduct); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J.
1239, 1249-60 (1991) (describing the "legalization" of "fraternal norms issuing from
an autonomous professional society . . . into a body of judicially enforced
regulations"); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching
in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 41-53 (1995) (discussing causes of the de-
moralization of legal ethics); Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the
Legalization of American Legal Ethics-Il. The Modern Era, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
205, 217 n.43 (2002) [hereinafter Wolfram, Legal Ethics Il] (acknowledging the de-
moralization of legal ethics).
5. Introduction of Resolutions, 35 A.B.A. Rep. 47, 53 (1910).
6. Report of the Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 39 A.B.A. Rep. 559, 560-61 (1914).
7. Report of the Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 49
A.B.A. Rep. 466, 467 (1924).
8. Canons 33-45 were adopted at the A.B.A.'s annual meeting in 1928.
Proceedings, 53 A.B.A. Rep. 29, 130 (1928). Canon 46, regarding advertisement of
specialized legal services, was adopted at the A.B.A.'s annual meeting in 1933.
Proceedings, 58 A.B.A. Rep. 41, 178, 429 (1933). Canon 47, regarding conduct that
aids the unauthorized practice of law, was adopted on September 30, 1937.
Supplemental Report of the Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
62 A.B.A. Rep. 761, 767 (1937).
9. Canons 7, 1t, 12, 13, 27, 28, and 31 were the only Canons of the original thirty-
two ever amended. Drinker, supra note 3, at 25-26. In 1928, Canon 28 was amended.
Proceedings, 53 A.B.A. Rep. 130, 130-31 (1928). In 1933, Canons 11 and 13 were
amended. 58 A.B.A. Rep. 428 (1933). In 1937, Canons 7, 11, 12, and 31 were
amended. Report of the Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 62
A.B.A. Rep. 761-64 (1937). None of those amendments were substantive, with the
exception of the 1937 amendment to Canon 11, which added the following as the first
paragraph of that Canon: "The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in
him by his client." Id. at 761. Canon 27 was entirely redrafted in 1937, Id. at 762-64,
and then amended five more times before 1970, House of Delegates Proceedings, 65
A.B.A. Rep. 89, 97-98 (1940); House of Delegates Proceedings, 67 A.B.A. Rep. 103,
149-50 (1942); House of Delegates Proceedings, 68 A.B.A. Rep. 115, 144-45 (1943);
Report of the Special Comm. to Study the Matter of Amendment of Canon 27, 76
A.B.A. Rep. 437, 437-38 (1951); House of' Delegates Proceedings, 88 A.B.A. Rep.
403, 448-49 (1963).
10. The Model Code was superseded by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules"), which were adopted by the A.B.A. in August, 1983. House of
Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 763, 778 (1983). For an in-depth discussion
of the drafting and adoption of the Model Rules, see Ted Schneyer. Professionalism
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The Canons have rarely been the subject of a comprehensive and
detailed analysis.11 Since the Canons were superseded by the Model
Code, there has been no scholarly attempt to view the Canons as a
separate and defining moment in the history of American legal ethics
or the development of the modern legal profession. 12  The legal
literature concerning the history of American legal ethics generally
has discussed the Canons in terms of broader historical issues, 3
dealing, for example, with the influence of earlier nineteenth-century
ethics texts on the Canons, 4 or the trend towards increased lawyer
as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 677 (1989).
The Model Rules underwent a wholesale revision resulting from the work of
the A.B.A.'s Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which
was established in the Spring of 1997. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised A.B.A.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 441 (2002). That Commission presented its recommendations to the
A.B.A.'s House of Delegates in August 2001 and February 2002 and the resulting
amendments to the Model Rules became effective on February 5, 2002. See id. at 443-
44.
11. The major exception is Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), which is a
comprehensive treatise on the subject of legal ethics by the longtime chairman of the
A.B.A.'s Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances. See infra note
50 and accompanying text. Since 1922, that Committee and its successors have been
in charge of interpreting the A.B.A.'s normative rules. American Bar Foundation,
Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics 1-3, 6 (1967). In 1953, those rules
were the Canons, as amended since 1908.
A second exception is Raymond L. Wise, Legal Ethics (1966), which explained
groups of the Canons and their interpretations by ethics committees regarding specific
topics. By 1970, when that book's second edition was published, the Canons had been
superseded by the Model Code, and the newer norms were the subject of Part 1 of the
book's second edition in 1970.
12. Jerold S. Auerbach's Unequal Justice (1976) might be considered an
exception. That book discusses the Canons and their adoption, but within a much
broader historical study of the development of the highly stratified modern legal
profession. It does not discuss in any detail the historical antecedents of the Canons
or the process of drafting the Canons, and it does not attempt to discuss the Canons as
a whole or the vision underlying them. It does, however, discuss some of the Canons
intended to combat the commercialism affecting the legal profession around the turn
of the twentieth century, and Auerbach's views in that regard are discussed below. See
infra notes 68, 441, 492, 496-97, 499, 574-77 and accompanying text.
13. One recent exception is Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty To Do Justice: A New
Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1999). That article
focuses directly and in detail on the Canons, but its analysis concerns the Canons'
approach to only one issue-a lawyer's duty to be concerned about the justice of a
client's cause.
14. For example, the influence of David Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to
Professional Deportment [hereinafter Hoffman's Resolutions] on American legal
ethics is explored in Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a
Republican Legal Culture, 38 Md. L. Rev. 673 (1979), and Stephen E. Kalish, David
Hoffman's Essay on Professional Deportment and the Current Legal Ethics Debate, 61
Neb. L. Rev. 54 (1982). The influence of George Sharswood's Essay on Professional
Ethics [hereinafter Sharswood's Ethics] upon the Canons and the A.B.A.'s
subsequent normative statements regarding lawyer conduct is the focus of Pearce,
Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 241, and is discussed in Russell G. Pearce.
Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the
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regulation, 5 or the increasing de-moralization of American legal
ethics. 6 Recently, a number of articles have referred to one or two
Canons as the historical starting point for an analysis of a particular
topic in legal ethics. 17 Thus, the Canons have become an obligatory
reference in legal ethics scholarship, but their overarching, animating
vision has been almost entirely overlooked. It is time now, as we
approach their one hundredth anniversary, to identify that vision and
to explain their distinctive contribution to the development of
American legal ethics and the modern legal profession.
This article is intended to begin that task. 8 It attempts to place the
Canons in their particular historical context and to understand some
of the meanings they had for those who promulgated or adopted
them. This is no easy task. Already by the 1960s, when the A.B.A.
was in the process of adopting the Model Code, the Canons seemed
"quaint" and "hoary," as if they were simply museum pieces, relics of
an age whose power and complexity were no longer well understood.' 9
Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable
381 (2001) [hereinafter Pearce, Governing Class]. The influence of the Alabama
Code of Legal Ethics on American legal ethics is explored in Allison Marston,
Guiding The Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar
Association, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 471 (1998), and Walter Burgwyn Jones, Canons of
Professional Ethics, Their Genesis and History, 7 Notre Dame Law. 483 (1932)
[hereinafter Jones, Canons]; Walter Burgwyn Jones, First Legal Code of Ethics
Adopted in the United States, 8 A.B.A. J. 111 (1922) [hereinafter Jones, First Legal
Code]. Hoffman's Resolutions, Sharswood's Ethics, and the Alabama Code are each
described briefly in Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J.
1063 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Toward A History of the Legalization of
American Legal Ethics-IL Origins, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 469 (2001)
[hereinafter Wolfram, Legal Ethics 1].
16. See supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., Terry R. Day and Scott L. Rogers, When Principled Representation
Tests Antidiscrimination Law, 20 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 23, 26-27 (1998) (tracing back
to Canon 31 a lawyer's discretion to decide whom to represent); Daniel M. Filler,
Lawyers in the Yellow Pages, 14 Law & Literature 169, 173 (2002) (tracing back to
Canon 27 the restrictions on lawyer advertising); Lindsay M. Oldham & Christine M.
Whitledge, The Catch-22 of Model Rule 8.3,15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 881, 882-83 (2002)
(tracing back to Canon 29 the lawyer's duty to report attorney misconduct); Joseph R.
Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of
Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 833, 879-82
(1997) (tracing back to Canon 5 the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence).
18. This article is part of a larger project regarding the history of the Canons
which seeks, among other things, to explore the Canons in terms of the intellectual
and social history of the United States in general and of the American legal
profession in particular around the turn of the twentieth century.
19. The Model Code was the outgrowth of a five-year process that began in May
1964, when the A.B.A. Board of Governors created the Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards, the Committee that drafted the Code. Armstrong,
supra note 14, at 1069; Wright, supra note 2, at 4. The Chairman of that Committee
described its efforts to reorganize and rewrite the Canons:
[I]t was found that much of the language which had previously seemed clear
because of its familiarity was in fact ambiguous. Inaccurate or obscure
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The first part of this article discusses the genesis of the A.B.A.'s
project to promulgate an authoritative moral code of lawyer conduct
(the "Canons Project"). It shows that the Canons were the A.B.A.'s
response to President Theodore Roosevelt's criticism of lawyers
during a June 1905 commencement address at Harvard University, in
which he disparagingly described lawyers as "hired cunning" because
they thwarted what he viewed as the public interest by their lucrative
representation of corporations and wealthy entrepreneurs.2 ° In its
1906 report regarding the "advisability and practicability of the
adoption of a code of professional ethics, '21 the A.B.A.'s Committee
on the Code of Professional Ethics ("Canons Committee" or
"Committee") 22 described the pervasive commercialism that, in its
view, was threatening to reduce a prestigious profession with an
essential role in the administration of justice to a mere money-getting
trade .2  The promulgation of Canons was intended to help the legal
profession enhance its reputation and, thereby, better perform its
important social and political role as America's "governing class, '24 by
expressions obviously should not be perpetuated. The Committee
encountered many doubts as to what much of the language meant, which in
turn led to detailed analysis of what in fact the duties of a lawyer are and
should be. And so our original efforts merely to reorganize and reword the
Canons became an extended search for the full meaning of professional
responsibility in the context of modern-day society, a search that culminated
in the formulation of the [Model] Code.
Id. at 6. In short, the Committee found that the Canons "'abound with quaint
expressions of the past."' Id. at 5 (internal citation omitted). Other commentators
have agreed. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 54 (1986)
[hereinafter Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics] (explaining that the Canons used
"verbiage and conceptualization that even in 1908 must have appeared terribly
dated"); Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10
(1934) (observing that the Canons "for the most part are generalizations designed for
an earlier era").
20. See infra notes 53-86 and accompanying text.
21. Report of the Comm. on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 600, 600
(1906) [hereinafter, 1906 Comm. Rep.] (quoting 28 A.B.A. Rep. 132 (1905)).
22. The Committee grew in three phases. The Committee appointed in 1905
consisted of William Wirt Howe of New Orleans; James G. Jenkins of Milwaukee;
Francis Lynde Stetson of New York City; Ezra R. Thayer of Boston; and the
Chairman, Henry St. George Tucker, of Lexington, Virginia. In 1906, the Committee
was expanded by four members: Lucien Hugh Alexander of Philadelphia; Frederick
V. Brown of Minneapolis; Franklin Ferriss of St. Louis; and Thomas Hamlin Hubbard
of New York City. In 1907, the Committee was expanded for the final time to
enhance its prestige even more by adding five members: David Josiah Brewer of
Washington, D.C.; Jacob McGavock Dickinson of Chicago; Thomas Goode Jones of
Montgomery, Alabama; Alton Brooks Parker of New York City; and, George R.
Peck of Chicago.
23. See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
24. At the turn of the twentieth century, the standard text describing the special
social and political role played by lawyers in American democracy was Alexis de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America. De Tocqueville summarized his discussion of
the role lawyers play in American democracy in flattering terms that lawyers have
referenced ever since:
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providing ethical standards: (i) to judge who should be permitted to
become and remain lawyers; (ii) to educate young or inexperienced
lawyers; and (iii) to elicit and strengthen lawyers' resolve to conduct
themselves in accordance with the highest ethical standards.
The second Part of this Article describes the process of drafting and
adopting the Canons and the pre-existing texts of legal ethics that
were used in that process. Although the Committee made every
effort to involve not just A.B.A. members, but the legal profession
more generally, 2 there were three main texts they consulted in
drafting the Canons: (1) a section-by-section compilation of the codes
of ethics adopted by eleven state bar associations over the score of
years from 1887, when the Alabama State Bar Association adopted
the first such code;27 (2) George Sharswood's Essay on Professional
Ethics ("Sharswood's Ethics");" and (3) David Hoffman's Fifty
Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment ("Hoffman's
Resolutions").29
In terms of the language and content of the Canons, the most
influential of these sources was the code of ethics adopted by the
Alabama State Bar Association ("Alabama Code")," which
synthesized prior ethical texts and speeches into one code and formed
the foundation for each of the subsequent state bar association codes
of ethics. But even the influence of the Alabama Code was limited.
In addition to consolidating and editing lightly the provision of the
Alabama Code of which it approved, the Committee ploughed new
ground. It significantly enhanced the lawyer's moral autonomy in the
attorney-client relationship and, therefore, the lawyer's moral
accountability, by expanding the role envisioned in the Alabama Code
for the lawyer's conscience." Consistent with that deliberate
limitation on the lawyer's zealous representation of a client, the
In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to
mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class,
and the most cultivated portion of society.... If I were asked where I place
the American aristocracy, I should reply, without hesitation that it is not
among the rich, which are united by no common tie, but that it occupies the
judicial bench and the bar.
Alexis De Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 278 (Vintage Classic ed. 1990)
(1840).
De Tocqueville was not the only nineteenth-century writer who saw in lawyers
a "governing class." It was a common theme among those who adopted a republican
political viewpoint in the antebellum period, including lawyers such as David
Hoffman and George Sharswood. See Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 14, at 384-
95.
25. See infra notes 114-31.
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.3
28. See infra Part 1l.B.2.
29. See infra Part 11.B.1.
30. See infra Part 11.B.3.
31. See infra Part III.A.
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Committee placed less emphasis than did the Alabama Code on
conflicts of interest and the zealous defense of criminal defendants.32
It created prohibitions on advertising and solicitation and other
commercial and competitive activities that were entirely
unprecedented. 33  And, it imposed new obligations on lawyers to
regulate their profession, at both the point of entry and thereafter.34
Thus, the Canons are much more than just a restatement of or a new
form for the ethical views of David Hoffman, George Sharswood, or
even Thomas Goode Jones, the draftsman of the Alabama Code.35
The third part of this article demonstrates that the Canons were
animated by the vision of a self-regulating profession in which lawyers
engaged in their professional activities as gentlemen. 3' The Canons
prescribed a vision of conscientious lawyering.3' According to that
vision, lawyers should zealously represent their clients, but only
insofar as they could do so in conformity with their personal duties
and views as gentlemen and their republican duties as "officers of the
court"38 with a special obligation for achieving moral and legal
justice.39  Lawyers were to measure those duties by their own
consciences, not those of their clients.' They should never allow their
duties to their clients to obscure or undermine their moral autonomy
or, therefore, their moral accountability.4' Consistent with that vision,
and the concomitant goal of enhancing the stature of lawyers through
adoption of the gentlemanly distinction between a profession and a
trade, the Canons required lawyers to eschew commercialism in all
facets of their professional practice, including specifically in relation
to their existing and potential clients and in relation to other lawyers.42
In this respect, the Canons represent a counter-insurgency by a
professional elite aimed at protecting their status from the
increasingly ascendant bourgeois values during the Gilded Age and
the increasing dominance of the market orientation of twentieth-
century American capitalism.43 Finally, recognizing a competitive
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part III.C.
34. See infra Part III.D.
35. See infra Part III. As the Chairman of a three-lawyer committee appointed to
draft such a code, Jones alone prepared the original draft and submitted it to the
other two Committee members. Jones, Canons, supra note 14, at 485. Although they
"heart[ily] approv[ed]" of it, they appear to have made some changes in Jones's draft
before the Committee proposed it to the Alabama State Bar Association for
adoption, because Jones himself moved to strike out a portion of section 14 of the
proposed code during the Association's consideration of it. Id; see infra note 327.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part I.A.
38. See infra Part II.A.4.
39. See infra Part 1II.A.4.
40. See infra Part 1II.A.4.
41. See infra Part 1I1.A.4.
42. See infra Part III.C.
43. See infra notes 592-99 and accompanying text.
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pressure to lower the standards of lawyer conduct in an ever-
expanding market for legal services, the Canons imposed
requirements on lawyers to regulate their profession through control
over admissions to the bar and reporting violations of the Canons'
normative standards.44
Although the Canons were surely a product of their times, they
became an important aspect of the A.B.A.'s efforts to define the legal
profession in the context of the modernizing, industrialized capitalist
economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus,
the Canons became the capstone completing the A.B.A.'s
"professionalism project" and were a crucial component in the legal
profession's self-conception around the turn of the twentieth
century.46
I. THE GENESIS OF THE CANONS PROJECT
A. The Precipitating Dialogue in 1905
There was nothing necessary about the A.B.A.'s promulgation and
adoption of a normative statement regarding lawyer conduct. The
A.B.A. was formed in 1878 "as an exclusive social fraternal
organization of high-status lawyers. '47 Although on a few occasions
during the 1890s the A.B.A. Committee on Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar commented on the importance of legal ethics, s
there was no suggestion to promulgate a code of legal ethics for
almost forty years. This is particularly noteworthy, because in the
years from 1887 through 1907, ten state bar associations, following the
lead of the Alabama State Bar Association, adopted their own codes
of ethics. 49
Thus, Henry S. Drinker, the leading twentieth-century authority on
44. See infra Part III.D.
45. See infra notes 555-99 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 555-99 and accompanying text.
47. Wolfram, Legal Ethics 1, supra note 15, at 485; see also John A. Matzko, "The
Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the American Bar Association, in The New
High Priests: Lawyers in Post Civil War America 75 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984)
(describing the elite lawyers who founded the A.B.A. as liberal reformers who fit
John Sproat's definition of "'the best men.... men of breeding and intelligence, of
taste and substance,"' epitomized by the man most responsible for the A.B.A.'s
formation, Simeon E. Baldwin (quoting John G. Sproat, "The Best Men": Liberal
Reformers in the Gilded Age 4-10 (1968))).
48. See, e.g., Report of Comm. on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 20
A.B.A. Rep. 349, 377-82 (1897) (discussing the need "for some special training in the
ethics of the law, training which is systematic and to be had in a course, instead of
being accidental and incidental"); Report. of Comm. on Legal Education, 18 A.B.A.
Rep. 309, 324-25 (1895) (recommending that a legal ethics course be included in the
law school curriculum).
49. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
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the Canons," did not overstate the case when he said of Henry St.
George Tucker, the A.B.A.'s President in 1904-1905," that "it was
primarily owing to his influence that the project [of drafting an A.B.A.
code of professional ethics] went forward. ' 52  Tucker placed the
question of whether to promulgate such a code on the A.B.A.'s
agenda. At the end of his 1905 presidential address, after completing
his report on the legislation passed during the past year, as was then
required by the A.B.A. Constitution,53  Tucker reached out in
response to President Roosevelt's recent criticism of lawyers:
The serious charge made by the President... against some of the
members of our profession must give us pause; his recognized
position in the country in stimulating lofty ideals in life, as well as his
recognition of the position of our profession in moulding public
sentiment in the country, forces upon us, willingly or unwillingly, as
an Association, the inquiry, not only whether the charge be true, but
also the broader inquiry whether the ethics of our profession rise to
the high standard which its position of influence in the country
demands; surely no more important question than this can be forced
upon the profession.5
4
What was President Roosevelt's "serious charge"? In a
commencement speech at Harvard, his alma mater, 55 Roosevelt
appealed to the graduates to adopt and help create
a public sentiment which shall demand of all men of means, and
especially of the men of vast fortune, that they set up an example to
their less fortunate brethren, by paying scrupulous heed not only to
the letter but to the spirit of the laws, and by acknowledging in their
heartiest fashion the moral obligations which cannot be expressed in
law, but which stand back of and above all laws.56
50. See Drinker, supra note 3, at viii; Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding
Lawyers' Ethics 3 (1990). Drinker was a member of the A.B.A.'s Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances for fourteen years, from 1939 to 1953, and the
Committee's Chairman for nine of them, before publishing his treatise on the Canons
in 1953. He then served another three years on the Committee from 1955-1958.
American Bar Foundation, supra note 11, at 4; see also Armstrong, supra note 14, at
1067 (describing Drinker's influence on legal ethics as "exceed[ing] that of anyone
else in the history of the American bar").
51. A.B.A. Presidents take office at the A.B.A.'s annual meeting in August and
serve a one-year term until the next annual meeting. A.B.A. Const., art. III, reprinted
in 28 A.B.A. Rep. 170 (1905). Tucker became A.B.A. President in August 1904,
Election of Officers, 27 A.B.A. Rep. 63 (1904), and was succeeded by George R. Peck
in August 1905, Election of Officers, 28 A.B.A. Rep. 91,133 (1905).
52. Drinker, supra note 3, at 24 n.12.
53. A.B.A. Const., art. VIII, supra note 51, at 173.
54. Henry St. George Tucker, Address of the President, 28 A.B.A. Rep. 299, 384
[hereinafter Tucker, Address].
55. Roosevelt graduated from Harvard College in 1880. See XIV Harvard
Graduates' Magazine No. 53 at 9 (Sept. 1905).
56. Roosevelt's speech, The Harvard Spirit, was presented at the Harvard
Commencement Exercises in Memorial Hall on June 28, 1905, and was printed in
2003] 2403
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In Roosevelt's view, Harvard had imbued the graduates with a
"character" fit to do "honorable" work, 7 and, therefore, "[m]uch has
been given to these men and we have a right to demand much of them
in return. '' "x Roosevelt called for moral leadership from the graduates
and other Harvard alumni who would join or already had joined "the
great profession of the law, whose members are so potent in shaping
the growth of the national soul."59 Observing a distance between the
moral leadership he was exhorting and the existing practices of some
of the leaders of the legal profession, Roosevelt criticized the role
elite lawyers played in assisting wealthy clients to subvert the law:
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical
contempt for those prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning
he can escape or evade is a menace to our community; and the
community is not to be excused if it does not develop a spirit which
actively frowns on and discountenances him. The great profession
of the law should be that whose members ought to take the lead in
the creation of just such a spirit. We all know that, as things actually
are, many of the most influential and most highly remunerated
members of the Bar in every centre of wealth make it their special
task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which their very
wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws which
are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of great
wealth. Now, the great lawyer who employs his talent and learning
in the highly remunerative task of enabling a very wealthy client to
override or circumvent the law is doing all that in him lies to
encourage the growth in this country of a spirit of dumb anger
against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy. Such a spirit may
breed the demand that laws shall be made even more drastic against
the rich, or else it may manifest itself in hostility to all laws. Surely
Harvard has the right to expect from her sons a high standard of
applied morality, whether their paths lead them into business, or
into the profession of the law... . 0
The President's speech sounded standard Progressive themes. The
law, in Roosevelt's view, reflected the public interest, which was being
corrupted by concentrations of the wealthy serving their own private
interests. His description of the big businessman with a "cynical
contempt" for the law recalls Holmes's "bad man," who single-
mindedly pursues his own economic advantage without regard for the
law's moral content or his personal conscience." The elite lawyers-
XIV Harvard Graduates' Magazine, supra note 55. See also Theodore Roosevelt, The
Harvard Spirit (June 28, 1905), in IV Presidential Addresses and State Papers 407
(1910).
57. XIV Harvard Graduates' Magazine, supra note 55, at 1.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 7-8.
61. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,459 (1897)
(describing the bad man). Holmes contrasts the "bad man" with the "good man": "[a
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in Roosevelt's metaphor, "hired cunning" -adopted a complementary
attitude, using their talents and legal learning to undermine the moral
spirit of the law, and the public interest it was designed to serve, by
enabling their wealthy clients to implement their own private interests
at the expense of the law, rather than strengthening the law by
advocating it to their clients and eliciting their "better nature."
The President's criticism of corporation lawyers echoed another
well-known progressive's speech about lawyers addressed to another
Harvard audience just weeks before. On May 4, 1905, Louis Brandeis
presented his famous address, The Opportunity in the Law, to
undergraduates at the Harvard Ethical Society.62 Brandeis shared
Roosevelt's observation that the wealthy and powerful corporate
interests had retained members of the legal elite and made them
captive to their private interests: "The leading lawyers of the United
States have been engaged mainly in supporting the claims of the
corporations; often in endeavoring to evade or nullify the extremely
crude laws by which legislators sought to regulate the power or curb
the excesses of corporations."63
Unlike Roosevelt, Brandeis placed the current problem of the
declining prestige of the legal profession in historical context. He
referred back to the early nineteenth century, when almost all lawyers
were individual general practitioners, representing at one time or
another during their career-and often concurrently-all the various
constituents of the small town community.64 He recalled the public's
bad] man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict,.. . a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." Id. Robert
Gordon views Holmes's bad man as "the rational man-homo law-and-economics-
who treats all legal rules as prices on conduct, risks to be discounted by the
probability of enforcement, data for cost-benefit analysis." Robert W. Gordon, Law
as Vocation: Holmes and the Lawyer's Path, in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and the
Path of the Law 13 (Steven Burton ed., 2000). Some commentators have considered
"the bad man [a]s a realistic picture of the usual corporate client of Holmes' day." See
David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer, in id. at 43. By "Holmes' day,"
Luban may be referring to 1897, when Holmes first presented The Path of the Law as
an address at the dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law.
See Holmes, supra, at 457 n.1. Roosevelt was familiar with Holmes's judicial decisions
and appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1903. E. Digby Baltzell, Puritan Boston
and Quaker Philadelphia 13 (Beacon Press ed. 1979) [hereinafter Baltzell, Puritan
Boston] (citing Catherine Drinker Bowen, Yankee From Olympus: Justice Holmes
and His Family 361 (1944)).
62. This address was first published in Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the
Law, 39 Am. L. Rev. 555 (1905). It was subsequently published in Louis D. Brandeis,
Business: A Profession 329 (photo. reprint 1996) (1914) [herinafter Brandeis,
Business].
63. Brandeis, Business, supra note 62, at 338; see'also id. ("The leaders of the Bar,
without any preconceived intent on their part, and rather as an incident to their
professional standing, have, -with rare exceptions, been ranged on the side of the
corporations ... ").
64. Id. at 332. For a more current, but confirming, description of that small town
general practitioner in the first half of the twentieth century by another Supreme
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reputedly high regard for lawyers then, when, according to De
Tocqueville, they occupied the position of a political aristocracy and
acted "as a brake upon democracy. ' 61
Marking the decline in lawyers' public standing since the Civil War,
Brandeis quoted the well-known observation of yet another foreign
observer, Lord Bryce, in the 1880s, that "the last thirty years have
witnessed a certain decadence in the Bar of the great cities" because
"the growth of the enormously rich and powerful corporations willing
to pay vast sums for questionable services has seduced the virtue of
some counsel whose eminence makes their example important. '66 In
Brandeis' view, the primary reason why contemporary lawyers
enjoyed less prestige was their failure to remain independent of the
interests of the highest paying constituency:
It is true that at the present time the lawyer does not hold as high a
position with the people as he held seventy-five or indeed fifty years
ago; but the reason is not lack of opportunity. It is this: Instead of
holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and the
people, prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers have, to
a large extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great
corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their powers
for the protection of the people. We hear much of the "corporation
lawyer," and far too little of the "people's lawyer." The great
opportunity of the American Bar is and will be to stand again as it
did in the past, ready to protect also the interests of the people. 67
Although many lawyers themselves were dismayed by the
increasing commercialization of legal practice around the turn of the
twentieth century,68 it was President Roosevelt's attack on corporation
Court Justice, see Robert H. Jackson, The County-Seat Lawyer, 36 A.B.A. J. 497(1950). See also Robert H. Jackson, Tribute to Country Lawyers: A Review, 30 A.B.A.
J. 136 (1944) (reviewing book by a "county-seat" lawyer in Georgia).
65. Brandeis, Business, supra note 62, at 342.
66. Id. at 337-38; see also id. at 333-34, (quoting James Bryce, The American
Commonwealth (1888)).
67. Id. at 337. In this speech, Brandeis gives little guidance on precisely what he
means by "independence." Is he criticizing legal specialization and exclusive
representation for wealthy clients, suggesting that every lawyer should represent a
wide range of clients within his or her practice, corporations and the "people" alike?
Or, is he suggesting that within the representation of a single client, even during
representation of the "bad man" for example, a lawyer has the obligation to take into
account his personal view of the interests of third parties and the public generally?
Brandeis himself states no clear answer in this speech. See id. at 342-43.
68. See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen, The Law: Business or Profession 212, 241, 244(G.A. Jennings Co., Inc., rev. ed. 1924); John R. Dos Passos, The American Lawyer
13, 25, 46, 177-78 (photo reprint 1986) (1907); Theron G. Strong, Landmarks of a
Lawyer's Lifetime 347, 354, 377-78 (1914); Champ S. Andrews, The Law-A Business
or a Profession?, 17 Yale L.J. 602 (1908); George F. Shelton, Law as a Business, 10
Yale L.J. 275 (1901). As Jerold S. Auerbach has astutely observed,
"commercialization" was the "protean term of invective that most vividly expressed"
the uneasiness lawyers felt in the early twentieth century about the social changes in
their profession. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 40.
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lawyers captured by their wealthy and powerful clients that caught
Tucker's attention during the summer of 1905. Less than two months
after President Roosevelt's Harvard address, Tucker gave the annual
presidential speech to the 277 delegates at the A.B.A.'s Annual
Meeting.69 At the end of his speech, Tucker quoted Roosevelt's
comments about corporation lawyers and posed his important
question: Do "the ethics of our profession rise to the high standard
which its position of influence in the country demands?"7"'
Tucker addressed that question in an explicitly religious context.
He began by comparing the moral value of the legal profession with
that of the clergy: "I am one of those who believe that the profession
of the law has more potential for good than any other profession,
excepting the Christian ministry, and in some respects more powerful
for good than even that high profession. '71 He ended his speech by
appealing to the delegates before him "who stand forth clothed in
priestly robes, as ministers at the altar of justice," for "vindication of
the claim that the profession of the law is the most ennobling and
powerful for good of all the secular professions. '72 Between these
religious references, Tucker presented his reasoning.
Like Roosevelt, Tucker viewed the lawyer as a powerful force in
shaping public sentiment, analogizing the lawyer's power to teach
right and wrong in everyday affairs to the priest's Sunday sermons:
At one extreme, it expressed anxiety about concentrated economic power
and hostility toward corporation lawyers, whose rapid professional
ascendance and apparent subservience to businessmen were deeply
unsettling. At the other as an indication of concern with immigrant ghettos
and urban poverty, it demonstrated antagonism toward lawyers from ethnic
minority groups-the profession's new and growing underclass. Both the
Wall Street lawyer and the ambulance chaser threatened models of
professional independence and esteem associated with a homogeneous
society and an arcadian past.
Id.; see also Wayne K. Hobson, The American Legal Profession and the
Organizational Society, 1890-1930, at 298 (1986) ("'Commercialization' had several
meanings, depending upon which stratum of the bar it was applied to.").
69. List of Members and Delegates Registered, 28 A.B.A. Rep. 155 (1905). There
were 2,04.9 A.B.A. members at the time. Id. at 296.
70. Tucker, Address, supra note 54, at 384.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 389. Elsewhere in his presidential address, Tucker likens lawyers to
"minister[s]" and courts to "temples of justice." Id. at 385. This religious metaphor
was common throughout the nineteenth century and adopted by many legal thinkers,
such as Maryland's David Hoffman, see infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text,
and Ohio's Timothy Walker, see Timothy Walker, Introduction to American Law 17-
18 (1837) ("I speak of the enlightened and high-minded jurist, who ministers, with
clean hands and a pure heart, in the sacred temples of human justice."); Kentucky's
George Robertson, see Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting of the Kentucky
State Bar Association 27 (1903) [hereinafter Ky. Second Meeting] (quoting George
Robertson, Valedictory Address (1847)); and Pennsylvania's George Sharswood, see
infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. That metaphor still had vitality among
elite lawyers in 1905. See, e.g., Alfred Hemenway, The American Lawyer, 28 A.B.A.
Rep. 390, 395 (1905) (referring to lawyers "in whose temple he is a minister").
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"the lawyer appears in a different role, as the minister of week-day
ethics as applied to men in their everyday business affairs, as the
expositor of justice and right unaided by priestly exegesis or any other
sources than those of natural law and justice." 73 Tucker then
contrasted "the bad lawyer" with "the good lawyer":
If by cunning artifice he seeks to conceal the real truth, or by
devious methods he seeks to attain immoral ends under legal form,
or if for the purpose of obtaining a meretricious success he takes
position in favor of an immoral conclusion in its application to the
facts of his case, that position finds ready defenders among those
already too willing to applaud a principle which, however base, has
for its object the success of the cause. On the other hand, the lawyer
who fights his battles in the open, with no weapons save those taken
from the arsenal of eternal truth and right, who scorns the
temptation to advance a principle for his client or his cause as his
own which cannot be defended in the forum of conscience, leaves a
lasting impress for good upon those who hear him .... 74
Given the potential of lawyers to exemplify for the community both
good and bad, and recognizing "the delicate distinctions in the law...
which makes it possible for a lawyer to cover his tracks in the
accomplishment of his wicked ends, if he be so inclined," Tucker
contended that "principles of genuine honesty" counted more than
"learn[ing] in the law. '75  What America really needed "in the
transaction of private business and in the moulding of a lofty, public
sentiment," Tucker concluded, like Roosevelt before him, was "the
high-toned, honorable, conscientious lawyer. 7
To Tucker, a fourth generation legal educator,77 the challenge for
the A.B.A. was more educational than disciplinary. "[P]urging its
membership of the unworthy member who brings dishonor upon the
whole profession '' 71 was an issue for both the A.B.A. and state bar
associations alike, but, because dishonorable conduct would be known
only to the local bar where such conduct occurred, Tucker rejected a
disciplinary role for the A.B.A. itself.79  "This is one of the many
questions to be considered in the education of the lawyer, and like all
other questions which affect morality and ethics, can best be
73. Tucker, Address, supra note 54, at 385.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 387.
76. Id. Tucker's agreement with Roosevelt about the importance of "lofty ideals"
and the need for lawyers to live by them puts into question Jerold Auerbach's view
that Tucker was "stung" by Roosevelt's criticism of lawyers. Auerbach, supra note
12, at 40.
77. In 1905, at the time of his presidential address, Tucker was the Dean of the
School of Jurisprudence and Law at what is now George Washington University in
Washington, D.C. See James Grafton Rogers, American Bar Leaders 131 (1932);
Concise Dictionary of American Biography 1059-60 (3d ed. 1980).
78. Tucker, Address, supra note 54, at 387.
79. Id.
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accomplished in the very beginning of the study of the law, when
character is unformed .... "8(
Tucker made two specific educational proposals. First, he proposed
that all law schools prescribe "an enlarged and comprehensive course
in the subject of 'legal ethics' to be taught.., by 'men of lofty ideals,
which they try to live up to and not merely talk of.' '.. Second, he
proposed the adoption in every law school of an "honor system,"
which, Tucker explained, helped to create within a student "a manly
sentiment of honor. and integrity and a corresponding scorn of
chicanery and deception."82
Tucker himself did not suggest that the A.B.A. adopt a code of legal
ethics. That step was not formally proposed until the A.B.A.'s 1906
Annual Meeting. But, after hearing Tucker's presidential address, M.
F. Dickinson, an A.B.A. member from Massachusetts, proposed a
resolution that a five person committee be appointed, with Tucker as
Chair, "to report at the next meeting.., upon the advisability and
practicability of the adoption of a code of professional ethics by this
Association. '"83 The resolution carried. 4
In sum, the Canons Project grew Out of President Theodore
Roosevelt's progressive critique of corporation lawyers and the spirit
of commercialism pervading legal practice. Tucker agreed with
Roosevelt that money was having a corrupting influence upon
lawyers' conduct; he acknowledged "the great temptation to the
lawyer to take that course which may lead to the largest remuneration
to himself." 5 But Tucker did not focus the A.B.A.'s ethical concerns
directly on corporation lawyers, even though he shared Roosevelt's
critical stance towards corporations. 6
B. The Committee's 1906 Report
On August 26, 1906, during the A.B.A.'s next annual meeting,
Tucker presented the Committee's printed report on the advisability
and practicability of adopting a code of professional ethics. 7 There
are no public records indicating that the Committee's five original
members held any meetings or discussions regarding that report.
Indeed, correspondence of Ezra R. Thayer, a Committee member and
later the Dean of Harvard Law School, with Tucker in September,
80. Id.
81. Id. at 388 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, The Harvard Spirit, in IV
Presidential Addresses and State Papers 418 (1910)).
82. Id. at 388-89.
83. Proceedings of the Comm. on Legal Ethics, 28 A.B.A. Rep. 132, 132 (1905)
[hereinafter 1905 Comm. Proc.].
84. Id.
85. Tucker, Address, supra note 54, at 387.
86. See, e.g., Henry St. George Tucker, Have the Corporations Been Law Abiding?
16 Va. L. Reg. 881 (1911).
87. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra, note 21, at 600-04.
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1906, strongly suggests that Tucker authored that report without
significant input from the other four original Committee members."
That 1906 report was based substantially on a paper presented at the
A.B.A. annual meeting the previous year.
Two days before Tucker gave his 1905 presidential address, Lucien
Hugh Alexander, a Philadelphia lawyer who became a member and
the secretary of the Committee after the A.B.A.'s 1906 annual
meeting, 9 read his paper, Some Admission Requirements Considered
Apart From Educational Standards."' The issue of bar admissions
requirements had long been an important topic at A.B.A. meetings. 9'
From its very first meeting, the A.B.A. had focused on the importance
of raising the educational standards for bar admission. 92 By 1905, as a
result of the A.B.A.'s efforts, law school had become the preferred
means of legal education,93  eclipsing the older practice of
apprenticeships. 94
88. Only four of the five members of the Canons Committee signed the
Committee's 1906 report-Tucker, Howe, Jenkins, and Stetson. Id. at 604. The fifth
member of the Committee, Thayer, acknowledged that he did not participate in the
drafting of the report. See Letter from Thayer to Tucker (Sept. 11, 1906), in the
Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 4, at 391. Indeed, on July
31, 1906, Tucker telegrammed Thayer, asking Thayer for authorization to sign his
name to the Committee's report without his having seen it. See id. Thayer responded
that he first would like to see that report. Id. Tucker then sent the proposed report to
Thayer, who reviewed it just before he left for his summer vacation. Id. Although "all
the views expressed commanded [his] unqualified approval," Thayer did not send
Tucker the requested formal authorization because the proposed report already had
his name on it. Id. Apparently believing, however, that he had not been authorized to
sign Thayer's name, Tucker submitted the Committee's 1906 report without Thayer's
name on it.
Because Tucker did not even contact Thayer about the proposed Committee
report until July 31, less than a month before the A.B.A.'s Annual Meeting, because
Tucker shared the proposed report with Thayer only as a result of his special request,
and because there is no reason to believe that any other Committee member was
more involved in the drafting than Thayer, it appears that Tucker drafted the
Committee's 1906 report entirely himself.
89. Alexander was added to the Canons Committee after the Committee gave its
1906 report, see 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 600, and Tucker chose Alexander
as secretary of the Committee in or about December 1906. See Letter from Thayer to
Tucker (Dec. 29, 1906), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School,
Vol. 4, at 463 (endorsing Tucker's selection of Alexander as secretary of the
Committee).
90. Alexander read his paper on the afternoon of August 23, 1905. Minutes of
Section on Legal Education, 28 A.B.A. Rep. 549, 550 (1905); see Lucien Hugh
Alexander, Some Admissions Requirements Considered Apart From Educational
Standards, 28 A.B.A. Rep. 619 (1905).
91. M. Louise Rutherford, The Influence of the American Bar Association on
Public Opinion and Legislation 42-55 (1937).
92. Id.
93. In his 1905 report, Alexander stated that the A.B.A. "recogniz[ed] the [law
schools] to be the giant feeder of the profession, and destined to be ever increasingly
so." Alexander, supra note 90, at 622. He noted that by 1904 there were 108 law
schools with nearly 15,000 students in the country, a dramatic increase from the forty-
three law schools with just over 3,000 students in 1880. Id. at 627 (citing James Barr
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Concerned about the number and quality of the resulting "flood" of
law school graduates,95 Alexander proposed two requirements for bar
admissions in addition to formal academic programs. First, "the
standard for admission to the Bar [should] be held sufficiently high in
matters of character as well as in educational qualifications. 96
Second, admission should be restricted to those who have gained
experience and knowledge of the actual practice of law.9 Alexander
suggested a one year clerkship in a law office as a means to satisfy that
criterion.9"
Alexander's 1905 paper must have made an impression upon
Tucker, because the first half of the Committee's 1906 report was
drawn directly from Alexander's paper. The Committee's report
began, like Alexander's paper, with the republican emphasis on the
bar's politically important role in American government:
Under our form of government, unless the system for establishing
and dispensing justice is so developed and maintained that there
shall be continued confidence on the part of the public in the
fairness, integrity, and impartiality of its administration, there can be
no lasting permanence to our republican institutions. Our
profession is necessarily the keystone of the republican arch of
government... [T]he future of the republic depends upon our
maintenance of the shrine of justice pure and unsullied. 99
Ames, Chairman's Address, 27 A.B.A. Rep. 507 (1904)).
94. Reading law in a practitioner's office was the most common means of legal
education for lawyers seeking bar admission before the twentieth century. Auerbach,
supra note 12, at 94 & n.53; Hobson, supra note 68, at 104 ("During the 1890s, the law
school replaced the law office as the primary focus of legal training."); Robert
Stevens, Law School 24 (1983) ("The vast majority of the legal profession until the
turn of the century still experienced only on-the-job legal education."); Wolfram,
Legal Ethics I, supra note 15, at 480 ("'[R]eading law' was the method by which the
great majority of lawyers prepared for admission until after the Civil War, when most
of the oldest law schools were founded."). In 1909, there were approximately 20,000
law students attending 124 law schools. Stevens, supra, at 113 & n.6. By 1910, two-
thirds of those admitted to the bar were graduates of law school, compared to one-
quarter in 1870. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 94.
Although law school overtook apprenticeships as the standard means of legal
education by the end of the nineteenth century, the apprenticeship or clerkship
method still continued in many jurisdictions. Several Committee members-Brewer,
Hubbard, and Parker-read law in a law office in addition to attending law school
during the middle of the nineteenth century. See infra note 307 and accompanying
text.
95. Alexander explained that:
[T]he fact remains that the Bar is being flooded with law school men, most
of whom are inadequately prepared in practice, and the law school army for
admission still comes marching on, ever increasing with a rapidity out of all
proportion to the population and needs of the courts for practising lawyers.
Alexander, supra note 90, at 628.
96. Id. at 629.
97. Id. at 630-33.
98. Id. at 630.
99. This is taken nearly verbatim from Alexander's 1905 paper. Compare 1906
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The Committee exalted that republican view of the lawyer's special
role in the administration of justice in the religious metaphor used by
both Tucker and Alexander in 1905: "[T]he lawyer is and must ever be
the high priest at the shrine of justice."""' Other portions of the
Committee's report extended that metaphor: like God, "justice
reigns;""" courts are "shrines of justice;""' 2 lawyers are the "ministers
of her courts of justice robed in the priestly garments of truth, honor
and integrity;'" 3 the practice of law is a lawyer's "high calling;""'4 and
the code of ethics is called and composed of "Canons. 105
The problem, explained the Committee, lay in the "trend of
many... away from the ideals of the past and the tendency more and
more to reduce our high calling to the level of a trade, to a mere
means of livelihood or of personal aggrandizement."'"6 Contributing
to this trend, if not creating it, is "the influx of increasing numbers
who seek admission to the profession, mainly for its emoluments."'' 17
These lawyers -"the shyster, the barratrously inclined, the ambulance
chaser, the member of the Bar with a system of runners""'-who are
"controlled by graft, greed and gain, or other unworthy motive," exert
a "corroding and demoralizing influence" on other lawyers and the
profession as a whole."'9 "[T]hey not only lower the morale within the
profession, but they debase our high calling in the eyes of the public.
They hamper the administration and even at times subvert the ends of
justice.,"'
The Committee's analysis of the problem affecting the legal
profession was widely shared. The vice of commercialism, often
expressed in terms of the gentlemanly distinction between a
profession and a trade,"' had been articulated as a primary reason for
Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 600-01, with Alexander, supra note 90, at 620.
100. Alexander said precisely the same thing in his 1905 paper. Compare 1906
Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 600 with Alexander, supra note 90, at 619.
101. Alexander, supra note 90, at 600.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 602.
104. Id. at 601,602.
105. Id. at 602-04.
106. Id. at 601.
107. Id.
108. Id. Noticeably absent from this list is the wealthy and powerful corporation
lawyer that was the focus of President Roosevelt's 1905 speech. See supra notes 55-61
and accompanying text.
109. Alexander, supra note 90, at 601.
110. Id. at 602.
111. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe in detail the origins of the
English gentleman's distinction between a profession and a trade, and its significance
for late nineteenth-century American culture in general and for late nineteenth-
century American lawyers in particular. That is a task for another time. For purposes
of this article, it is sufficient to acknowledge the view of eighteenth-century English
gentlemen that only certain occupations were suitable for someone of their class:
"apart from government and the armed services, [there] were the 'liberal professions',
and of these there were only three: divinity, physic [medicine], and law." W. J.
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state bar associations to adopt their own codes of legal ethics. Like
Tucker's 1905 presidential address and the Committee's 1906 report,
the state bar leaders most often spoke about the spirit of
commercialism in general, not specifying what particular lawyer
conduct they so opposed.'1 2 Only a few focused their concern on
corporation lawyers." 3
The Committee intended the A.B.A.'s "adoption and promulgation
of a series of reasonable Canons of professional ethics in the form of a
code"' 1 4 to address this problem of commercialism. The fundamental
purpose of the Canons was to enable the legal profession better to
perform its special political role.' Achieving that ultimate goal
required lawyers to improve the ethical quality of their conduct and
motives." 6 The hoped-for result would be the restoration of the legal
profession's prestige in the eyes of the general public.
The Canons, the Committee envisioned, would help improve the
ethical quality of lawyers' conduct and motives in four respects. First,
the Canons would provide a set of ethical standards by which
judgments could be made about which individuals should be
permitted to become, and to remain, lawyers.1' 7 Second, the Canons
Reader, Professional Men 9 (1966).
Trade, in the ordinary contemporary meaning of the word, was beneath him:
partly because commercial morality was not high and its associations were
all rather grubby, partly for the simple reason that it did not pay enough.
'Trade' was what the blacksmith did, or the carpenter, or the tailor, or any
other skilled craftsman, and there certainly was not a gentlemanly
competence in that.
Id. at 6.
112. See Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Ass'n
106 (1888) [hereinafter Ala. Tenth Meeting]; see also Report of the Fifth Annual
Meeting of the Georgia State Bar Ass'n 146 (1889) [hereinafter Ga. Fifth Meeting];
Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n 38-39 (1902)
[hereinafter Md. Sixth Meeting].
113. Report of the First Annual Meeting of the Colorado Bar Ass'n 60-61 (1898)
[hereinafter Colo. First Meeting]; Ky. Second Meeting, supra note 72, at 32.
114. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 603. Although the Committee was
appointed in 1905 to report on the "advisability and practicability of the adoption of a
code of professional ethics," 1905 Comm. Proc., supra note 83, at 132, the Committee
vacillated in its 1906 report between referring to the normative statement it was
considering as a "code of ethics," 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 601-03, or as
"Canons of ethics." Id. at 602-04. At the end of its Report, the Committee
recommended the adoption of "a series of Canons of professional ethics in the form
of a code." Id. at 604.
115. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 601.
116. The Committee's concern was not merely about how lawyers acted, but also
about lawyers' motives. The Committee contrasted the tradesmen's motives of
personal gain, self-aggrandizement, and the "quest for lucre," with the motives of a
high-minded lawyer who practiced a calling, "pure and unsullied," designed to serve
justice. Id.
117. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 602. Some of the state bar associations
that promulgated their own ethics codes in the twenty years before 1906 were
similarly motivated. See also Report of the Third Annual Meeting of the Alabama
State Bar Ass'n 235 (1881) [hereinafter Ala. Third Meeting]; Report of the
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would educate lawyers, especially well-intentioned young
practitioners whose professional character was not yet formed, by
informing them of "the ethical requirements of the situation.""'
These Canons now had to be written down and authoritatively
promulgated apparently because, as Alexander's 1905 paper
indicated, recent law school graduates had not had the experience and
knowledge of actual practice gained under the old apprenticeship
system or the one year clerkship Alexander had proposed. 119 Third,
the Canons would motivate practitioners of any experience level-by,
for example, its "high resolve,"'2" and "moral suasion,"2' -to aspire to
conduct themselves in accordance with their special obligations as
"officers of the court" and would support and strengthen the resolve
of those already so committed,'22 even though, as the Committee
acknowledged, peer pressure was less effective outside the smaller,
more homogeneous community of lawyers that formerly had
existed. 3 Fourth, because the Canons would apply nationwide, they
Seventeenth Annual Session of the Georgia Bar Ass'n 106 (1901); Proceedings of the
First Annual Meeting of the Kentucky Bar Ass'n 95 (1902); Report of the Comm. on
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth
Annual Meeting of the Missouri Bar Ass'n 29 (1907).
118. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 603. This educational goal was often
articulated by the state bar associations that adopted codes of legal ethics in the
twenty years before 1906. See, e.g., Ala. Tenth Meeting, supra note 112, at 14; Ky.
Second Meeting, supra note 72, at 33; Md. Sixth Meeting, supra note 112, at 47.
119. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as the case method
replaced recitations in law schools, it became common for law school professors to
teach full time without having had the experience of legal practice. See Stevens, supra
note 94, at 38. Thus, a law school graduate might have little, or even no, exposure to
teachers with any practical and moral experience to impart. The absence of
professors who were or had been practitioners meant that law students wholly lacked
socialization in the lawyer's role, including experience and training regarding the
ethical issues that arise in actual legal practice. See Report of the Comm. on Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar, 20 A.B.A. Rep. 378 (1897) (observing that law
students have a special need to be instructed "in the relations which exist between a
lawyer and his client, and their correlative rights and duties").
120. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 603.
121. Id. at 601.
122. Moral support was another reason state bar associations promulgated codes of
legal ethics. Thomas Goode Jones told the members of the Alabama State Bar
Association, for example, that "the Code [of Legal Ethics] would.., carry with it the
whole moral power of the profession." Ala. Third Meeting, supra note 117, at 235.
Similar statements were made to members of other state bar associations. See, e.g.,
Colo. First Meeting, supra note 113, at 108 ("The world is ruled by force of example,
and the standard of this association, vigorously defended, ought to bring every
member of the bar to a sense of the honor and responsibility of his calling."); Ky.
Second.Meeting, supra note 72, at 33-34 ("The printed code ... will undoubtedly tend
to keep all of us on our good behavior.").
123. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 601. ("Once possible ostracism by
professional brethren was sufficient to keep from serious error the practitioner with
no fixed ideals of ethical conduct"; but, "the good or bad esteem of their co-laborers"
is nothing to "this new type of lawyer."). Charles A. Boston, a New York City
attorney very active in ethics matters, and subsequently an A.B.A. President from
1930-1931, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 1340 (1983), observed that the need for a code of ethics
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would tend to create a uniform ethical standard among the states,
thereby offering even greater "moral support." 124
For these reasons, the Committee recommended that the A.B.A.
promulgate and popularize a written code that would "crystallize
abstract ethical principles into a series of canons applicable to the
usual concrete ethical problems which confront the lawyer in the
routine of practice. ' 125 The Committee's recommendation represents
both a continuation of, and a change from, the past. On the one hand,
the Committee's recommendation still implied the creation of an
ethos or moral code-what the Committee called "that indefinable
ethical something which is the soul and spirit of law and justice"' 126 -
that was a standard for judging lawyer conduct that aimed higher than
either the criminal law or the rules of the marketplace.'27 On the
other hand, that same recommendation was an acknowledgement of a
changed legal profession, a profession with far more lawyers, differing
in class and educational background, and trained in the law through
law school instead of apprenticeships. 128  Although formerly the
was greatest among lawyers in large cities, like New York, where "there is no
brotherhood; the Bar is too numerous and too heterogeneous for any central
influence." Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, 20 The Green Bag 224, 227
(1908). Boston's observation implies that there was a general need for the Canons
because the informal pressures of a close-knit legal community had dissipated; the
American legal profession, at least in metropolitan areas, was no longer cohesive
enough for such pressures to influence lawyer conduct and motives.
124. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 603.
125. Id. at 604.
126. Id. at 602. Many of the state bar associations also recognized the need for an
inspirational moral standard higher than positive law. See, e.g., Ga. Fifth Meeting,
supra note 112, at 144; Ky. Second Meeting, supra note 72, at 34.
127. The need for a set of ethical standards that were more stringent than the rules
of conduct embodied in the criminal law was well recognized by the state bar
associations in adopting their own ethics codes. See, e.g., Proceedings of the First
Annual Meeting of the Kentucky Bar Ass'n 96 (1902) ("The criminal code and the
criminal laws of the Commonwealth serve a good purpose for extreme cases, but
there are many matters resting largely in conscience and in good manners, which the
criminal statutes do not, and can not reach.").
Many years later, Justice Stone made a similar point: "It is needful that we
look beyond the club of the policeman as a civilizing agency to the sanctions of
professional standards which condemn the doing of what the law has not yet
forbidden." Stone, supra note 19, at 13. More recently, Justice O'Connor has pointed
out, in the context of attorney advertising, that enforcing high ethical standards for
lawyers lies beyond the realm of positive law. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Membership [in the legal profession]
entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by
adhering to standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or
through the discipline of the market.").
128. One contemporary commentator, George Costigan, Jr., Dean of the College
of Law at the University of Nebraska, wrote that "democratization has made it
inevitable that the unwritten common law of professional etiquette.., which
governed generations of lawyers in the past shall be replaced by written rules of
professional etiquette and a written ethical code." George P. Costigan, Jr., The
Proposed American Code of Legal Ethics, 20 The Green Bag 57, 57 (1908)
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informal understandings of appropriate lawyer conduct, coupled with
the peer pressure among lawyers in a smaller, more homogenous legal
community, 29 had seemed sufficient, except in the few instances of
actual fraud or criminal conduct, 3" the Committee's Report implied
that this was no longer the case and that something more, something
written and more formal, had become necessary. Thus, in addition to
a step backward to an idealized past, the Committee's
recommendation was simultaneously a step forward towards a more
positivistic regulation of lawyer conduct than previously had existed, a
step toward the sort of purely formal, de-moralized regulation to
which lawyers are subject today. 3'
II. CREATION OF THE TEXT
A. The Drafting Process
The process of drafting and adopting the Canons reflected the
Committee's view that the task to be accomplished was "so
momentous" that there should be extended discussion of the subject
matter not merely among the Committee or even the A.B.A.
delegates present at its annual meetings, but from all A.B.A. members
and from state and local bar associations as well.' Involving the
entire profession in the process of drafting the Canons began in
November 1907, when, in conformity with the recommendation
contained in the Committee's 1907 Report, the Committee mailed to
every A.B.A. member a copy of its 1907 Report and a reprint of
Sharswood's Ethics, requesting their suggestions and comments.'33
Three weeks later, the Committee sent the same package to every
state and local bar association in the United States, requesting their
comments as well.' Lucien Alexander, once again the Committee's
[hereinafter Costigan, American Code]. Professor Wolfram has acknowledged that
the rapid growth of the number of lawyers in the first half of the nineteenth century
"substantially weakened" the "informal controls lawyers formerly exerted over their
colleagues." Wolfram, Legal Ethics I, supra note 15, at 477; see also supra note 123
and accompanying text.
129. For example, George Sharswood emphasizes the importance to a lawyer of his
reputation among "his professional brethren." Sharswood's Ethics, 32 A.B.A. Rep.
75-76 (1907) [hereinafter Sharswood]. In Sharswood's view, "[s]ooner or later, the
real public-the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits, and
are valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of
the Bar." Id.
130. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 601.
131. See supra note 4.
132. Report of the Comm. on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 A.B.A. Rep. 61, 62
(1907) [hereinafter 1907 Comm. Rep. I].
133. Final Report of the Comm. on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 A.B.A. Rep.
567, 568 (1908) [hereinafter Final Report]. The date of the transmittal letter was Nov.
29, 1907. Id.
134. Id. The date of the transmittal letter was December 19, 1907.
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secretary,135 reviewed the replies received from the bar associations
and the A.B.A. members and selected "the more important and
complete replies." '36 He compiled them, along with selections from a
number of articles previously published in professional journals on
topics in legal ethics, into a 131-page memorandum, dated March 23,
1908, and entitled Memorandum for Use of American Bar
Association's Committee To Draft Canons of Professional Ethics.137
One hundred copies of that memorandum-the so-called "Red
Book"131-were printed, and a copy was provided to each of the
Committee's fourteen members.
139
The Red Book contains the comments of twenty-six identified
lawyers or judges, three persons who made comments anonymously,
and the Bar Association of the City of Boston. Of the identified
commentators, three were members of the Committee-Dickinson,
Hubbard, and Howe. 4 " A fourth member, Thayer, was a member of
the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association of the City of
Boston, which prepared an extensive letter of comments that was
reviewed and revised by that Association's Executive Council.
141
Other notable commentators were Simeon E. Baldwin, then Chief
Justice of Connecticut and the founder and a former President of the
A.B.A.;4 1 Charles A. Boston, a New York lawyer prominent in the
135. Letter from Thayer to Stetson (Nov. 9, 1907), in the Thayer Archives at
Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at 200 (regarding the appointment of
Alexander as secretary of the Committee). Alexander was similarly endorsed as
secretary of the Committee in 1906. See Letter from Thayer to Tucker (Dec. 29,
1906), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 4, at 463.
136. Lucien Alexander, Memorandum for Use of American Bar Association's
Committee to Draft Canons of Professional Ethics 3 (1908) [hereinafter, Red Book].
137. See id.
138. Final Report, supra note 133, at 568-69.
139. Red Book, supra note 136, at 2.
140. Id. at 3-4.
141. Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 28-29.
142. Id. at 3. Baldwin was one of "the best men" who founded the A.B.A. Simeon
Eben Baldwin, in Rogers, supra note 77, at 61, 64-65. He was the A.B.A. President in
1890-1891. Id. at 61. In addition to being the "founder and original guiding spirit" of
the A.B.A., Charles E. Clark, Foreward, in Frederick H. Jackson, Simeon Eben
Baldwin, at x (1955), he was for 50 years a professor and a financial mainstay of the
Yale Law School, see Frederick H. Jackson, Simeon Eben Baldwin 92-94, 130, 211
(1955). A leader of the Mugwumps in Connecticut, id. at 84, he thereafter switched
his allegiance to the Democratic Party and was elected Governor of Connecticut in
1910 as a Democrat. Id. at 86, 165.
In 1840, Baldwin was born into a family that had everything- "distinguished
ancestry, a well-established and esteemed position in the community, culture and
intelligence, and an ample income though not great wealth." Id. at 5.
From 1871 through 1893, Baldwin practiced primarily as a corporation lawyer,
representing, among others, the New York and New England Railroad. Id. at 58, 75.
During those years, "he attained an eminence at the Connecticut bar equaled by few
and surpassed by none." Id. at 75. In 1893, he became Associate Justice of
Connecticut's Supreme Court, a position he held until 1907, when he became Chief
Justice of that court. Simeon Eben Baldwin, in Rogers, supra note 77, at 61.
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field of legal ethics who served as the A.B.A. President in 1931-
1932;14 George P. Costigan, Jr., Dean of the College of Law,
University of Nebraska;'" William Draper Lewis, Dean of the
Department of Law at the University of Pennsylvania;' 45 Roscoe
Pound, then editor of the Illinois Law Review; 46 and Edward S. Cox-
Sinclair, an English barrister practicing in London.'47
Armed with the Red Book, the Committee met in Washington,
D.C., on March 30 through April 1, 1908, to draft the Canons and a
form of lawyer's oath.4 ' With the exception only of Howe and two
other members, Franklin Ferriss and James G. Jenkins, the entire
committee was present for at least one day.'49 At the end of that
meeting, the Committee delegated to Lucien Hugh Alexander,
Thomas Hamlin Hubbard, and Francis Lynde Stetson the task of
resolving "various questions of form and style.., that the nature and
value of the Code ... ma[de] ... peculiarly important."''
Once the Canons were adopted, Baldwin recommended adoption of the
Canons by state and local bar associations in his article, The New American Code of
Legal Ethics, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 541 (1908) [hereinafter Baldwin, New American
Code].
143. Red Book, supra note 136, at 3; Yearbook of the New York County Lawyer
Ass'n 394-98 (1935).
144. Red Book, supra note 136, at 3. Costigan wrote one article about the A.B.A.'s
proposed Code, Costigan, American Code, supra note 128, at 57, parts of which were
excerpted in the Red Book, supra note 136, at 20, 24-25, 26, 32, 49, 99, 126, and he
wrote another recommending that the Nebraska State Bar Association adopt the
Canons, George P. Costigan, The Canons of Legal Ethics, 21 The Green Bag 271, 277
(1909) [hereinafter Costigan, The Canons].
145. Red Book, supra note 136, at 4. Lewis "was active in the movement to tighten
admission standards for law schools and the bar," arguing in 1900 that "the proper
preparatory study for law students required ... a college degree." Carle, supra note
13, at 21,28 n.53.
146. Red Book, supra note 136, at 4. Pound succeeded Thayer as Dean of the
Harvard Law School in 1915. Joel Seligman, The High Citadel 57 (1978).
147. Red Book, supra note 136, at 3. During the years 1904 through 1908, Cox-
Sinclair carried on a correspondence with Committee member Hubbard about issues
regarding legal ethics. Id. at 103.
148. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 56.
149. Id. In describing the participants at the Washington meeting, Dickinson did
not state that Judge Jones was present. However, a letter suggests that Jones did
attend. Letter from Thayer to Jones (July 2, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at
Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at 452. And, a May 1908 letter from Lucien
Alexander cited in the Committee's 1908 Report states that Judge Jones "attended
the three days' session ... in Washington, March 30 to April 1, 1908, and moved the
adoption of a number of your committee's modifications of the Alabama code drafted
by him more than a score of years ago." Final Report, supra note 133, at 569-70. But
not all attending Committee members attended for the full three days. For example,
Stetson was not present for the sessions on all three days. See Letter from Thayer to
Stetson (Apr. 8, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School,
Vol. 5, at 322.
150. Letter from Thayer to Stetson (Apr. 8, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at
Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at 322.
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Following the Washington meeting, this smaller subcommittee met
at Stetson's office on April 24, 1908, to resolve those issues, and a
number of changes were made "in the way of simplification and
reduction."'' In May 1908, the Committee sent a draft of the
proposed Canons and of the proposed form of oath to every A.B.A.
member'12 and to the secretaries of all state bar associations and their
ethics committees, requesting suggestions and comments.153 That
letter stated about the enclosed draft:
The annexed draft for the canons represents our best present
judgment after a most careful consideration of the subject; but we
hope that the committees of the respective State Bar Associations
will aid us with their advice, and that every member of the American
Bar, whether a member of the American Bar Association or not,
will freely and frankly criticise the canons and before June 15 next
advise the committee of any points, whether of substance or
phraseology, with which he is not in accord, and will also submit
draft for any additional canons which he believes should be inserted.
All such criticisms and suggestions will receive your committee's
careful consideration. Only in this way can our final report be
presented tp the Association in the best possible form and in
harmony with the consensus of opinion in the profession. 54
The preliminary draft contained a notation that "Hon. James G.
Jenkins of the committee, dissents from Canon 13, as he is opposed to
contingent fees under any circumstances.' 1 55
151. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 56-57; Letter from Thayer to
Stetson (Apr. 23, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School,
Vol. 5, at 347.
152. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 56. (Dickinson's 1908 oral Report of
the Committee); Final Report, supra note 133, at 567 (Committee's 1908 written
report).
153. Final Report, supra note 133, at 570 (Committee's 1908 written report). The
text of that May 1908 first draft was presented to and in some instances actually
adopted by state bar associations between May 1908 and the A.B.A.'s annual meeting
in August 1908. See, e.g., Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the State Bar
Association of Indiana 164-85 (1908) (adopting, on July 21, 1908, the Canons of
Ethics "which will be reported to the 1908 meeting of that association, soon to
convene at Seattle"); Report of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania
Bar Ass'n 257-70 (1908) [hereinafter Penn. Fourteenth Meeting] (copy of the May
1908 Preliminary Report of the Canons Committee, with a copy of the May 1908
Draft); Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Bar Ass'n of
Tennessee 38-46 (1908) [hereinafter Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting] (copy of the
"canon of professional ethics recommended by a committee of the American Bar
Association" before May 21,1908).
154. Final Report, supra note 133, at 570. The Committee's entire preliminary
report is quoted at id. at 567-70. The requested "suggestions and criticisms," id. at
567, were to be sent to Alexander no later than June 15, 1908. Id. at 570.
155. Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the State Bar Ass'n of Indiana 169
(1908); Penn. Fourteenth Meeting, supra note 153, at 266; Tenn. Twenty-Seventh
Meeting, supra note 153, at 41; see also Costigan, The Canons, supra note 144, at 277.
When that distinguished Committee of fourteen members sent out its
preliminary report with the original clause about contingent fees bearing the
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The Committee received more than 1,000 replies,156 more than 200
of which specifically concerned the draft provision on contingency
fees.'57 The Committee reported that "with the exception of the
canon on contingent fees, the preliminary draft has been
overwhelmingly approved by those communicating with us, adverse
criticisms of the other canons and of the oath being few in number and
relating mainly to matters of phraseology.""15
In response, there was another meeting in New York on July 15,
1908, among Alexander, Stetson, Hubbard, Thayer, and Dickinson,
"to make the canons more precise by slight changes in phraseology,
and in a few instances [to] redraft[ ] particular canons.' ' 59  What
resulted from that meeting and some subsequent correspondence
among Committee members was a set of Canons "unanimously
recommended by all the members of the committee."''"
The Canons were formally presented at the A.B.A.'s Annual
Meeting in Seattle on August 27, 1908.16 After Dickinson presented
unlucky number 13, it contained this notation: "Hon. James G. Jenkins [the
Wisconsin member] of the Committee dissents from Canon 13, as he is
opposed to contingent fees under any circumstances."
Id.
156. Final Report, supra note 133, at 570.
157. Id. at 571.
158. Id. The Committee made minor language changes to the preliminary draft of
Canons 13, 21, 22, 28, and 31 before proposing the final version of the Canons at the
A.B.A.'s annual meeting in August 1908. Compare Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting,
supra note 153, at 38-46 (May 1908 first draft), with infra App. (August 1908 final
version).
159. Final Report, supra note 133, at 571. The date of that meeting is implied in
the Letter from Thayer to Stetson (July 16, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard
University Law School, Vol. 5, at 488. The participants at the meeting are stated or
implied in the Letter of Thayer to Alexander (Aug. 3, 1908), in the Thayer Archives
at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 6, at 30. Thayer's correspondence suggests
that the content of the oath and Canon 30, at least, were among the texts subject to
further redrafting. See infra notes 336-43 and accompanying text. In addition, the
final version of the Canons the Committee proposed in August 1908 contained
substantive changes to Canons 1,5, 7, 10, 15, 21,22, 28, 30, and 31 from the May 1908
first draft. See Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Bar Ass'n of
Tennessee 163 (1909); compare Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 38-
46 (May 1.908 preliminary draft), with infra App. (August 1908 final version). Only
the changes to Canons 1, 5, 7, 10, 15, and 30 were substantive. They are discussed
below. See infra notes 320-28, 334-41, 384, 450-54, 493-95, 545-47 and accompanying
text.
The change to Canon 1.3 noted above in the Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth
Meeting of the Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, was a change between the May 1908 draft and
what the A.B.A. adopted in August 1908 that was based upon a change proposed
during the debate on the proposed Canons. See infra notes 465-72 and accompanying
text. Canon 13 was presented to the A.B.A. delegates in August 1908 in precisely the
same form as it was presented in the May 1.908 preliminary draft. Compare Tenn.
Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 41 (1908), with Canon 13 as presented
infra App.
160. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 57.
161. See id. at 55.
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the oral report, the delegates debated and voted on the Canons, one-
by-one. 62 With the exception of Canon 13 regarding contingent fees,
they were adopted that day as proposed.'63
In its report, the Committee recommended that the Canons be
adopted and printed annually in the Association's reports, that they
be reprinted in pamphlet form, and that two copies be forwarded to
each A.B.A. member and ten copies to the Secretary of each state bar
association. The Committee further recommended that the A.B.A.
"advise that the subject of professional ethics be taught in all law
schools, and that all candidates for admission to the Bar be examined
thereon. ""6
In his presidential address, Dickinson, the outgoing A.B.A.
President, stated that the Canons had been framed with the
expectation that they would appeal to and serve as guidance for the
majority of the profession, not just A.B.A. members.'65 He expressed
his further "expectation that it will be accepted not only by the Bar
Associations of the several states, but will, at least in substance, be
enacted into law by many of the states."'' 66
B. The Materials at Hand
The Canons Committee's report at the A.B.A.'s Annual Meeting in
1907 identified the three principal sources for creating the text of a
national code of legal ethics: (1) Hoffman's Resolutions, a "code of
professional ethics... framed early in the XIXth century by David
Hoffman... of the Baltimore Bar, for adoption by his students on
admission to the Bar.' 1 67 (2) Sharswood's Ethics, 6 "doubtless the
inspiration for the Alabama code"; 16 9 and (3) a section-by-section
compilation of the codes of ethics adopted by eleven state bar
associations during the score of years from 1887, when the Alabama
162. Id. at 61-85.
163. Id.; see also supra notes 465-72 and accompanying text.
164. Final Report, supra note 133, at 573.
165. Jacob M. Dickinson, Address of the President, 33 A.B.A. Rep. 341, 356.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 717-35. Because Appendix H to the Committee's 1907 Report contains
the text of Hoffman's Resolutions that the Committee used, that is the text of
Hoffman's Resolutions that is referenced throughout this article.
168. The first edition of that work was published under the title "A Compend of
Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profession of Law, delivered before the Law
Class of the University of Pennsylvania." Sharswood, supra note 129, at 7. The
Committee recommended that a reprint of Sharwood's Ethics be sent to each A.B.A.
member by December 1, 1907. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 680. That
reprint, 32 A.B.A. Rep. (1907), was mailed to A.B.A. members on November 29,
1907. See supra note 133, infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. Because that is
the version of Sharswood's Ethics that was prepared for the Committee's use, that is
the text of Sharswood's Ethics that is referenced throughout this article.
169. Report of the Comm. on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 A.B.A. Rep. 676, , at
678 (1907) [herinafter 1907 Comm. Rep. II].
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State Bar Association adopted the first such code. 7  Each of those
principal sources and its influence on the Canons is described below. 171
1. Hoffman's Resolutions
David Hoffman (1784-1854), a very successful Baltimore lawyer, 172
also was one of the foremost legal educators of the early American
Bar. 173 In 1817, he published A Course of Legal Study, a curriculum
for his planned law school at the University of Maryland, which was a
standard manual for prospective lawyers until well after its second
printing in 1836.1 4  The second edition contained Hoffman's
Resolutions, considered by some commentators as "the first American
code of legal ethics."'175 Intended to instruct law students and aspiring
170. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 685-713. Because that compilation
includes the provisions of the Alabama Code that the Committee used in drafting the
Canons, that is the text of the Alabama Code that is referenced throughout this
article.
171. The Report also included, as Appendix C, the Louisiana Bar Association's
Code of Ethics. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 714. Stated in Article II of
the 1899 charter of that Association, that code of ethics-just an enumeration of eight
duties-more closely resembled a lawyer's oath than a code of ethics. See Drinker,
supra note 3, at 23. The Louisiana Code was substantially similar in form and content
to the attorneys' oaths in Washington, Oregon and California, which derived from the
oath proposed in the so-called Field Code of Procedure recommended in New York
in 1850, which was translated from the advocate's oath prescribed by the Swiss
Canton of Geneva. See id. at 23; Wolfram, Legal Ethics I, supra note 15, at 485.
Unlike the codes of ethics adopted by the other state bar associations, the Louisiana
Code was not based upon and did not share a family resemblance in either form or
content with the Alabama Code. 1907 Comm. Rep. 1I, supra note 169, at 678.
Drinker observed that in addition to the state ethics codes in the states listed
in the 1907 report, "there were also, by 1908, Codes of Ethics more or less complete,
as the result of codifications of statutory enactments or of the action of bar
associations" in "Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Utah." Drinker, supra note 3, at 23. Those codes also derived
from the so-called Field Code of Procedure recommended in New York in 1850, and
they also did not bear a family resemblance to the ethics codes based upon the
Alabama Code. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics 1, supra note 15, at 484-85. In any event,
those codes were outside the chain of influence upon the Canons Committee.
172. See Bloomfield, supra note 14, at 678 n.21.
173. Perry Miller, The Legal Mind in America 83 (1962) ("In the history of legal
education ... Hoffman is a central figure."). Writing in 1817, Supreme Court Justice
Story called Hoffman's Course of Legal Study "by far the most perfect system for the
study of the law that has ever been offered to the public." Joseph Story, Book Review,
The North American Review 76 (Nov. 1817).
174. James M. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 Yale L.J.
1052 (1994) (citing Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 540 (William S.
Hein & Co. 1990)).
175. Kalish, supra note 14, at 58; accord Armstrong, supra note 14, at 1064; see also
George Akers, Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions, 14 Ala. Law. 171, 171 (1953)
("Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions may be regarded as the first outline of a code of
ethics."). Hoffman himself believed that the subject of the proper conduct of the
lawyer was "almost wholly new," David Hoffman, 2 A Course of Legal Study 723 (2d
ed. 1836), and that "on the peculiar duties and conduct of the lawyer, little that is very
valuable, has been written." Id. at 724.
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lawyers, the Resolutions are written primarily in the active voice of an
experienced practitioner making promises about his future intentions
and most of them take the form "I will do ... "; "I will never ... 176
Based upon what Susan Carle has called a "religious
jurisprudence," 77 Hoffman's Resolutions recognize as important the
distinction between moral law and positive law, consistently requiring
the lawyer to give priority to the moral law, natural justice, and the
purity and quality of his character.' Above all, Hoffman stresses the
importance of the lawyer's own conscience. In Hoffman's view,
"neither loyalty to client nor compliance with the technicalities of the
legal process could absolve an attorney from obeying the dictates of
conscience and striving to do substantial justice to all parties."'7 9
Resolution XXXIII summarized Hoffman's view that personal
176. In a few instances, they are written in the first person passive voice, see 1907
Comm. Rep. 1I, supra note 170, at 719 (Resolutions IX, X, XXII), and in a few
instances they are general statements written in the third person, see, e.g., 1907
Comm. Rep. 1I, supra note 170, at 723, 727, 732-33 (Resolutions XXI, XXXI, XLV,
XLVI, and XLVII).
177. Carle, supra note 13, at 10-11, 10 n.19. Like many of his contemporaries,
Hoffman made use of the religious metaphor in talking about lawyers, regarding them
as "ministers at a holy altar." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 720-
21(Resolution XV); accord 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 718 (Resolution
V); see supra note 72.
178. A number of the Resolutions distinguish justice or moral law or God's law
from positive or man-made law. See, e.g., 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 719
(Resolution XI) (referring to a result denied "both by law and justice"); id. at 720
(Resolution XIII) (referring to "legal or moral defense"); id. at 720-21 (Resolution
XV) (referring to evidence, "whether legal or moral," against someone accused of a
serious crime); id. (Resolution XV) (referring to violations of "the laws of God and
man"); id. at 724-25 (Resolution XXIV) ("A claim or defense may be perfectly good
in law, and in justice"); id. at 726 (Resolution XXIX) (refunding the unused portion
of a retainer required "on every principle of law, and of good morals"); id. at 727
(Resolution XXXI) (expressing his belief that counsel should be responsible "to God
and man").
Other Resolutions concern the preservation of the purity and quality of the
lawyer's character. Id. at 717 (Resolution I) ("I will never permit professional zeal to
carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum."); id. at 721-22 (Resolution XVI)
("Whatever personal influence I may be so fortunate as to possess shall be used by me
only as the most valuable of my possessions, and not be cheapened or rendered
questionable by a too frequent appeal to its influence. There is nothing more fatal to
weight of character than its common use."); id. at 727 (Resolution XXXII) (rejecting
tactical negotiations, even though they "might finally extract something more than my
own or even my client's hopes," because "[r]eputation gained for this species of skill is
sure to be followed by more than an equivalent loss of character.").
Hoffman accorded greater priority to the lawyer's own personal views about
morality and justice than to his client's interests. Id. at 719-20 (Resolution XI, XIV).
In order to preserve the purity of the lawyer's views and character, Hoffman required
that lawyers control the representation of a client, making the lawyer the sole judge
whether the circumstances were appropriate to assert defenses, such as the statute of
limitations or infancy, which might in the circumstances lead to an unjust result. See
id. (Resolutions XII & XIII). Similarly, Resolution XIV made the lawyer the sole
judge of whether the facts and the law warrant the assertion on behalf of the client of
certain factual or legal propositions. Id. at 720.
179. Bloomfield, supra note 14, at 684.
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conscience is the cornerstone of professional ethics: "I am resolved to
make my own, and not the conscience of others, my sole guide. What
is morally wrong cannot be professionally right."'' "
Because they were written in a different form and for a different
purpose than the Canons, and because their style is pretentious and
frequently verbose, Hoffman's Resolutions generally were not used as
the immediate source from which individual Canons were drafted.'
With only one possible exception, the language of the Resolutions was
not directly incorporated in the Canons. That possible exception is
Resolution XIV, which begins, "My client's conscience and my own
are distinct entities." That first sentence of Resolution XIV may be
the basis for the last sentence in Canon 15, which states that the
lawyer "must obey his own conscience and not that of his client."'8 2
180. 1907 Comm. Rep. I1, supra note 170, at 728. Maxwell Bloomfield has stated
that Hoffman "referred all problems to the practitioner's conscience." Bloomfield,
supra note 14, at 687; see also Michael 1. Krauss, The Lawyer as Limo: A Brief History
of the Hired Gun, 8 U. Ch. L. Sch. Roundtable 325, 332 (2001) ("Fifty Resolutions is
remarkable for its unrelenting contention that representation of clients in no way
absolves lawyers from the dictates of conscience."). Allison Marston agrees that the
role of conscience is prominent in Hoffman's thought: "Hoffman's moral system,
then, is explicitly premised on the assumption that men's consciences will accurately
reflect shared community norms." Marston, supra note 14, at 494. Although she cites
Bloomfield in support of that statement, neither Marston nor Bloomfield gives any
textual support, in Hoffman's Resolutions or elsewhere, for the view that Hoffman
"assum[ed] that men's consciences will accurately reflect shared community norms."
181. In a circular dated November 28, 1907, the Committee asked for comments
upon Hoffman's Resolutions and some of those responses were collected in the Red
Book at pages 91-94. Herbert Fordham, a lawyer in New York City, considered
Hoffman's Resolutions "too verbose and cumbersome." Id. at 4, 92. Another lawyer
agreed they were "too longwinded." Id. at 92. Mark Norris, a Michigan lawyer who
chaired the Michigan Bar Association committee presenting that association's code of
ethics, opined that "Hoffman's Resolutions are all good, but I do not think there is
anything in them which states the ethics of the profession any better than the several
state codes." Id. at 4, 93. William Draper Lewis, Dean of the Department of Law at
the University of Pennsylvania, agreed and suggested that the compilation of the
ethics codes of the state bar associations "is on the whole a better code to work with
as a basis for final action." Id. at 4, 92. The Boston Bar Association rejected
Hoffman's Resolutions for:
our present purpose, which is to form a Code of Professional Ethics...
[because] many of his resolutions are in the nature of counsels of perfection
... land] the code ... should contain only such Canons as the ordinarily
honest man would cheerfully subscribe [to] or would at least concur in after
he had given the matter some small measure of reflection.
Id. at 93.
182. See infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text. Although the language of
Canon 18 also appears to support an argument that it was drawn directly from
Hoffman Resolution XIV, the drafting process makes that questionable. The Canons
Committee considered both Resolution XIV and Section 27 of the Alabama Code in
drafting Canon 18. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; Red Book, supra note
136, at 40-50. The part of Canon 18 resembling Hoffman Resolution XIV-the
second sentence of Canon 18, which states that "[t]he client cannot be made the
keeper of the lawyer's conscience in professional matters," infra App. (Canon 18), is
identical to Section 27. There is no available textual evidence that Jones, the
draftsman of the Alabama Code, drew upon Hoffman Resolution XIV in drafting
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It is undisputable, however, that the Committee consulted more
than 40 of the Resolutions in drafting the Canons.1 3 Although many
of those Resolutions were relevant to the Canons' subject matter, in
only one or two instances do the Resolutions offer an idea taken up in
the Canons that is not also contained in more suitable language in the
ethics code of a state bar association.
8 4
Although Hoffman's Resolutions had only limited direct influence
on the Canons' text, they were known to George Sharswood8 5 and
apparently also to Thomas Goode Jones,'86 and their influence on the
Section 27. Moreover, that Code section bears an even greater resemblance to Chief
Justice Gibson's opinion in Rush v. Cavanaugh, see infra note 275 and accompanying
text, with which Jones would have been familiar as the result of his study of
Sharswood's Ethics. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
183. See Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; Red Book, supra note 136, at
11-90.
184. One of those exceptions is Hoffman Resolution XLIV, which concerns the
subject of lawyers dealing with unrepresented parties. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra
note 170, at 732. That subject is dealt with in Canon 9, which states:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
Infra App. (Canon 9). Although the Committee indicated that Canon 9 was based on
Sections 46 and 47 of the Alabama Code, among other sources, infra App., both of
those sections concern only a lawyer's contact with a represented party, 1907 Comm.
Rep. II, supra note 170, at 706. The Committee also indicated that Canon 9 was
based upon Hoffman Resolutions XLIII and XLIV, Index and Synopsis of Canons,
infra App., but only Resolution XLIV deals with a lawyer's contact with an
unrepresented party:
Should the party just mentioned have no counsel, and my client's interest
demand that I should still commune with him, it shall be done in writing
only, and no verbal response will be received. And if such person be unable
to commune in writing, I will either delay the matter until he employs
counsel, or take down in writing his reply in the presence of others; so that if
occasion should make it essential to avail myself of his answer, it may be
done through the testimony of others, and not by mine. Even such cases
should be regarded as the result of unavoidable necessity, and are to be
resorted to only to guard against great risk, the artifices of fraud, or with the
hope of obviating litigation.
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 732. Presumably, then, Hoffman Resolution
XLIV is the basis for the second sentence of Canon 9.
Another likely exception is Canon 10, which appears to be derived from
Resolution XXIV, rather than Section 38 of the Alabama Code. See infra notes 451-
54 and accompanying text.
185. According to the legal historian Maxwell Bloomfield, "Sharswood was
familiar with Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions and agreed with many of their specific
recommendations." Bloomfield, supra note 14, at 687. It is likely that Sharswood
knew of Hoffman and his work, because Hoffman conducted a private law school in
Philadelphia from 1844 to 1847, Maxwell Bloomfield, supra note 14, at 685 n.47, when
Sharswood was in private practice and then a judge in Philadelphia. Sharswood,
supra note 129, at 5-6.
186. See Thomas L. Shaffer, David Hoffman's Law School Lectures, 1822-1833, 32
J. Legal Educ. 127, 128 (1982). Allison Marston also concludes that Jones
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Canons primarily passed indirectly through Sharswood's Ethics and
the Alabama Code.8
7
2. Sharswood's Ethics
As recommended in the Canons Committee's 1907 Report,
Sharswood's Ethics was reprinted in November 1907 and sent to every
A.B.A. member.' The costs were paid by Hubbard, a Committee
member, who, out of gentlemanly modesty, requested that his
generosity not be publicly mentioned.'
In his Ethics, Sharswood combines Hoffman's religious and
moralistic orientation with a solid commitment to republican political
ideas." On the one hand, Sharswood views lawyers as engaged in
"the ministry of the Temple of Justice,"' 9' believes that "no man can
ever be a truly great lawyer, who is not also in every sense of the
word, a good man,"192 and emphasizes the importance of a lawyer's
conscience in carrying out his professional duties. 93 On the other
hand, he is at least more explicit than Hoffman in viewing lawyers as
the governing political class, not only because they held so many high
public offices 4 and "the actual administration of law is entirely in
"laipparently... consulted" Hoffman's writings, Marston, supra note 14, at 493 &
n.124, but she cites in support only a law review article, N. Lee Cooper & Stephen F.
Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image and the Scope of Professionalism, 26
Cumb. L. Rev. 923, 927 (1995), which itself offers no support for its statement that
"Hoffman's [Riesolutions... influenced the first official ethics code adopted by
Alabama in 1887."
187. See Shaffer, supra note 186, at 128 (noting Hoffman's influence on the
Canons' two precursors, Sharswood's Ethics and the Alabama Code). It is
noteworthy that Hoffman's Resolutions "failed to attract a substantial readership,"
Bloomfield, supra note 14, at 688, and that Hoffman was criticized for "impracticality
and neglect of his clients' interests" on at least one occasion when he carried out his
Resolutions in his own practice. Id. at 685.
188. See supra text accompanying note 133.
189. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 5.
190. Sharswood's republicanism and its influence on both the Alabama Code and
the 1908 Canons are a major focus of Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3. The
religious dimension in Sharswood's Ethics is discussed briefly in Carle, supra note 13,
at 12-13. These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing in Sharswood's Ethics. For
example, according to Sharswood, the lawyer's oath reflects his status as "the
incumbent of an office ... in the administration of justice," Sharswood, supra note
129, at 58, and "the higher and more impressive sanction of an appeal to the Searcher
of all Hearts," id. at 61. As that statement about the lawyer's oath suggests,
Sharswood views the religious dimension as more fundamental and important than
the political dimension. See also id. at 10 (noting that legislation is "nobler" than
adjudication because "it resembles most nearly the work of the Deity").
191. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 163.
192. Id. at 168.
193. See, e.g., id. at 90, 96, 99, 145 n.1; see also id. at 55 ("There is, perhaps, no
profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more
imperatively necessary that that of the law ... High moral principle is [the lawyer's]
only safe guide.").
194. Id. at 26, 54, 171-72.
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their hands," '95 but also because they are a potent force in shaping
public opinion about political matters. 9 ' In Sharswood's view, the
dignity and honor of the legal profession is based upon the lawyers'
role in the administration of justice. 19 7
Because Sharswood emphasizes, much more than Hoffman, the
importance of the adversary process to the administration of justice
and acknowledges, to a much greater extent, that the lawyer's
professional role is shaped by that process, Sharswood's view of the
lawyer's duty "when the legal demands or interests of his client
conflict with his own sense of what is just and right" 1918 is much more
nuanced than Hoffman's. Indeed, the complexity of Sharswood's
explication of that conflict has sometimes led to a misunderstanding
among commentators. It is helpful, therefore, to observe that
Sharswood's explication proceeds in two stages: the first, a response to
the "common accusation" that "lawyers are as often the ministers of
injustice as of justice;"'99 the second, a few "principle[s] of private
action for the advocate"2"" for "solving this [conflict] practically in the
majority of cases. '2..
Initially, in defending lawyers against that common accusation,
Sharswood seems to exonerate them for their actions as advocates in
the adversary system:
Now the lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an
officer of the court. The party has the right to have his case decided
upon the law and the evidence, and to have every view presented to
the minds of the judges, which can legitimately bear upon the
question. This is the office which the advocate performs. He is not
morally responsible for the act of the party in maintaining an unjust
cause, nor for the error of the court, if they fall into error, in
deciding it in his favor. The court or jury ought to hear and weigh
both sides; and the office of the counsel is to assist them doing that,
which the client in person, from wanting of learning, experience, and
address, is unable to do in a proper manner. The lawyer, who
refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the case
is unjust and indefensible, usurps the function of both judge and
jury.212
But Sharswood is very clear that this defense to a general accusation
against lawyers as a class, which he considers "quite satisfactory," is
no basis for an individual lawyer to claim a lack of moral
195. Id. at 30.
196. Id. at 30-31,54, 172.
197. Id. at 62.
198. Id. at 81.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 84.
201. Id. at 90.
202. Id. at 83-84.
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accountability in determining how to conduct himself personally.2 3
Indeed, it is precisely at this point in the Ethics, when he turns to the
question of how an individual lawyer should resolve the conflict
between his duty to his client and his personal moral views of what is
just, that he rejects unfettered zeal on behalf of the client as a
principle for individual action.20 4
Sharswood proposes a general solution to that conflict in four
different situations. Before doing so, however, he emphasizes the
vagaries of any general propositions, because the resolution of that
conflict in any situation heavily depends upon the particular
circumstances of the case, the parties, and the information available to
the lawyer.
First, as counsel appointed to represent a criminal defendant,
Sharswood maintains that "the advocate [should] exert all of his
ability, learning, and ingenuity,... even if he should be perfectly
assured in his own mind of the actual guilt of the prisoner. "216 In
Sharswood's view, in that situation, the accused's right to trial and
counsel trumps the lawyer's right to preserve his moral purity, even if
the accused is guilty.2111 Of course, the defense attorney in that
situation is limited in the means he may employ in conducting the
defense: he should present only fair arguments based upon the
evidence and he should not engage in sharp practices, exploit the
prosecutor's mistakes, or place his reputation in the service of the
defendant.2111 In stating that the court-appointed lawyer's defense of a
criminal defendant, even one the lawyer believes is guilty, "is not to
be termed screening the guilty from punishment, 2119 Sharswood may
be deliberately distancing himself from Hoffman, who used a similar
phrase to express his disdain for lawyers who defend those guilty of
heinous crimes.2"1
Second, Sharswood maintains that a lawyer should never engage in
a private prosecution against a person whom he knows or believes is
innocent.21 l Because the government provides public prosecutors,
there is no justification, Sharswood concludes, for a lawyer to pursue a
203. Id. at 84.
204. Id. at 84-88.
205. Id. at 88-89.
206. Id. at 92.
207. Id. at 90.
208. Id. at 99-100, 103-07.
209. Id. at 92.
210. In Resolution XV, Hoffman describes as "inwardly base [and] unworthy"
those lawyers who defend murderers and "other perpetrator[s] of like revolting
crimes" they know are guilty and, thereby, "pollute the streams of justice and ...
screen such foul offenders from merited penalties." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note
170, at 721.
211. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 93.
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private prosecution that he does not believe is warranted on the
merits.212
Third, in representing a defendant in a civil case, Sharswood again
considers the dependency of defendants upon lawyers in the adversary
system sufficient justification for a lawyer to represent a civil
defendant whom he believes committed a wrong.2 3 In other contexts,
Sharswood makes it clear, however, that in his view there are limits to
the zeal with which a lawyer should undertake such a defense.21 4
Fourth, in representing a plaintiff in a civil case, a lawyer has "an
undoubted right, and [is] in duty bound, to refuse to be concerned for
a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand, which offends his sense of
what is just and right. ' 215 In this situation, Sharswood remarks, there
is no need for counsel to assist a client, as there is with a criminal
defendant or even a defendant in a civil case. 2 6 Therefore, Sharswood
considers it "an immoral act to afford that assistance, when his
conscience t[ells] him that the client [is] aiming to perpetrate a wrong
through the means of some advantage the law may have afforded
him. '21 1 In giving priority to the lawyer's sense of justice over the
client's legal or moral interests, Sharswood's approach to this situation
approximates Hoffman's less discriminating moralism.
Sharswood's Ethics has had a significant impact on the legal
profession's thought and writing about legal ethics. But the view that
Sharswood's Ethics "became the standard work on the subject [of
professional ethics] for the next century, "218 is clearly exaggerated,
because that work was not institutionalized like the Alabama Code
and its progeny or the 1908 Canons. There is no doubt, however, that
Sharswood's Ethics had an important influence on the Alabama Code
212. id. at 93-94.
213. Id. at 95-96.
214. Sharswood rejects Lord Brougham's view at Sharswood, supra note 129, at 86-
88. Sharswood also speaks of specific limits on overly zealous representation. He
insists that a lawyer must "use no deceit, imposition, or evasion" in all his dealings
with the court. Id. at 72. Commenting on the Courvoisier case, he agrees that a
criminal defense lawyer who is satisfied in his own mind that his client is guilty should
not present the defense that an innocent third party committed the crime. Id. at 103-
07. With respect to drafting client affidavits, Sharswood cautions counsel against
proceeding in a manner that will tempt the client to, stretch the truth. Id. at 111-12.
He advises counsel to avoid strategies to mislead or surprise opposing counsel, id. at
73-74; to avoid abusing the opposing party and witnesses, id. at 118-19; to avoid undue
influence over the judge and jury, id. at 66-67; and to restrain his client from engaging
in these improprieties, id. He even defends a lawyer's right, based upon his own
"sense of honor and propriety," not to take advantage of opposing counsel's "slips
and oversights" despite the client's contrary instructions. Id. at 74-75.
215. Id. at 96.
216. Id.
217. Id. In support of his view, Sharswood quotes from Chief Justice Gibson in
Rush v. Cavanaugh, 2 Pa. 187 (1845), to the effect that the client is not the keeper of
the lawyer's conscience. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
218. Bloomfield, supra note 14, at 687 (citing Auerbach, supra note 12, at 40-52).
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and, through that Code, the ethics codes of other state bar
associations.2 Indeed, Thomas Goode Jones's son has written that
his father kept Sharswood's Ethics on his desk and consulted it for
ethical guidance. 221 The Chairman of the Kentucky Bar Association
committee that proposed its code of ethics in 1903 remarked upon the
extent of its substantive influence: "Anyone who is familiar with the
little book by Judge Sharswood on 'Legal Ethics' will readily see how
large a part of [the Alabama] code has been drawn from that
source." 22' The Canons Committee agreed, considering Sharswood's
Ethics "the inspiration for the Alabama Code. '222
Although Sharswood's Ethics had a significant indirect influence on
the Canons because of its role in the formulation of the Alabama
Code, the central text for the formulation of the Canons, 223 the direct
impact of Sharswood's Ethics on the Canons has been overstated.224
First, there is only one small portion of Sharswood's Ethics that is
quoted verbatim in the Canons: Sharswood's definition of the duty of
zealous representation a lawyer owes a client that is marked by
quotation marks in Canon 15.25
219. Armstrong, supra note 14, at 1063 (explaining that the Alabama Code "is
based largely on a series of lectures delivered by Judge George Sharswood ... and
published as Essay on Professional Ethics").
220. Jones, Canons, supra note 14, at 484. In an earlier article, Jones's son stated
that his father drafted the Alabama Code "without model or guide, though he had
read Judge Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics." Jones, First Legal Code, supra
note 14, at 113. Jones himself described a part of the process of drafting the Alabama
Code in 1884, three years before the draft code was proposed at the 1887 Annual
Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, but he made no mention of consulting
Sharswood's Ethics. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State
Bar Ass'n 21 (1884).
221. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 678 (quoting Ky. Second Meeting,
supra note 72, at 25).
222. Id. Relying on these sources and their own comparisons of the text of
Sharswood's Ethics and the Alabama Code, modern legal scholars have reached the
same conclusion with more specific support. See, e.g., Marston, supra note 14, at 498-
503; Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 243-44 (arguing that the Alabama
Code is "largely. .. a codification of the principles contained in Sharswood's essay.").
223. See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
224. Russell Pearce has stated that "Sharswood's work ... was the basis for the
Canons." Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 248; see also id. ("The 1908
Canons largely borrow text and standards from Sharswood."); id. at 259 ("The
drafters [of the Canons] liberally borrowed text and ideas from Sharswood's essay.");
id. at 267 ("The Canons drew on Sharswood's republican vision for both form and
content."). Other legal ethics commentators have reached the same conclusion based
upon a less detailed analysis. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 12, at 41 ("The new
canons drew heavily upon George Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics,
published in 1854."); Geoffrey C. Hazard & Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal
Profession: Responsibility and Regulation 108 (3d ed. 1994) (Sharswood's Ethics
"heavily influenced ... the [A.B.A.'s] Canons of Ethics"); L. Ray Patterson, Legal
Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 Emory L.J. 909, 929 (1980) (Sharswood's
"Essay was enormously influential in the drafting and adoption of the Canons").
225. See infra App. (referring to Canon 15's use of "zealous representation"). The
Canons Committee also chose to introduce the Canons with three famous quotations,
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Second, the main topics of eight out of the original thirty-two
Canons are not discussed at all in Sharswood's Ethics: Canon 2,
dealing with the merit selection of judges; Canon 7, dealing with
differences in opinions with professional colleagues and competition
with them; Canon 9, dealing with communications with an adverse
party; Canon 19, dealing with the advocate-witness rule; Canon 20,
dealing with the use of newspaper publicity; Canon 27, dealing with
newspaper and other advertising; Canon 28, dealing with runners and
paid third party recommendations; and, Canon 29, dealing with the
reporting of lawyer misconduct.226
Third, at least six other Canons diverge substantively from the
content of Sharswood's Ethics.227
one of which-the quotation about the moral temptations a lawyer faces-is from
Sharswood's Ethics. Id.
226. Compare infra App. (Canons 2, 7, 9, 19, 20, 27, 28 and 29), with Sharswood,
supra note 129, at 9-182 (Sharswood's Ethics). Professor Pearce acknowledges that
seven of the thirty-two Canons (all of those cited, except Canon 28) are not derived at
all from Sharswood. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 245-46, 268.
227. For example, Canon 4 discourages, but still allows, a lawyer to decline court-
assigned representation of an indigent prisoner for non-trivial reasons. Infra App.
(Canon 4). Sharswood's Ethics approvingly cites judicial decisions prohibiting a
lawyer from declining such court assignment. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 91-92.
Professor Pearce acknowledges that the Canons are "less rigorous" in this regard.
Pearce. Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 245.
Canon 13 requires judicial supervision of contingent fee arrangements. It is
"less restrictive" than Sharswood's Ethics because it "allow[s] contingent fee
agreements but urge[s] strict court scrutiny," Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note
3, at 270, while Sharswood's Ethics completely discountenances contingent fee
arrangements. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 153, 159-64; see also Pearce, Republican
Origins, supra note 3, at 245 n.24.
Canon 14 defines the circumstances when a lawyer can sue a client for a fee.
Infra App. (Canon 14). Canon 14 is less restrictive of such suits than Sharswood's
Ethics, which envisions such suits being warranted only in an extraordinary situation.
Compare id., with Sharswood's Ethics, Sharswood, supra note 129, at 151-52.
Professor Pearce acknowledges this. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 270
& n.244 (explaining that Canon 14 is "less restrictive" than Sharswood's Ethics in that
"[w]hile disfavoring suits against clients, the Canons permit such suits."); see also id.
at 245 n.24.
Canon 15 generally prohibits a lawyer from stating his personal belief in the
justice of his client's cause. Infra App. (Canon 15). This is contrary to Sharswood's
Ethics, which acknowledges that there are some "very rare" occasions when a lawyer
"ought to throw the weight of his private opinion [about the justice of his client's
cause] into the scales in favor of the side he has espoused." Sharswood, supra note
129, at 99.
Canon 23 is more absolute in its prohibition of trial counsel's communication
with jurors, proscribing communications "even as to matters foreign to the cause,"
infra App. (Canon 23), while Sharswood's Ethics requires the avoidance of only
"unnecessary communications with the jurors." Sharswood, supra note 129, at 67.
Canon 26 allows lawyers to lobby before legislatures and executive
departments of the government, reflecting the Committee's rejection of Sharswood's
unqualified condemnation of lawyers lobbying for legislative changes affecting
pending cases they are handling. Red Book, supra note 136, at 127-28 (quoting
Sharswood, supra note 129, at 24-25) see also Sharswood, supra note 129, at 24-25
(describing Sharswood's opposition to such lobbying).
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Fourth, in virtually every instance where the Alabama Code is the
basis for the Canons-which, in the Committee's view, is twenty-eight
of the thirty-two original Canons 22 -the available sources evidencing
the Committee's work strongly suggest that, except for Canon 15,
Sharswood's text played no role in the wording of the Canons.229 The
Red Book incorporates lawyers' comments and materials Alexander
considered relevant regarding each of the provisions of the codes of
ethics of the state bar associations. The Red Book shows that with
respect to the vast majority of the Canons, the Committee and other
commentators edited the sections of the Alabama Code or the ethics
code of some other state bar association to arrive at the language
actually used in the Canons.23 The Committee itself cross-referenced,
as part of its 1908 Report, the sections of the state bar association
ethics codes and the numbers of Hoffman's Resolutions which related
to each Canon, but it did not cross-reference to Sharswood's Ethics.T
Moreover, there are a few references to Sharswood's Ethics in the Red
Book itself,2 2 suggesting, at least, that the non-referenced portions of
Sharswood's Ethics were not part of the materials the Committee used
directly in drafting the Canons.
For example, Professor Pearce contends that Canon 6, which
concerns conflicts of interest, "incorporates many of Sharswood's
phrases without quotation marks. '23 3  In support, Professor Pearce
quotes the following passage in Sharswood's Ethics:
[T]he advocate is bound in honor, as well as duty, to disclose to the
client at the time of the retainer, every circumstance of his own
connection with the parties or prior relation to the controversy,
which can or may influence his determination in the selection of him
for the office.234
He compares that quoted passage to the first paragraph of Canon 6,
which states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any
Canon 30 "go[es] further than Sharswood by requiring a lawyer for a
defendant, as well as a plaintiff, not to take a case intended "to harass or to injure the
opposite party or to work oppression or wrong." Pearce, Republican Origins, supra
note 3, at 269.
228. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; but see infra note 263 and
accompanying text.
229. But see Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 243-44 (noting that the
language of Sharswood's essay found its way into the Canons sometimes by
"unattributed quotation" and at other times was "generally paraphrased").
230. See infra Part III.A-D.
231. See Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
232. Red Book, supra note 136, at 8, 39, 98, 127-28.
233. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 244.
234. Id. at 244 n.21, (quoting Sharswood, supra note 129, at 109-10).
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interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of counsel.235
Although the language of the two passages is close, the language of
Canon 6 is also close to the first sentence of Section 34 of the
Alabama Code, which states:
An attorney is in honor bound to disclose to the client at the time
of retainer, all the circumstances of his relation to the parties, or
interest or connection with the controversy, which might justly
influence the client in the selection of his attorney.236
Although it is debatable whether the language of the first paragraph
of Canon 6 is closer to the first sentence of Section 34 or the quoted
passage from Sharswood, the Red Book shows that the comments
made to the Committee generally approved of the language of Section
34 and did not mention the quoted passage from Sharswood at all.237
Thus, it is fair to assume that Canon 6 was based upon Section 34, as
the Committee reported,23' rather than the language Professor Pearce
quotes from Sharswood.23 9
Similar close textual analysis and the available documentary history
of the Committee's drafting efforts reveals that, even when the
Canons adopted provisions similar to the normative standards
proposed or approved in Sharswood's Ethics, except in rare instances,
the language of the other Canons also are generally drawn from the
Alabama Code, not Sharswood's Ethics.
240
235. Infra App. (Canon 6).
236. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 703.
237. Red Book, supra note 136, at 57.
238. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
239. For an extensive comparison of Canon 6 in its entirety and the Alabama Code
sections upon which it is based, see infra notes 392-416 and accompanying text.
240. For example, Canon 1 is much closer to Sections 1 and 4 of the Alabama
Code, which the Committee cross-referenced, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra
App., than Sharswood's comments about respect for the courts, compare infra App.
(Canon 1), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 688-90 (Ala. Code §§ 1, 4),
and 1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note 132, at 61-64; see also Pearce, Republican Origins,
supra note 3, at 268 & n.208. Canon 3 is much closer to Sections 3 and 15 of the
Alabama Code, which the Committee cross-referenced, Index and Synopsis of
Canons, infra App., than Sharswood's negative comments on ex parte conversations
with judges, compare infra App. (Canon 3), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170,
at 689, 695 (Ala. Code §§ 3, 15), and Sharswood, supra note 129, at 66, cited in Pearce,
Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 245 & n.22. Canon 8 is much closer to Sections
32 and 35 of the Alabama Code, which the Committee cross-referenced, Index and
Synopsis of Canons, infra App., than Sharswood's comments about the lawyer's duty
to advise the client candidly about the merits of his case and the duty to seek a
settlement in litigation, compare infra App. (Canon 8), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II,
supra note 170, at 703-04 (Ala. Code §§ 35, 38), and Sharswood, supra note 129, at
107, 109, cited in Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 270 & n.236. The
second paragraph of Canon 11 is closer to Section 37 of the Alabama Code, which the
Committee cross-referenced, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App., than
Sharwood's comments on handling client funds, compare infra App. (Canon 11), with
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 705 (Ala. Code § 37), and Sharswood, supra
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Fifth, with respect to the four or five Canons that were not based
upon the Alabama Code, at least two of those Canons clearly were
based upon sources other than Sharswood's Ethics.241
note 129, at 166, cited in Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 270 & nn.234-35.
Although Canon 15 contains a quotation of Sharswood's famous definition of zealous
representation, see supra note 225 and accompanying text, the remaining text of that
Canon is derived primarily from Section 10 of the Alabama Code, as edited by
commentators on that section, see infra notes 321-27 and accompanying text. The first
sentence of Canon 18 is closer to Sections 27 and 53 of the Alabama Code, which the
Committee cross-referenced, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App., than
Sharswood's exhortation not to abuse the opposing party, compare infra App. (Canon
18), with 1907 Comm. Rep. I1, supra note 170, at 701, 710 (Ala. Code §§ 27, 53), and
Sharswood, supra note 129, at 118. Canon 23 is closer to Section 55 of the Alabama
Code, which the Committee cross-referenced, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra
App., than Sharswood's negative comments on an advocate's communications with
jurors, compare infra App. (Canon 23), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at
712, and Sharswood, supra note 129, at 67 (Sharswood's comments). The last
sentence of Canon 24 was based upon a rewriting of Section 30 of the Alabama Code,
see infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text, rather than Sharswood's counterpart
statement that "[t]he client has no right to require him to be illiberal," see Pearce,
Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 268 & n.217, (citing Sharswood, supra note 129,
at 74-75 (1907)). Canon 25 is closer to Section 41 of the Alabama Code, which the
Committee cross-referenced, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App., than
Sharswood's admonitions to act fairly towards opposing counsel and avoid misleading
or surprising them, compare infra App. (Canon 25), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra
note 170, at 705 (Ala. Code § 41), and Sharswood, supra note 129, at 73-74, cited in
Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 264 & nn.183-85 and 268 & n.216. But,
the second sentence of Canon 18-"The client cannot be made the keeper of the
lawyer's conscience,"-may or may not be closer to Sharswood's quotation of Chief
Justice Gibbons, Sharswood, supra note 129, at 96-97, than Hoffman's Resolution
XIV, to which the Committee referred, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; see
also supra notes 182, 331-32 and accompanying text. There are, however, a few
instances when Sharswood's Ethics offers a closer match to the Canons' concept or
language than the Alabama Code, even when the Committee cross-referenced
Canons to sections of the Alabama Code. For example, Canon 10 states: "The lawyer
should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting." The referenced section of the Alabama Code, Section 38, states that a
lawyer and client "ought scrupulously to refrain from bargaining about the subject
matter of their litigation, so long as the relation of attorney and client continues."
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 704. The pertinent text from Sharswood's
Ethics, Sharswood, supra note 129, at 155, n.1, seems closer to Canon 10 in both
concept and language: "The purchase by an attorney from his client, pending
litigation, of the subject-matter of the litigation, is absolutely void."
241. See Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra
note 170, at 713. Canon 2, which concerns lawyer obligations to support the non-
partisan, merit-based selection of independent judges, was based upon Section 55 of
the code of ethics of the Kentucky Bar Association. See infra note 550 and
accompanying text. As discussed above, this topic is not discussed at all in
Sharswood's Ethics. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Canon 16 was based
primarily upon Section 37 of the code of ethics of the Michigan State Bar Association,
even though Canon 16, which concerns a lawyer's duty to restrain his client from
engaging in improprieties surrounding the trial of his case, expresses a duty with
which Sharswood concurs. See infra note 353 and accompanying text; Sharswood,
supra note 129, at 66-67. Canons 30 and 31 draw upon suggestions that Hubbard
made to the Committee, but those suggestions may themselves have been based on
Sharswood's Ethics. See infra notes 246-51, 336-46 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the Committee was well aware of Sharswood's
Ethics, and there is nothing to suggest that particular Committee
members did not bring Sharswood's Ethics into their discussions.
Although the Committee met to discuss the formulation of the
Canons for three days during the Spring of 1908,242 no notes or
minutes of that meeting have yet been located. Also, Dickinson's
statement that the Committee's work was "based upon Sharswood's
Legal Ethics "243 raises at least the possibility that the implications of
the existing written record may be misleading in minimizing the direct
influence of Sharswood's Ethics on the Canons.244 Indeed, the
Committee acknowledged its use of Sharswood's Ethics in formulating
the lawyer's oath they proposed. The A.B.A. adopted this oath as an
accompaniment to the Canons.245
For example, Committee member Hubbard made suggestions
regarding the text of both Canons 30 and 31.246 Those Canons
concern, among other things, a lawyer's gate-keeping responsibilities
for both litigation and transactional work, and both Canons not only
make lawyers morally accountable for their decisions in that regard,
but Canon 31 also explicitly states that lawyers cannot hide behind
their clients' instructions to justify or excuse their decisions.247 This
same idea is expressed in Sharswood's Ethics,24 s and that may have
been the source of Hubbard's suggestions, since those suggestions
were not based upon any of the state bar association ethics codes.2 49
Further, Hubbard appears to have been familiar with Sharswood's
242. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
243. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 56.
244. Although the Alabama Code was the source for the language of the vast
majority of the Canons, sometimes a Canon contained another idea or additional
language not provided by the pertinent section or sections of the Alabama Code. In
those instances, Sharswood's Ethics may have provided the basis for the additional
idea or language. For example, some of the types of misleading conduct that are
prohibited by the lawyer's duty of candor to the court as described in Canon 22 do not
derive from the pertinent section of the Alabama Code, but appear to come from
Sharswood's Ethics, which describes the ethical issues relating to drafting client
affidavits and witness statements that are the subject of the third paragraph of Canon
22. See infra text accompanying note 348.
245. See infra App. (Lawyer's Oath).
246. See Red Book, supra note 136, at 107; see also infra notes 336-46 and
accompanying text.
247. See infra App. (Canon 31); see also infra note 346 and accompanying text.
248. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 84, 96-97. This "principle of private action for
the advocate," is distinguishable, however, from Sharswood's acceptance and general
defense of the adversary system of justice, which allows the lawyer, as an officer of the
court, "to assist [the client] by doing that, which the client, for want of learning,
experience and address, is unable to do in a proper manner." Id. at 83-84.
249. Although the Canons Committee cross-referenced Section 13 of the Alabama
Code with respect to Canons 30 and 31, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.,
that reference appears erroneous. Section 13 concerns the obligation of a lawyer to
defend a person accused of a crime. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 695. The
focus of Canons 30 and 31 is much broader and much different. See infra notes 336-46
and accompanying text.
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Ethics, having suggested its reprinting and distribution to every
A.B.A. member,251" and then having paid the associated costs. 21
Thus, like Hoffman's Resolutions, Sharswood's Ethics left only a
very limited mark on the language of the Canons. Unlike Hoffman's
Resolutions, however, Sharswood's Ethics had a very direct and
pervasive influence on the content of the Alabama Code. Although,
as the next part of this article demonstrates, both the content and
language of the Alabama Code were substantively and substantially
changed when Code sections were incorporated into the Canons,
because so many of the values and ethical standards contained in the
Alabama Code are found in Sharswood's Ethics, many of those same
values and ethical standards have been continued, albeit often
modified, in the Canons. In that respect, the content and intellectual
underpinnings of the Canons share a family resemblance with that of
Sharswood's Ethics. It is clearly an overstatement to say that George
Sharswood is the father of the 1908 Canons,252 but it is not an
exaggeration to think about him as having a grandfatherly influence
over them.
3. Alabama Code
George Sharswood died in 1883, by which time Thomas Goode
Jones already may have been busy at work on the Alabama Code. 3
In 1881,254 at age thirty-seven, Jones first proposed that the Alabama
250. 1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note 132, at 63.
251. See supra note 189.
252. Compare supra text accompanying notes 218-41 with Russell G. Pearce, The
Lawyer and Public Service, 9 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 171, 172 n.5 (2001)
("Sharswood was the father of the legal ethics codes.").
253. The Alabama Code was not proposed and adopted until 1887. See Ala. Tenth
Meeting, supra note 112, at 10-21. Jones, the sole draftsman of the Code, had
prepared a draft of the code by the Annual Meeting in 1886. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text; Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State
Bar Ass'n 51 (1888). Jones also had written letters to judges and lawyers soliciting
their views on such a code by the time of that Association's Annual Meeting in 1884.
See Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Ass'n 21
(1884).
254. Jones was the Chairman of the Alabama State Bar Association's Committee
on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure in 1881, and he gave the
Committee's report on December 30, 1881. Report of the Third Annual Meeting of
the Alabama State. Bar Ass'n 173 (1881). In that report, his Committee
"recommend[ed] that the Association appoint a committee, with instructions to
report a Code of legal ethics for consideration, at the next annual meeting." Id. at 236.
Jones and his Committee sought to improve the quality of lawyers in Alabama
by expelling unethical practitioners: "[J]udicial administration would be greatly
advanced if there were some organized body of lawyers, armed with legal authority
and duty to investigate and prosecute unworthy members." Marston, supra note 14, at
483 (citing Proceedings of the First, Second, and Third Annual meetings of the
Alabama State Bar Ass'n 235 (1882) (alteration in original)). But Jones questioned
the propriety of such prosecutions without clear ethical guidelines:
While there are standard works of great eminence and authority upon
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State Bar Association adopt a code of ethics, and he was appointed
chairman of the committee to draft such a code the next year.255 That
code was proposed and adopted at that Association's Annual Meeting
in 1887, making it the first code of ethics adopted by any state bar
association in the country. 6  With the exception of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, each of the other eleven state bar associations
that adopted a code of ethics between 1887 and 1907 acknowledged
reliance upon the Alabama Code. 7 The Committee, which compiled
all of the codes of ethics of the state bar associations as Appendix B to
its 1907 Report,258 expressly recognized the overwhelming reliance of
the ethics codes of the other state bar associations on the Alabama
Code and the uniformity of their content.
259
legal ethics, these are not always accessible. In many instances practices of
questionable propriety are thoughtless rather than willful, and would have
been avoided if any short, concise Code of Legal Ethics, stamped with the
approval of the Bar, had been in easy reach. Nearly every profession has
such a work, which is treasured by its members.
Id. at 483 (quoting Proceedings of the First, Second, and Third Annual Meetings of
the Alabama State Bar Ass'n 235 (1882)).
An additional motive for adopting the Alabama Code was to codify the moral
views of the profession, so as to be a written embodiment of peer pressure. Jones and
his Committee certainly saw the proposed code in that way:
With such a guide, pointing out in advance the sentiment of the Bar
against practices which it condemns, we would find them gradually
disappearing; and should any be bold enough to engage in evil practices, the
Code would be a ready witness for his condemnation, and carry with it the
whole moral power of the profession.
Id. at 500.
255. Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Ass'n 20
(1883).
256. Ala. Tenth Meeting, supra note 112, at 10-21; Jones, Canons, supra note 14, at
493 ("the first code of Legal Ethics ever adopted in this country").
257. See, e.g., Colo. First Meeting, supra note 113, at 108 (1898); Report of the
Sixth Annual Meeting of the Georgia Bar Ass'n 99 (1889); Proceedings of the First
Annual Meeting of the Kentucky State Bar Ass'n 25-26 (1903); Report of the Sixth
Annual Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n 47 (1901); Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Meeting of the Michigan State Bar Ass'n 34 (1897); Proceedings of the
Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Missouri Bar Ass'n 29 (1906); Report of the
Second Annual Meeting of the North Carolina Bar Ass'n 87 (1899); Report of the
First Annual Meeting of the Virginia State Bar Ass'n 25 (1889). On the origins of the
Louisiana Code, see supra note 171.
258. 1907 Comm. Rep. 11, supra note 170, at 685, 713.
259. Citing the Preliminary Report of the Committee, dated May 1908, and sent to
each member of 'the A.B.A., the Committee stated that the other state bar
associations adopted the Alabama Code "with but slight modifications." Final
Report, supra note 133, at 569. The Committee made a similar observation the prior
year: "With the exception of the Louisiana code, all the State Bar Association codes
are formulated, almost totidem verbis, upon that of Alabama .... 1907 Comm. Rep.
II, supra note 170, at 678. In introducing that 1907 Report, Committee member
Hubbard commented on the Alabama Code's relation to the ethics codes of the other
state bar associations: "It was substantially adopted in ten other states; it was slightly
extended in some and in others slightly contracted." 1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note
132, at 61. Modern legal scholars have acknowledged how wholesale was the
adoption of the content of the Alabama Code by the other state bar associations.
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Because the Alabama Code was, as the Committee recognized, "the
foundation of all the other [ethics] codes, '261 it likewise became for
the Committee "[t]he foundation of the draft for [the] canons of
ethics." '261  As Hubbard explained, the pull of precedent on the
lawyerly mind was too great to ignore:
[T]he Alabama Code and the variations made by the ten
associations other than the' association of the State of Alabama that
have followed it [are] the substance of all that is needed to prepare
canons of ethics and you have in the main a form which may safely
be adopted; for manifestly, it is safer to follow a good precedent if
one has been made than to establish a new one.
262
Following these statements, modern legal scholars have been quick to
recognize the Canons' reliance on the Alabama Code,263 but in doing
Allison Marston, who has given the most scholarly attention to the Alabama Code,
has observed:
The ABA's report reveals substantial uniformity among the state codes.
Not surprisingly, advertising and fee fixing were two of the only three areas
significantly modified by other states. Six states heightened their
condemnation of soliciting individuals for legal business. While Alabama
had stated this practice "ought to be avoided," three states declared the
practice "disreputable," while Kentucky labeled it "highly objectionable."
However, seven states rejected both the Alabama Code's assertion that
lawyers often overestimate the worth of their services and the admonition
that "[a] client's ability to pay can never justify a charge for more than the
service is worth ...." Six states rejected the Code's provision that a regular
client may be charged less for services than a "casual" client.
Marston, supra note 14, at 504-05 (alteration in original). Her description of the few
inconsistencies is, however, somewhat inaccurate. The advertising approach of
Alabama was widely adopted by the other state bar associations; it was Alabama's
approach to personal solicitation that was condemned more vigorously by other state
bar associations. See 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 696 (comparing
provisions regarding advertising and personal solicitation). Section 48 of the
Alabama Code, the provision about not overestimating the value of one's legal
services, was rejected (or at least not included) in the ethics codes of seven other state
bar associations, and adopted by three other state bar associations. 1907 Comm. Rep.
1I, supra note 170, at 708.
260. 1907 Comm. Rep. I1, supra note 170, at 685.
261. Final Report, supra note 133, at 569.
262. 1907 Comm. Rep. 1, supra note 132, at 62.
263. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Problems and Materials
on Professional Responsibility 12 (6th ed. 1995) ("It was the Alabama Code [of
Ethics], in turn, that formed the basis for the American Bar Association's first
statement of ethical principles, the Canons of Professional Ethics, published in
1908."); Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, supra note 19, at 54 n.21 ("The 1908 Canons
were not designed to break new ground. They were largely copied from the 1887
Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association."); Marston, supra note 14, at
471 n.2 ("[Tihe Canons of Professional Ethics... drew heavily from the structure
and content of the Alabama Code."); Id. at 504 (The Canons Committee "used [the
Alabama Code] as its model"); Patterson, supra note 224, at 929 ("The Canons were,
in fact, a redraft of the Alabama Code of Ethics."); id. at 935 ("The Canons, indeed,
were little more than a redraft of the Alabama Code .... ).
Allison Marston, in particular, overemphasizes the Canons' reliance upon the
Alabama Code, when she states that "[v]irtually all of the thirty-two original Canons
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so they have glossed over the Canons' substantial original
contributions.
One of the goals of the next part of this article is to demonstrate
that too superficial an understanding of this reliance has caused a
failure to appreciate the distinctive contribution the Canons made to
American legal ethics. Indeed, there has never been an effort to
describe the originality of the Canons .2 4 Although it is indisputable
that the Alabama Code was the starting point for the vast majority of
the Canons,265 the members of the Committee further developed some
of the key concepts of the Alabama Code, made startling substantive
changes in others, and added their own entirely new ethical ideas.
What resulted was a comprehensive and detailed vision of
conscientious lawyering, supported by new and expanded prohibitions
on commercial practices by lawyers and by a virtually unprecedented
duty imposed on lawyers actively to regulate the conduct of the
lawyers and judges comprising what became the modern legal
profession.266
derive from one of the fifty-six provisions of the Alabama Code of Ethics." Marston,
supra note 14, at 505. This is not true. The Committee itself references the Alabama
Code as a basis for 28 of the 32 Canons, all except Canon 2 (derived from Section 55
of the Kentucky Code), Canon 10 (derived from Hoffman's Resolutions), Canon 16
(derived from Section 37 of the Michigan Code), and Canon 32 (purportedly derived
from Section 52 of the Kentucky Code). See Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra
App. However, a careful comparison of the Canons and the Alabama Code shows
that Section 14 of the Alabama Code is not the basis for Canon 31, see infra note 344
and accompanying text, as the Committee states, see Index and Synopsis of Canons,
infra App. Thus, only twenty-seven of the Canons can fairly be described as based at
least in part on sections of the Alabama Code, and of those twenty-seven Canons
there is much that is new and different. See infra Part IlI.
Allison Marston also argues that Canon 10 is really based upon Section 38 of
the Alabama Code, even though the Committee did not indicate that in its 1908
written report, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App. See infra notes 451-54 and
accompanying text.
264. For example, even though the Canons' reliance on the Alabama Code has
been well recognized, no careful comparison of the Canons and the counterpart
sections of the Alabama Code has ever been made. Allison Marston, whose recent
article is the most detailed discussion of the Alabama Code and its background,
expressly states that "a detailed comparison between the A.B.A. Canons and the
Alabama Code of Ethics is beyond the scope of this article." Marston, supra note 14,
at 505.
265. See supra note 263.
266. The Canons also contributed to the development of American legal ethics and
professionalism by omitting some of the concepts in the Alabama Code. By
identifying the Alabama Code sections that were not carried over into the Canons, a
clear pattern emerges, demonstrating that the Canons did not promote civility as
much as the Alabama Code and the ethics codes of the other state bar associations.
Section 5 of the Alabama Code stated: "Personal colloquies between counsel
tend to delay and promote unseemly wrangling, and ought to be discouraged." 1907
Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 691. The third paragraph of this section, adopted
in the ethics codes of eight other state bar associations, id., was omitted from Canon
22, which is based on Alabama Code Section 5. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra
App.
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III. THE CANONS' DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION
A careful comparison of the Canons' provisions against the sections
of the Alabama Code reveals four overarching patterns to the
Committee's work.267 First, compared with the Alabama Code's
Section 6 of the Alabama Code stated: "whenever an attorney is late he
should apologize or explain his absence." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 691.
This was adopted in the ethics codes of seven other state bar associations, id., but was
omitted from Canon 21, which is based on Alabama Code Section 6. Index and
Synopsis of Canons, infra App..
Section 7 of the Alabama Code stated: "One side must always lose the cause;
and it is not wise or respectful to the court, for attorneys to display temper because of
an adverse ruling." 1907 Comm. Rep. Ii, supra note 170, at 692. This section was
adopted in the ethics codes of ten other state bar associations. Id. This Code section
is not the basis of any Canon. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
Section 9 of the Alabama Code stated:
An attorney should not speak slightingly or disparagingly of his
profession, or pander in any way to unjust prejudices against it; and he
should scrupulously refrain at all times, and in all relations of life, from
availing himself of any prejudice or popular misconception against lawyers,
in order to carry a point against a brother attorney.
1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note 170, at 693. This section was adopted in the ethics
codes of nine other state bar associations, id., but not in the Canons. Index and
Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
Section 26 of the Alabama Code quoted from pages 118-19 of Sharswood's
Ethics: "It is not a desirable professional reputation to live and die with-that of a
rough tongue, which makes a man to be sought out and retained to gratify the
malevolent feeling of a suitor, in hearing the other side well lashed and vilified." 1907
Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 701. This section was adopted in the ethics codes
of seven other state bar associations, id., but not in the Canons. Index and Synopsis of
Canons, infra App.
Section 53 of the Alabama Code goes beyond Canon 18, which concerns the
treatment of witnesses and litigants. The second sentence of Section 53 stated: "When
essential to the ends of justice to arraign their conduct or testimony, it should be done
without vilification or unnecessary harshness. Fierceness of manner and uncivil
behavior can add nothing to the truthful dissection of a false witness's testimony and
often rob deserved strictures of proper weight." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170,
at 710. This section was adopted in the ethics codes of ten other state bar
associations, id., but not in the Canons.
267. These four patterns are formed from twenty-two of the original thirty-two
Canons. The other ten Canons do not fit into any of those four patterns or any other
overarching pattern. Canon 3 concerns the proper relationship between the bench
and the bar. Canon 8 concerns a lawyer's advice to a client on the merits of a claim.
Canon 9 concerns a lawyer's dealings with represented and unrepresented parties.
Canon 11 concerns a lawyer's handling of trust property. See infra note 578 and
accompanying text. Canon 19 concerns the advocate-witness rule. Canon 20
concerns trial publicity. See infra note 438 and accompanying text. Canon 21 concerns
punctuality in court. Canon 23 concerns trial counsel's dealing with juries. Canon 25
concerns a lawyer's agreements and dealings with opposing counsel. See infra note
585 and accompanying text. Canon 26 concerns lobbying.
All but two of those Canons are substantially the same as the sections of the
Alabama Code upon which they are based. The last sentence of Canon 9, however,
concerns a lawyer's duty not to mislead an unrepresented party or to advise him as to
the law, a topic not addressed in Section 45 of the Alabama Code, see 1907 Comm.
Rep. II, supra note 170, at 707, the section upon which Canon 9 is based, see Index
and Synopsis of Canons, infra App. Canon 21 concerns a lawyer's punctuality in
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provisions regarding the moral dimensions of the attorney-client
relationship, nine of the Canons-Canons 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 30, 31,
and 32- express a more robust vision of conscientious lawyering that
enlarges the authority of, and gives greater support to, the lawyer's
moral autonomy in that relationship. Second, consistent with that
vision of conscientious lawyering, Canons 4, 5 and 6 de-emphasize the
duties imposed by the Alabama Code to represent a criminal
defendant and to avoid conflicts of interest. Third, building on the
gentlemanly distinction in Section 50 of the Alabama Code between a
profession devoted to justice and a trade dedicated to money-getting,
seven of the Canons-Canons 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 27, and 28-adopt a
more thorough-going attitude against commercialism with respect to
both the financial dimensions of an existing attorney-client
relationship and the efforts of lawyers to obtain new clients. Fourth,
expanding upon Section 11 of the Alabama Code, four of the
Canons-Canons 1, 2, 28, and 29-impose additional obligations upon
lawyers to regulate their profession, including at its point of origin-
admission to the bar-and at its successful point of termination-
appointment or election to a judgeship. Each of these four patterns,
including the relationship of each of the Canons in the patterns to the
Alabama Code and other pre-existing ethical texts, is described below.
Together, those four patterns constitute the Canons' overall vision
and the Canons' distinctive contribution to the development of
American legal ethics.
A. The Vision of Conscientious Lawyering
The captured corporation lawyers whom Roosevelt criticized
exemplify a fundamental conflict intrinsic to the private attorney-
client relationship in a free market economy. Because litigators play a
role in the administration of justice, they have been considered
"officers of the court" with special obligations to the court system.26
court, like Section 33 of the Alabama Code, but it is narrower than Section 33, which
also concerns punctuality in responding to letters and keeping appointments.
Compare infra App. (Canon 21), with 1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note 170, at 703.
Insofar as Canon 21 also makes it a lawyer's duty to "be concise and direct in the trial
and disposition of causes," it is broader than both Section 33 and Section 6 of the
Alabama Code, see 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 691, 703, upon which it is
based, see Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App., because neither of those sections
addresses the speed or brevity of a lawyer's presentations in court.
268. Although some commentators have contended that lawyers do not owe any
substantive obligations to the court system that other citizens do not, see, e.g., James
A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer of the Court,"
48 Buff. L. Rev. 349 (2000), it is undeniable that lawyers, unlike other citizens, have a
special gate-keeping obligation to ensure that the courts are not clogged with lawsuits
raising frivolous claims or defenses and that lawsuits are not used solely for purposes
of harassment or delay. Not only is such an obligation imposed upon lawyers
practicing in federal court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see infra note 336 and accompanying text, and similar state statutes or
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Insofar as transactional lawyers engage in structuring and
documenting transactions in the context of a legal system comprised
of substantive and procedural rules and enforcement regimes, they are
"custodians of the legal system" with special obligations to preserve
that system.269  But all private practitioners, whether litigators or
transactional lawyers, are agents for the clients who retain them.
Those clients (or third parties on their behalf) pay their lawyers and
collectively enable them to earn a living. Thus, a four-sided conflict is
created within the attorney-client relationship among: (1) the lawyer's
duty to the court and the legal system generally; (2) the lawyer's duty
to his own moral and political views about what is just; (3) the
lawyer's duty to represent zealously the interests of his private client;
and (4) the lawyer's economic self-interest in the continuity of
representation and the client's payment of legal fees.27 When clients
are wealthy or politically powerful and hire lawyers on a regular basis,
there is the potential that the continuous impact of clients' wealth or
power will cause lawyers to privilege the interests of such clients over
their duty to the courts and the legal system generally and even over
their own moral and political views. When that happens, as in the
case of Roosevelt's captured corporation lawyers, the courts and the
rules regarding the state courts, see, e.g., 22 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 1, § 130
(2001), but also the applicable rules of professional conduct generally impose such an
obligation upon lawyers, see Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, R. 3.1; R. 4.4; Model
Code of Prof'l Resp., DR 7-102(A)(l). As demonstrated below, Canons 1, 2, and 32
regarding lawyer conduct vis-A-vis judges and Canon 23 regarding lawyer conduct vis-
A-vis juries impose ethical obligations upon lawyers regarding the administration of
justice that are not incumbent upon citizens generally. See infra notes 357-76, 545-50
and accompanying text. There are other Canons as well, such as Canon 20 regarding
trial publicity and Canon 26 regarding lobbying, that impose ethical obligations upon
lawyers regarding the administration of justice that are not imposed on citizens
generally.
269. Robert W. Gordon "paint[s] a portrait of [such a] Progressive lawyer-
statesman" in his article, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 Md. L. Rev.
255, 265 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Corporate Law Practice]. In that portrait,
lawyers are members of a public profession who
are supposed to work ... to maintain the integrity of the framework of laws,
institutions, and procedures that constrain their clients' practices and their
own-and not just to maintain that framework, but to help transform it so
that it more nearly will approach the conditions of justice and civic
community.
Id. at 255. Gordon draws from Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's
1934 address at the University of Michigan to describe the role of the transactional
lawyer who subscribes to that ideal: "[Ljawyers ... lift their eyes from day-to-day
deals, to understand the social effects of their practices taken as a whole, and then to
discipline each other to act collectively to counsel corporate clients to observe, rather
than subvert, their obligations as trustees." Id. at 258 (citing Stone, supra note 19, at
9).
270. The A.B.A. Model Rules acknowledges those four duties: "Virtually all
difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities [11 to
clients, [2] to the legal system and [3] to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an
upright person while [4] earning a satisfactory living." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct,
Preamble para. 8 (1983).
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legal system suffer the distortions caused by lawyers' failure to
maintain sufficient independence from their clients.
1. The Nineteenth-Century Criticism of Unlimited Loyalty to the
Client
Roosevelt's criticism of corporation lawyers resonated with a well-
developed theme among elite lawyers during at least the last half of
the nineteenth century. During that period, American lawyers often
viewed the problem of lawyer independence in terms of Lord
Brougham's famous speech to the English House of Lords during his
defense of Queen Caroline in 1820:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go
on, reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate
to involve his country in confusion.2"
Although Lord Brougham commented later that the absolute loyalty
to the client articulated in his speech was "not so much a statement of
[a lawyer's] duty as it was a political threat" in the particular context
of challenging King George IV's bill to divorce Queen Caroline,272 the
quoted language has stood for decades as the classic statement of
zealous representation. 273 According to Lord Brougham's speech, a
litigator's duty to a client completely eclipses any duty that he owes to
anyone else, whether the courts, the legal system generally, the
government, any other third parties, or even himself. By making the
client sovereign over the advocate, Lord Brougham's speech accords
the lawyer no independence whatsoever during the attorney-client
relationship.
271. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821).
272. Patterson, supra note 224, at 909-10 & nn. 1-4; see also Freedman, supra note
50, at 66 n.6; Krauss, supra note 180, at 332 ("Lord Brougham's dictum is routinely
taken out of context. Brougham never advocated 'hired gunship'-he simply said he
would stand up to political power when his client was in the right."). On the other
hand, Brougham "was proud enough of [his speech] to polish it, and republish it."
David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer 189 (t973) (citing 9 Brougham, Works
83 (1872)). Lord Brougham "was a prolific author and statesman who went on to
become Lord Chancellor of England." M. H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth
Century: The "Other Tradition," 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 793, 794 n.5 (1999).
273. Geoffrey Hazard calls Brougham's speech the profession's "classic
articulation" of the lawyer's duty. Hazard, supra note 4, at 1244. Monroe Freedman
considers Brougham's speech the "classic statement of th[e] ideal [of zealous
representation]." Freedman, supra note 50, at 65.
2003] 2443
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
One "tradition" of nineteenth-century legal ethics was critical of
Lord Brougham's view of zealous representation.274 In 1845, Chief
Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took issue with
Lord Brougham's view. In an influential opinion in a case involving a
private lawyer's decision, as a special prosecutor, to dismiss his client's
charges against the accused, Gibson wrote:
It is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes
no fidelity to any one except his client; and that the latter is the
keeper of his professional conscience. He is expressly bound by his
official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all due
fidelity to the court as well as the client; and he violates it when he
consciously presses for an unjust judgment..-. The high and
honorable office of a counsel would be degraded to that of a
mercenary, were he compelled to do the biddings of his client
against the dictates of his conscience.275
Underlying Chief Justice Gibson's statement is the view that the
lawyer's professional role as an officer of the court, as a "minister of
justice," requires the exercise of an independent, finely-tuned
professional conscience that makes discriminating judgments about
what is just and unjust in a broader moral sense, not merely what is
lawful and unlawful. Thus, says Gibson, the lawyer who abandons his
own conscience in deference to the client's self-interested views of
what is right and wrong in professional matters has abdicated his
"high and honorable office." He has become "degraded to [the role]
of a mercenary" because he has given up the moral authority of his
professional conscience by choosing to follow the self-interested
judgment of the person who pays him. In this respect, he has ceased
to be a professional; he is no better than a money-grubbing
tradesman. Too great an interest in financial reward, Gibson implies,
undermines a lawyer's professionalism.
Gibson's view was quoted approvingly in the 1854 edition of
Sharswood's Ethics and each of the four subsequent printings.276
Sharswood juxtaposed Gibson's view with Lord Brougham's view on
274. One historian of the nineteenth-century American legal profession has focused
his scholarship on the critical response of American lawyer's to Lord Brougham's
speech. "Brougham's statements quickly became well-known, but they were not
quickly approved. In fact, Brougham's vision of zealous advocacy ... was rejected by
many of his contemporaries. Indeed, in the United States, Brougham's statements
were attacked and viewed by contemporaries and successors as being utterly
inappropriate." Hoeflich, supra note 272, at 795. In that article, Hoeflich describes
the views of numerous lawyers, expressed in various treatises, lectures, public
orations, memoirs, funeral eulogies, and memorial addresses during the first three-
quarters of the nineteenth century that explicitly took issue with Brougham's speech
or advanced a view of a lawyer's ethical responsibilities that conflicted with that
speech's view of unlimited zeal and client loyalty. Id. at 795-814.
275. Rush v. Cavanaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845).
276. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 96-97; see also supra note 217 and
accompanying text.
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the advocate's duty to his client, which he also quoted, stating that
Lord Brougham "was led by the excitement of so great an occasion to
say what cool reflection and sober reason certainly can never
approve. '"277
Lord Brougham's speech was quoted also in a chapter on legal
ethics in a book by David Paul Brown,27 a noted Philadelphia lawyer,
that was published in 1856 and purchased by leading lawyers in and
outside Pennsylvania.2 9 After quoting Brougham, Brown stated: "[I]f
carried out to the extent suggested, [Brougham's words] make the
advocate worse than a highwayman, and render him, under cover of
the law, a virtual outlaw.
211
In New York, during this same twenty-year period, David Dudley
Field, the author of the Field Codes, also was speaking out against
Lord Brougham's view that a litigator's sole duty is to serve his client.
In an 1844 magazine article, he wrote:
[A] more revolting doctrine scarcely ever fell from any man's
lips.... It assumes that a man has a right to whatever the law will
give him, that the law itself is so clear that it cannot be mistaken or
perverted, and that he may rightfully avail himself of every defect in
an adversary's proof... ; three propositions, every one of which is
without foundation .... 281
After refuting each of those three propositions, Field gave his
comprehensive answer" to the maxim that litigators owe total
allegiance to their clients without regard to the justness of the client's
objectives: "[T]he law and all its machinery are means, not ends;...
the purpose of their creation is justice; and, therefore, he who in his
zeal for the maintenance of the means, forgets the end, betrays not
only an unsound heart, but an unsound understanding.""2 2
Thereafter, New York adopted Section 511 of the Field Code of
Procedure, which provided, "[i]t is the duty of an attorney... [t]o
counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses, only, as
appear to him legal and just, except the defense of a person charged
with a public offense.""2 3 In 1849, in commenting upon a litigator's
277. Sharswood, supra note 129, at 87; see also supra notes 198-217 and
accompanying text.
278. See 2 David Paul Brown, The Forum; or Forty Years Full Practice at the
Philadelphia Bar 28 (1856).
279. Hoeflich, supra note 272, at 807 & n.83.
280. Brown, supra note 278, at 28.
281. David Dudley Field, The Study and Practice of Law, 14 Democratic Rev. 345
(1844), reprinted in The Golden Age of American Law 30, 33 (Charles M. Haar ed.,
1965). The irony of Field's criticism of Lord Brougham's speech given Field's
subsequent conduct as counsel in the Erie litigation of the late 1860s and early 1870s
is described in Patterson, supra note 224, at 948-55.
282. Field, supra note 281, at 34.
283. 1 Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field 296-
97 (A.P. Sprague ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
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duties under Section 511, Field stated that lawyers should not be
indifferent to "the moral aspects of the causes they advocate" and that
it was error to believe "that a lawyer may properly advocate a bad
cause." 284 Field further argued that any lawyer asked to assent to "the
bad scheme of an unjust client" should "refrain from pursuing [such]
an unjust object. 285
Six years later Field placed the lawyer's duty to his client in the
context of his other duties:
His first duty is undoubtedly to his own client, but that is not the
only one; there is also a duty to Court, that it shall be assisted by the
advocate; a duty to the adversary, not to push an advantage beyond
the bounds of equity; a duty to truth and right, whose allegiance no
human being can renounce; and a duty to the state, that it shall not
be corrupted by the example of unscrupulous insincerity.
286
Ten years later, in Third Great Western Turnpike-Road Co. v.
Loomis,"7 the New York Court of Appeals expressed its own
disapproval of Lord Brougham's view regarding an advocate's duty to
his client in a case concerning a trial judge's discretion to exclude
cross-examination questions disparaging a witness' credibility. The
court's concern that trial judges needed discretion to protect a witness
from such cross-examination in certain situations was based, in part,
on its lack of faith that trial counsel, "deeply enlisted for their clients,
and zealous to maintain their rights," could be relied upon to exercise
appropriate forbearance.8  Finding Lord Brougham's statement
supportive of that lack of faith in trial counsel, the court referred to
Lord Brougham's speech as that "atrocious but memorable
declaration" which "shocks the moral sense, but ... illustrates the
impolicy of divesting the presiding judge of the power to protect
witnesses from irrelevant assault and inquisition. 29
Criticism of Lord Brougham's view continued into the early
twentieth century. John Dos Passos, a wealthy and well-regarded
New York City lawyer at the turn of the century 2 11 also offered a
deeply critical assessment of Lord Brougham's statement:
There perhaps never was language written, or spoken, which
contained worse doctrine than that which I have just quoted, of
Brougham, and yet it has been relied on over and over again by
lawyers, to cover all kinds of dishonest practices and defenses, and
284. Id. at 298.
285. Id. at 299.
286. Id. at 497-98.
287. 32 N.Y. 127 (1865).
288. Id. at 132.
289. Id. at 132-33.
290. E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment 16 (1964). Dos Passos's son,
also named John Dos Passos, was the well-known author of the U.S.A. Trilogy
published in the 1930s. Id. at 272.
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the great name of Lord Brougham is still used, to sustain many
ridiculous and false positions of advocates .... 291
This criticism of the principle of unfettered zealous representation
articulated in Lord Brougham's speech was so constant throughout
the mid- to late nineteenth century that it suggests something more
than just a scholarly criticism of a possible deformation in the
attorney-client relationship. The continuing criticism implies an
urgency, an important need, to attack something actually occurring
with distressing regularity in legal practice. Indeed, Chief Justice
Gibson observed that Lord Brougham's view was not only mistaken,
but also "popular. '292 In 1865, when the New York Court of Appeals
rejected Lord Brougham's views, the court acknowledged that
"[t]here is much diversity of opinion, even among eminent members
of the profession, as to the measure of obligation imposed upon
counsel, by the implied pledge of fidelity to the client. 2 3 Twenty-five
years after first rejecting Lord Brougham's views, David Dudley Field
was accused of adopting those views in his representation of clients in
the infamous Erie Railroad litigation.9 In the early twentieth
century, Dos Passos acknowledged that Lord Brougham's speech "has
been relied on over and over again by lawyers. '295 There is, therefore,
considerable support for the view that "by the 1870s leading
American lawyers were coming to espouse a responsibility to their
clients as their primary and even exclusive moral obligation as
lawyers. ' 296
291. John R. Dos Passos, The American Lawyer 142 (1907).
292. Rush v. Cavanaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845).
293. Third Great W. Turnpike-Road Co., 32 N.Y. at 133.
294. See Altman, supra note 174, at 1054-55.
295. Dos Passos, supra note 291, at 142.
296. Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The
Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 Am. J. Legal Hist. 191,
193 (1977); accord Wolfram, Legal Ethics 11, supra note 4, at 221 ("Field's sentiments
then were much more securely client-centered, and represented far more accurately
what had already become, and remains, the dominant professional outlook of
American lawyers and their ethical rules."). Another legal historian of the nineteenth
century agrees:
The change came-the change that initiated the more modern view of the
lawyer-client relationship-in the 1870s. This change brought with it a
reinvigoration of Lord Brougham's perspective on the relationship and the
lawyer's duties within it. Once again, it is possible to identify both the
context within which this change occurred and the lawyer who most clearly
and earliest enunciated it. The context was the rise of a new type of law in
the United States, what we now call corporate law, and the lawyer most
responsible for popularizing the view was David Dudley Field.
Hoeflich, supra note 272, at 814. In his 1903 lecture to Albany Law School students,
Committee member Hubbard acknowledged that an ethics of conscientious lawyering
conflicted with much current legal practice. Gen. Thomas H. Hubbard & Simeon E.
Baldwin, Lectures Delivered Before the Students of Law Department of Union
University 14, 16-19 (Nov. 12, 1903) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hubbard &
Baldwin, Union Lectures]; see also infra notes 523-30 and accompanying text.
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2. The Alabama Code's Resolution
The Alabama Code also rejected Lord Brougham's view and
sketched an alternate view of the attorney-client relationship that
provided support for a lawyer's moral autonomy. Quoting directly
from Sharswood's Ethics,297 the first two sentences of the second
paragraph of Section 10 of the Alabama Code describe a lawyer's duty
of zealous representation:
An attorney "owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his cause, and the
exertion of the utmost skill and ability," to the end that nothing may
be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No sacrifice or peril, even to loss of life itself, can absolve
from the fearless discharge of this duty. 298
At the same time, however, the Alabama Code clearly states that
there are limits to that duty of zealous representation. The next two
sentences of Section 10 describe those limits:
Nevertheless, it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust
is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law
which creates it. The attorney's office does not destroy man's
accountability to the Creator, or loosen the duty of obedience to
law, and the obligation to his neighbor; and it does not permit, much
less demand, violation of law, or any manner of fraud or chicanery,
for the client's sake.299
Thus, according to the Alabama Code, the lawyer's duty of zealous
representation is subject to the lawyer's greater obligations to (i) the
legal system, i.e., "obedience to law"; (ii) third parties, i.e., "the
obligation to his neighbor"; and (iii) his own moral view of right and
wrong or, in other words, what was just and unjust in the eyes of his
God, i.e., "accountability to the Creator."
Consistent with Chief Justice Gibson's phraseology, Section 27 of
the Alabama Code locates the lawyer's moral autonomy in the
freedom of his conscience: "[t]he client can not be made the keeper of
the attorney's conscience in professional matters."' .... In various
circumstances, the Alabama Code seeks to clarify the extent of the
client's control over the lawyer and the lawyer's independence from
the client.
297. Compare 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 693, with Sharswood, supra
note 129, at 78-79.
298. 1907 Comm. Rep. I1, supra note 170, at 693.
299. Id. at 693-94.
300. Id. at 701. This language bears a resemblance to Chief Justice Gibson's
opinion in Rush v. Cavanaugh, see supra note 275 and accompanying text, with which
Thomas Goode Jones would have gained familiarity through his study of Sharswood's
Ethics, see supra note 220 and accompanying text, but it also echoes, albeit more
faintly, the language of Hoffman Resolution XIV, see supra note 182 and
accompanying text.
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Section 27, for example, deals with a litigator's interactions with the
opposing party: "An attorney is under no obligation to minister to the
malevolence or prejudices of a client in the trial or conduct of a
cause... He can not demand as of right that his attorney shall abuse
the opposite party. 3 1 Section 28 distinguishes a lawyer's relationship
to opposing counsel and the client's adversary from his client and the
relationship between the parties: "Clients and not their attorneys, are
the litigants; and whatever may be the ill feeling existing between
clients, it is unprofessional for attorneys to partake of it in their
conduct and demeanor to each other, or to suitors in the case."
302
Section 26 particularizes the rule of Section 28 with respect
specifically to how a lawyer talks to the opposing party: "It is not a
desirable professional reputation to live and die with-that of a rough
tongue, which makes a man to be sought out and retained to gratify
the malevolent feeling of a suitor, in hearing the other side well lashed
and vilified. ' '3
Finally, with respect to the "incidental matters pending the trial, not
affecting the merits of the cause, or working substantial prejudice to
the rights of the client," Section 30 of the Alabama Code makes it
clear that the lawyer cannot be constrained by the client's direction:
As to the incidental matters pending the trial,.., such as forcing
the opposite attorney to trial when he is under affliction or
bereavement; forcing the trial on a particular day to the serious
injury of the opposite attorney, when no harm will result from a trial
at a different time; the time allowed for signing a bill of exceptions,
cross interrogatories, and the like; the attorney must be allowed to
judge. No client has a right to demand that his attorney shall be
illiberal in such matters, or that he should do anything therein
repugnant to his own sense of honor and propriety.304
In the event that the client "insist[s]" that the lawyer engage in such
conduct "repugnant to his own sense of honor and propriety[, then]
the attorney should retire from the cause. '
3. The Hubbard Lectures on Legal Ethics
In 1902, Hubbard, a Committee member, donated $10,000 to the
Albany Law School to provide "for a half dozen lectures or so on th[e]
subject" of legal ethics.3"6 Along with Brewer before him and Parker
after him, Hubbard had attended Albany Law School in 1860 and
1861 in order to supplement his law office education.3"7 By 1902, after
301. 1907 Comm. Rep. It, supra note 170, at 701.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 702.
305. Id.
306. Hubbard & Baldwin, Union Lectures, supra note 296, at 5.
307. Brewer was in the Class of 1858. Id. at 8. Hubbard was in the Class of 1860,
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a highly successful law practice had led him to lucrative positions in
business, Hubbard was wealthy and already had undertaken a number
of philanthropic projects."
On November 12, 1903, Hubbard gave the inaugural lecture in what
became known as the Hubbard Course on Legal Ethics at the Albany
Law School.1 9  Acknowledging the public criticism of lawyers,
Hubbard described two prominent causes of that criticism:
First of these is the fact, recognized by the ethics of the
profession, that clients, and not lawyers, decide what cases shall be
brought into court and control the substantial methods of their
conduct in court.
The second is that lawyers are permitted to personate their
clients; to say what they think their clients would say and do what
they think their clients would do, in order to win their cases.
And so it turns out that the lawyer is compelled to conduct
litigations that his own conscience does not approve and to shelter
himself from its reproaches by adopting the hypothetical conscience
of the client.31 0'
To remedy the situation, Hubbard proposed the adoption of an
enforceable oath of office,31' such as the attorney's oath prescribed by
the State of Washington.3 2 The purpose of such an oath was to put
the lawyer's conscience in charge of all aspects of litigation:
The lawyer should be emancipated from servitude to his client in
respect to the commencement and conduct of suits.
The lawyer should control in determining what cases may be
brought before the court; what suits may be begun; what defenses
may be interposed. His appearance in any cause should be deemed
a certificate, upon his honor as counsel, that it involves, in his
opinion, the honest assertion of legal and equitable rights withheld
and Parker was in the Class of 1872. Id. at 8-9. Each of the three had also studied law
in a law office. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Hubbard and Parker were
active alumni. David J. Brewer, Address Delivered at Commencement of Albany
Law School 4 (June 1, 1904) (on file with author). Indeed, Hubbard was the president
of the alumni association from 1904-05. Id. at 3.
308. Henry S. Burrage, Thomas Hamlin Hubbard 52-54 (1923); Louis C. Hatch,
The History of Bowdoin College 385, 431-33 (1927) (describing Hubbard's gifts of a
library building, a building fund, and an athletic grandstand to Bowdoin).
309. Hubbard & Baldwin, Union Lectures, supra note 296, at 3.
310. Id. at 14,16.
311. Id. at 21 ("The most effectual aid must come from the oath administered to
the lawyer on his admission to the bar and the enforcement of that oath by
corresponding rules of the court.").
312. Id. at 24. For the text of that oath see id. at 24-25. Hubbard explained: "The
whole oath puts the responsibility of bringing suit, interposing defense, and of
conducting either, exactly where that responsibility should be put, upon the
conscience and honor of the lawyer." Id. at 26.
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by the opposing party. In all matters that involve conscience, whether
matters of form or substance, the lawyer's decision should be supreme
from the beginning to the end of litigation. The custom should be
shattered, that permits the lawyer to personate the client; to argue
against his own convictions; to substitute his client's morals and
conscience for his own, in the conduct of his cause.313
A few years later and just a few months before the Canons were
adopted, Henry St. George Tucker presented his own view of legal
ethics as part of the Hubbard Course on Legal Ethics.314 In discussing
the duty a lawyer owes his client, Tucker also registered his dissent
from Lord Brougham's view of unfettered loyalty to the client:
The duty which the lawyer owes his client is undoubtedly great.
It is said by some that he must forget self and regard only his client.
From that view I must dissent. I do not believe under any proper
system of ethics that a lawyer can be held as surrendering, when he
accepts a retainer, his personal notions of propriety or freedom of
personal action. To do so, would be to surrender the right of self-
use and personal responsibility to the paramount right of another.315
In Tucker's view, not only do a corporation lawyer's moral views-
"his own conscience"-place a limit on his representation of a
corporate client, but so do his political views about his obligations as a
citizen. 3 6  The consequence, Tucker concluded, is that the ethical
limits on a lawyer's conduct, such as giving advice to a corporate
client, will depend on the lawyer's own moral and political views
317
Thus, according to Tucker, when the law itself does not set limits on
whether the lawyer can pursue the client's expressed interests, what is
ethical representation for one lawyer may be unethical representation
for another, because people differ in their moral and political views.
For lawyers who seek to obtain or to continue representation of
wealthy or politically powerful corporations or individuals, Tucker's
view creates an economic incentive to adopt moral and political views
similar to those of such potential or existing clients.
318
313. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
314. See Henry St. George Tucker, Lecture Delivered Before the Students of the
Albany Law School in the Hubbard Course on Legal Ethics 3 (Apr. 8, 1908) (on file
with author).
315. Id. at 11.
316. 1d. at 10-11.
317. Seeid. at11-12.
318. Indeed. Robert Nelson's survey in the early 1980s about the attitudes of large
firm corporation lawyers showed that their political and social values and attitudes
closely match the political and social values and attitudes of their corporate clients.
See Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 524-28, 534-38
(1985), cj Gordon, Corporate Law Practice, supra note 269, at 288 ("[T]he obvious
psychological fact that if you spend your whole professional life among business
people, you are likely to come to think as they do about most things anyway, and will
not rock the boat even if you do not.").
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4. The Canons' Expansion of Conscientious Lawyering
The Canons Committee sought to hold the lawyer morally
accountable for all of his conduct in the course of a professional
representation. Like Jones, Hubbard, and Tucker, the other members
of the Canons Committee recognized the moral dimensions of the
attorney-client relationship. They understood that the moral
accountability of lawyers went hand-in-hand with the moral autonomy
of lawyers in that relationship-a lawyer could be morally accountable
for his conduct in the representation of a client only if he were free
enough of his client's direction to make his own choices regarding his
conduct during that representation. The Committee further
strengthened and supported the lawyer's autonomy by setting clear
limits on the extent to which the client may control the lawyer's
conduct. Adopting the vernacular of the nineteenth century, and
particularly of their class, the men who drafted the 1908 Canons
talked about these issues in terms of conscience. 9 When compared
to the Alabama Code, the Canons express a vision of conscientious
lawyering that enlarges the authority of, and gives even greater
support to, the lawyer's conscience.
Canon 15 directly expresses the Canon's vision of conscientious
lawyering:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular
prejudice against lawyers as a class, or to deprive the profession of
that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to
the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set
up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that
it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to
succeed in winning his client's cause.
It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal
belief in his client's innocence or in the justice of his cause.
319. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe in depth the meaning of
"conscience" for nineteenth-century lawyers and judges, such as Hoffman, Sharswood,
Jones, Tucker, Hubbard, and the other members of the Canons Committee. That is a
task for another time. See supra note 18. For purposes of this article, however, the
meaning of that term can be taken from William Whewell, The Elements of Morality,
Including Polity (1845), the only philosophical work concerning ethics that is used in
Sharswood's Ethics. See Sharswood, supra note 129, at 100-02. According to
Whewell:
Conscience is to each man the representative of the Supreme Law, and is
invested with the authority of the Supreme Law. It is the voice which
pronounces for him the distinction of right and wrong, of moral good and
evil; and when he has done all that he can to enlighten and instruct it, by the
aid of Religion, as well as of Morality, it is for him the Voice of God.
Whewell, supra, at 240. According to Whewell, insofar as Conscience involves a
judgment that an action does not conform to what appears to an individual as the
Supreme Law, Conscience "inflicts Punishment for the offenses thus condemned." Id.
at 236.
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The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing
be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should
restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum
the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect
his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to
be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him
for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane.
He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.320
Canon 15 is derived primarily from Section 10 of the Alabama
Code. The first paragraph of Canon 15 is based upon a rewrite of
Section 10 proposed by Simeon Baldwin.32' Like Section 10, that first
paragraph flatly repudiates the view of zealous representation
articulated in Lord Brougham's speech. The idea underlying the
second paragraph of Canon 15, which prohibits a lawyer from
stepping out of his professional role and personating the client by
stating his personal belief in the client or his cause, is drawn from
Section 19 of the Alabama Code.322 In accordance with Dickinson's
suggestion, the language in Section 10 that described the limitations
upon a lawyer's zealous representation of his client in terms of "man's
accountability to his Creator.... the duty of obedience to law, and the
obligation to his neighbor," was deleted.323 Believing that in the
normal case a retainer should not require a lawyer to put his life in
danger, the Boston Bar Association and others suggested deleting
Section 10's sentence, "No sacrifice or peril, even to loss of life itself,
can absolve [a lawyer] from the fearless discharge of his duty. 3 24 The
320. Infra App. (Canon 15).
321. Red Book, supra note 136, at 21. Baldwin is described supra note 142.
322. Section 19 of the Alabama Code states both the rule in the second paragraph
of Canon 15 and its rationale:
The same reasons which make it improper in general for an attorney to
testify for his client, apply with greater force to assertions, sometimes made
by counsel in argument, of personal belief in the client's innocence or thejustice of his cause. If such assertions are habitually made they lose all force
and subject the attorney to falsehoods; while the failure to make them in
particular cases will often be esteemed a tacit admission of belief of the
client's guilt, or the weakness of his cause.
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 697. This entire second paragraph was added
to Canon 15 after the preliminary draft of the Canons was sent out for comment.
Compare Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 41-42 (May 1908 first
draft), with infra App. (final version of Canon 15).
323. Red Book, supra note 136, at 22. The change from accountability to God to
the dictates of personal conscience reflects, perhaps, the force of secularization in late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America.
324. Id. at 21-22.
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third sentence of the third paragraph is entirely new and its origin is
unclear, except that it was added after the Committee sought
comments on the May 1908 first draft of the Canons. Its meaning
and language resemble the second sentence of Canon 5, which
concerns the duty of a defense attorney in a criminal case.326
However, the Canons Committee did not consider Section 13 of the
Alabama Code, from which the language of Canon 5 is derived, to be
part of the basis for Canon 15.327 The entirely new last sentence of
Canon 15, which describes the ultimate decision-making authority in
the attorney-client relationship in terms of personal conscience,
emphasizes that the lawyer owes the most fundamental duty to his
own conscience, rather than his client's. That sentence may be
derived from Hoffman's Resolution XIV. 328
Consistent with the fundamental vision expressed in Canon 15,
Canons 17, 18, and 24 give priority to the lawyer's conscience with
respect to dealings with opposing counsel, opposing parties, witnesses,
court personnel, and the incidental matters pending trial. For
example, combining language from Sections 5, 28, and 29 of the
Alabama Code,329 Canon 17 provides:
325. Compare Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 41-42 (1908)
(May 1,908 first draft of Canon 15), with infra App. (final version of Canon 15).
326. See infra notes 380-91 and accompanying text.
327. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App. Susan Carle suggests that in
drafting this third sentence the Canons Committee used "the language Thomas
Goode Jones had unsuccessfully proposed to the Alabama Legal Ethics Committee."
Carle, supra note 13, at 30. The available historical evidence does not support that
suggestion.
As Carle describes that situation, the original draft of what became Section 13
of the Alabama Code contained a second clause that was dropped based upon an
amendment from the floor during the members' debate on the proposed Code. Id. at
14-15 & n.27. But, it was Jones who proposed the floor amendment deleting that
language. Ala. Tenth Meeting, supra note 112, at 19; see also Jones, Canons, supra
note 14, at 495. Contrary to Carle's suggestion, the proposed language for Section 13
that was dropped during debate on that section, but was used later by the Canons
Committee for the third sentence of the second paragraph of Canon 15, would have
been language that Jones had opposed, rather than language he supported.
328. Resolution XIV begins: "My client's conscience and my own are distinct
entities." In the Red Book, Alexander suggested to the Canons Committee that
Hoffman Resolution XIV was something to consider in connection with Alabama
Code Section 10, Red Book, supra note 136, at 23, from which Canon 15 derived.
Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; see also supra notes 321-27 and
accompanying text.
329. The Canons Committee acknowledged that Canon 17 was derived from
Sections 28 and 29 of the Alabama Code, but it did not acknowledge the relevance to
Canon 17 of Section 5 of that Code. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
Nonetheless, the last sentence of Canon 17 is a paraphrase of the last sentence of
Section 5 of the Alabama Code, compare infra App. (Canon t7), with 1907 Comm.
Rep. II, supra note 170, at 690-91 (Ala. Code § 5), and Red Book, supra note 136, at
53 (regarding the Boston Bar Association's suggested revision of language combined
from Sections 5 and 29 of the Alabama Code).
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Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-
feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence
counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward
suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel should be
scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a cause it is indecent to allude
to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and
idiosyncrasies of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies
between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly
wrangling should also be carefully avoided.33"
Canon 18, which is based on Sections 27 and 53 of the Alabama
Code,33' states:
A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with
fairness and due consideration, and he should never minister to the
malevolence or prejudices of a client in the trial or conduct of a
cause. The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer's
conscience in professional matters. He has no right to demand that
his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive
personalities. Improper speech is not excusable on the ground that
it is what the client would say if speaking in his own behalf.32
The point of Canon 18 is that the lawyer should not be subject to his
client's demand to treat the opposing party or adverse witnesses
unfairly, nor pander to his client's prejudices or animosity in the trial
of his case. The lawyer has his own professional duty to treat both the
opposing party and adverse witnesses fairly and with due
consideration, and the lawyer should not delegate to the client the
authority to decide how to treat them.
In language virtually identical to the above-quoted language of
Section 30 of the Alabama Code,333 Canon 24 affirms the lawyer's
authority, and rejects the client's right, to control the incidental
330. Infra App. (Canon 17).
331. Red Book, supra note 136, at 51-52, 82. However, the last sentence of Canon
18 does not appear to be based on either Section 27 or Section 53 of the Alabama
Code. Although the general topic of a "rough tongue" is dealt with in Section 26 of
the Alabama Code, the focus on not allowing a lawyer to hide behind the client's
wishes echoes the concerns of Thomas H. Hubbard in his Hubbard Lecture: "[H]ow
can the standard be maintained if lawyers... may discard their own convictions and
adopt the assumed convictions of their clients, in the conduct of their causes and may,
with impunity, say malicious and false things about their adversaries." Hubbard &
Baldwin, Union Lectures, supra note 296, at 20; see also id. at 14.
Moreover, the Committee adopted a change in language from Section 27 of
the Alabama Code which emphasized even more the lawyer's moral autonomy. The
first sentence of Section 27 stated that "[a]n attorney is under no obligation to
minister to the malevolence or prejudices of a client." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra
note 170, at 701. Canon 18 does not merely release the lawyer from that obligation; it
prescribes as the lawyer's ethical duty not to engage in such pandering: "A lawyer. ..
should never minister to the malevolence or prejudices of a client .... " Infra App.
(Canon 18).
332. Infra App. (Canon 18).
333. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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matters pending trial based upon "his own sense of honor and
propriety." '334 In stating that "no client has a right to demand that his
counsel shall be illiberal 33 5 concerning the incidental matters pending
trial, Canon 24 uses a concept traditionally associated with such honor
and propriety-the generous attitude of a well-bred gentleman whose
broadened "liberal" attitudes have been developed through a
"liberal" education based upon the classics-in supporting the
lawyer's right to determine from the standpoint of his broader and less
self-interested perspective how to act regarding such matters.
In several respects, the Canons clearly surpass the Alabama Code in
the effort to strengthen and support the lawyer's moral autonomy in
the attorney-client relationship. First, Canons 30 and 31 establish the
lawyer's gate-keeping authority. Canon 30 makes gate-keeping with
respect to litigation the responsibility of the lawyer, not the client.
Sounding in its last sentence like a precursor to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure l's certification,336 Canon 30 states:
The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a
defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to
injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. But
otherwise it is his right, and, having accepted retainer, it becomes his
duty to insist upon the judgment of the Court as to the legal merits
of his client's claim. His appearance in Court should be deemed
equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client's
case is one proper for judicial determination. 337
Although the first sentence of Canon 30 is based upon Section 14 of
the Alabama Code,338 the last sentence of Canon 30 was based upon
the following proposal by Hubbard to the Committee: "His
appearance in Court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion, on
his honor, that in his opinion his client is justly entitled to some
measure of relief refused by his adversary. ' '331 The final language
changed the nature of the certification, requiring only that the client's
334. Infra App. (Canon 24). The Committee acknowledged that Canon 24 derives
from Section 30 of the Alabama Code. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App. The
slight change in wording was based upon Dickinson's suggestion to the Committee.
Red Book, supra note 136, at 47.
335. Infra App. (Canon 24).
336. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 is an elaboration of Canon 30. Under Canon
30, the lawyer's appearance in Court is "deemed equivalent to an assertion on his
honor that in his opinion" certain things are true, while under Rule 11(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it is the lawyer's signature on certain documents
presented to the Court that constitutes such a certification. The four propositions
certified under Rule 11 are, in effect, a detailed specification of Canon 30's
"assertion" that the case of the attorney's client "is one proper for judicial
determination." Infra App. (Canon 30).
337. Infra App. (Canon 30).
338. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
339. Red Book, supra note 136, at 29, 107. That proposal, in turn, reflects
Hubbard's earlier proposal to the same effect in his 1903 Lecture at Albany Law
School, see supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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case was "one proper for judicial determination. ' 34  As Simeon
Baldwin pointed out in an article advocating state and local bar
associations to adopt the A.B.A. Canons and the accompanying oath:
The [lawyer] pledges himself not to counsel or maintain any suit or
proceeding which shall appear to him to be unjust, nor any defence
except such as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law of
the land. The burden assumed as to actions is not to satisfy oneself
that a suit is just, before bringing it, but not to bring it if satisfied
that it is unjust-an obligation much less onerous; while as to
defences it is enough if they seem to him honestly to present a
question which, under the law, may be fairly made a subject of
discussion on the trial. In both cases, the client has the benefit of the
doubt. 341
This final language change was perhaps the most hotly discussed topic
among the members of the Canons Committee and was the result of
extended discussions among Hubbard, Thayer, Alexander, and
Stetson.342 In Alexander's view, Canon 30 "raise[d] some of the most
vital questions concerning the proper relations of the lawyer to his
client. '343
340. Infra App. (Canon 30). That substantive language change occurred after the
preliminary draft was sent out for comment, but before the Committee proposed the
final version of Canon 30 at the 1908 A.B.A. annual meeting. Compare Tenn.
Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 45 (May 1908 first draft), with Infra App.
(final version of Canon 30).
341. Baldwin, New American Code, supra note 142, at 545; but see Carle, supra
note 13, at 29 (viewing the change in the language Hubbard proposed as diminishing
the lawyer's duty to do justice).
342. A review of the correspondence of Ezra Thayer with other Committee
members during the spring and summer of 1908 reveals that the final language was
proposed by Thayer in a letter to Stetson (July 16, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at
Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at 488, after a meeting the previous day in
New York City attended by Alexander, those two men, and probably Hubbard and
Dickinson. See Letter from Thayer to Alexander (July 18, 1908), in the Thayer
Archives at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at 492 (discussing a 3 to 2 vote at
the meeting on July 15, 1908). At the meeting the day before, the last sentence of
Canon 30 stated: "His appearance in Court should be deemed equivalent to an
assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client is entitled to a judicial
determination of the questions involved." Letter from Thayer to Stetson, in the
Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School Vol. 5, at 488. Thayer considered
that "too mild an assertion" and, accordingly, proposed the alternative language
which, he believed, had more bite because it focused upon whether the client's entire
case merited judicial consideration, thereby requiring a disclaimer that the case was
"supported by perjured witnesses or false documents." 1d; see also Letter from Thayer
to Jacob M. Dickinson (July 29, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University
Law School, Vol. 6, at 15.
343. Red Book, supra note 136, at 30. For an excellent description of the role of
this gate-keeping responsibility in legal professionalism and an economic analysis of
the lawyer as gatekeeper with respect to strategic litigation, see, e.g., Ronald J.
Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md.
L. Rev. 869 (1990).
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Canon 31 reiterates the lawyer's gate-keeping responsibility for
litigation, but expands the lawyer's moral accountability to include
transactional matters as well. The Alabama Code was entirely silent
on that issue.344 Paraphrasing language newly proposed by Hubbard
to the Committee,345 Canon 31 provides:
No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must
decide what business he will accept as counsel, what causes he will
bring into Court for plaintiffs, what cases he will contest in Court for
defendants. The responsibility for advising questionable
transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging questionable
defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it by
urging as an excuse that he is only following his client's
instructions.346
The "right to decline employment," described in the first two
sentences of Canon 31, enables the lawyer to elect not to represent
clients with respect to lawsuits or transactions that are likely to
require a zealous lawyer to engage in conduct that would offend the
lawyer's conscience. The last three sentences of Canon 31 impose
ultimate moral accountability on the lawyer, but only after supporting
his moral autonomy by establishing his ultimate right to walk away
from prospective clients.
Second, Canon 22 is a particularized description of the lawyer's
duty of candor to the court that is based upon Section 5 of the
Alabama Code.347 However, Canon 22 includes additional types of
misleading conduct that is prohibited by that duty:
348
. 344. Although the Committee indicated in its 1908 Report that Canon 31 was
derived from Section 13 of the Alabama Code, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra
App., Section 13 of the Alabama Code had nothing to do with transactional work.
Section 14 stated only: "An attorney must decline in a civil cause to conduct a
prosecution, when satisfied that the purpose is merely to harass or injure the opposite
party, or to work oppression and wrong." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 695.
345. Red Book, supra note 136, at 107. That proposal reflects, in turn, Hubbard's
comments in his Hubbard Lecture. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text;
see also Hubbard & Baldwin, Union Lectures, supra note 296, at 17, 21.
346. Infra App. (Canon 31).
347. Jones, Canons, supra note 14, at 490.
348. For example, the second paragraph of Canon 22 includes one example of
improper conduct not included in the counterpart listing in Section 5 of the Alabama
Code: "in argument to assert as a fact that which has not been proved." Infra App.
(Canon 22); cf 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 690-91 (Ala. Code § 5). The
third paragraph of Canon 22, concerning candor in dealing with facts, also has no
basis in the Alabama Code. Compare infra App. (Canon 22), with 1907 Comm. Rep.
II, supra note 170, at 690-91 (Ala. Code § 5). The subject matter of that third
paragraph is discussed in, and may be based upon, Sharswood's Ethics. See
Sharswood, supra note 129, at 111-12. The available records of the Committee's
deliberations do not indicate the source of this third paragraph. See Red Book, supra
note 136, at 15-17.
[Vol. 712458
2003] THE A.B.A. 'S 1908 CANONS OF ETHICS 2459
The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness.
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the
contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a
text-book; or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a
decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed;
or in argument to assert as a fact that which has not been proved, or
in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing
arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding
positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends
to rely.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly
with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing
affidavits and other documents, and in the presentation of causes.
A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the Court
should reject, in order to get the same before the jury by argument
for its admissibility, nor should he address to the Judge arguments
upon any point not properly calling for determination by him.
Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed to the
Court, remarks or statements intended to influence the jury or
bystanders.
These and all kindred practices are unprofessional and unworthy
of an officer of the law charged, as is the lawyer, with the duty of
aiding in the administration of justice.349
As the last sentence of Canon 22 makes clear, the content of the
lawyer's professional duties, including specifically his duty of candor
and fairness, is shaped by the lawyer's special role in the
administration of justice-his status as an "officer of the law."35 " The
lawyer's status as an officer of the court also links the duty of candor
and fairness particularized in Canon 22 with the more general
statement in Canon 15 that "[t]he office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client,.., any manner of
fraud or chicane."35' Because he is an officer of the court, those
Canons admonish, the lawyer should not act dishonestly or unfairly
vis- -vis the opposing party or opposing counsel any more than he
should mislead a court.
349. Infra App. (Canon 22).
350. Infra App. (Canon 23). Thus, for example, Canon 23 makes "[a]ll attempts to
curry favor with juries... unprofessional." Fawning, pretended solicitude, and
flattery are not intrinsically immoral. They become "unprofessional" under the
Canons, however, because they undermine the function of the jury in the
administration of justice to make determinations based upon the facts, not subjective
emotions, and, as an officer of the court, the lawyer therefore has a duty not to engage
in such conduct with juries.
351. Id.
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Third, Canon 16 makes the lawyer responsible for trying to control
his client's conduct during litigation:
A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his
clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not
to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards Courts,
judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in
such wrong-doing the lawyer should terminate their relation. 2
The Alabama Code did not deal with this issue at all.353 The first
sentence of Canon 16 was based upon Simeon Baldwin's editing of
Section 37 of the Code of Legal Ethics of the Michigan State Bar
Association.3 4 The second sentence was proposed by William Draper
Lewis,355 then Dean of the Department of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania.3 6 Once again, the Canons contemplate that lawyers
may be forced to use their ultimate recourse vis-h-vis their clients-
withdrawal of representation -to protect their moral autonomy
against an uncooperative client.
Canon 32, the final Canon, states "[tihe Lawyer's Duty in [the] Last
Analysis":
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any
cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor
should any lawyer render, any service or advice involving disloyalty
to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office,
which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or
persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or
betrayal of the public. When rendering any such improper service
or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation.
Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the
best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice
tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also
observe and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until
a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and
as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and
extent. But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as
an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen. 357
352. Id.
353. The Canons Committee acknowledged this silence in the Alabama Code,
indicating in its 1908 Report that Canon 16 derived from Section 37 of the Code of
Legal Ethics of the Michigan State Bar Association. Index and Synopsis of Canons,
infra App.
354. Red Book, supra note 136, at 61; see supra note 353.
355. Red Book, supra note 136, at 61.
356. Id. at 4; see also supra note 145.
357. Infra App. (Canon 32).
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This Canon is unprecedented. The Canons Committee acknowledged
that it was not based upon the Alabama Code."' Although in its 1908
Report the Committee listed Section 52 of the Kentucky Code as
something considered in drafting Canon 32, the scope of Section 52
is much more limited than the full scope of Canon 32. Like the fourth
sentence of Canon 32, Section 52 is concerned only with lawyers
counseling a violation or evasion of statutory law.36°
Around the turn of the twentieth century, this issue of counseling a
violation or evasion of statutory law often arose in the context of
corporate challenges to the constitutionality of a statute or its proper
application. Thus, Canon 32 is, at least in part, the Committee's most
direct response to Roosevelt's concern with corporation lawyers.
That response reflects the influence of the corporation lawyers on the
Committee, particularly Stetson and Howe, and the subjectivity of the
Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering.
Members of the Committee were concerned about the destructive
influence of corporate wealth and power. By the summer of 1908,
both Brewer and Tucker had spoken out against corporations and
corporation lawyers. 31 In its comments about the Canons' first draft,
the Boston Bar proposed a Canon criticizing the conduct of some
corporation lawyers because it believed it was "the duty of the bar to
hold to obloquoy and contempt lawyers who... prostitute their
calling" so as "not to let the glamor of their success blind us to their
iniquities. '362 Transferring into a different context the moralistic
sentiments of Hoffman's Resolution XII that the client "shall never
make me a partner in his knavery, "363 the Boston Bar proposed the
following Canon specifically regarding corporation lawyers:
It is quite as wicked, unworthy and dishonorable for a member of
the bar to assist a rich and powerful corporation in evading the law,
in defrauding investors, in corrupting a legislature or city counsel or
in working an injury of any kind to the public or to an individual
merely because he has been or wishes to be employed as counsel, as
it would be for him to do similar things in his own business and for
his own personal benefit. For the duty to be an upright and public-
spirited citizen, which rests upon a lawyer even more than on a
layman, only increases with the importance of the business in his
charge, and no employment, no success, no fees, no opportunities
for money-making, can justify or excuse a member of the bar for
becoming a partner in his client's knavery.
358. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
359. Id.
360. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 712-13
361. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
362. Red Book, supra note 136, at 123.
363. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 719.
364. Red Book, supra note 136, at 123-24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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That proposal, so hostile to corporation lawyers as a group, had no
chance of adoption by a Committee so populated by lawyers whose
practices then or previously included the representation of railroads
and industrial corporations.3 65 Even though the Committee rejected
that proposal, its emphasis on the special duties of the lawyer to be
"an upright and public-spirited citizen" still can be found in the last
sentence of Canon 32.
On the other hand, at least two of the Committee members were
outspoken in defense of corporation lawyers. In comments that
Alexander excerpted and presented to the Committee,366 Howe
defended corporation lawyers on the theory that everyone's legal
interests deserved to be tested in the adversary system:
It is lamentably common nowadays for politicians and journalists
to scold at what they call "corporation lawyers."
... Corporations have a right to the service and advice of counsel,
and the larger they are the more important it is that they should
have the benefit of such services; and yet, if we are to believe
demagogues and yellow journalists, it is a kind of offense for a
member of the bar to be what they call a "corporation lawyer."
In the course of Federal and state legislation it often occurs that
acts, which claim to be laws, are unconstitutional. The corporations
against which they are directed are bound to take the opinion of
counsel, and to raise the question of constitutionality in such form as
may be proper, and the fact that such statutes have been frequently
found to be unconstitutional is a sufficient answer to the slur on
corporation lawyers. It seems to me that a code of Professional
Ethics might recognize the fact that, the more numerous and
important corporations become, the more it is the right and duty of
the American lawyer to give them advice and to defend them
against illegal attack.367
Stetson also publicly defended corporation lawyers. In a 1907
speech to honor his friend and fellow corporate lawyer, William Birch
Rankine, Stetson contended that "between high moral standards and
the ascertainment of the just rights of corporations and their
administrators there is no necessary divorce.""36  "To test and to
construe a law by its express terms, rather than by a popular
impression of its meaning," Stetson stated, "should not expose one to
just criticism."36 9 Two years later, when giving his presidential address
365. Committee members Dickinson, Howe, Hubbard, Jones, Peck, and Stetson,
among others, represented railroads and industrial corporations. See Carle, supra note
13, at 34-37.
366. See Red Book, supra note 136, at 122-23.
367. Id.
368. Response of Francis Lynde Stetson Before the Niagara Board of Trade 4
(Apr. 29, 1907) (on file with author).
369. Id. at 3.
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to the New York State Bar Association, Stetson pointed out a few
court cases in which a corporation's challenge to a statute was
criticized as an evasion of the law, but ultimately upheld by the
courts.37" Then, taking a more aggressive position, he suggested that
corporation lawyers can play a positive role in making corporations
more morally responsible:
The privilege and the opportunity of lawyers advising corporations
and combinations, and their creators and managers, is to aid in the
process of developing a managerial soul, and of infusing it into
corporate action, and thus to promote the righteousness that shall
exalt the nation.... This praiseworthy disposition may be developed
and stimulated by the judicious and helpful advice of the
corporation lawyers. If in the discharge of this conscientious duty
we shall be tactful and persistent we may help to establish for our
corporations a higher standard of methods and morals .... 371
Undergirding Stetson's positive vision of corporation lawyers was his
insistence that "[t]he lawyer must respect the moral law. 3 72
Canon 32 reflects Stetson's views regarding corporation lawyers.373
The first sentence makes corporation lawyers the equal of other
lawyers-no better, no worse-and imposes upon them the same
moral and political obligations as "ministers" of the laws. Canon 32
underscores that quasi-religious dimension in the attorney-client
relationship, stating in the third sentence that the lawyer "advances
the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when he
renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and
his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral
law. 3 74 With respect to the lawyer's counseling a client about the
scope or constitutionality of statutes, Canon 32 follows the approach
taken by the Committee's two outspoken corporation lawyers and
also by Tucker in his earlier Hubbard Lecture, finding in the lawyer's
370. Francis Lynde Stetson, The Lawyer's Livelihood, in 32 Proceedings of the
New York State Bar Association 169, 182-84 (1909).
371. Id. at 189.
372. Id. at 185.
373. Thayer appears to suggest that Stetson bears special responsibility for Canon
32, when he states in a letter to Stetson that "the new Canon is yours." Letter from
Thayer to Stetson (July 16, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law
School, Vol. 5, at 488. That letter does not identify the Canon to which Thayer is
referring, but by process of elimination it appears to be Canon 32. The only other
completely unprecedented Canons were Canon 2, regarding judicial selection, and
Canons 30 and 31, which were based upon Hubbard's proposals at page 107 of the
Red Book. There is nothing to suggest that Stetson had anything to do with the
proposal or content of Canon 2. Moreover, the content of Canon 32 very closely
parallels Stetson's ideas about corporation lawyers both before and after the Canons
were adopted. See supra notes 368-72 and accompanying text. Finally, in 1909, when
he expressed support to the New York State Bar Association for the Canons as a
whole, the only Canon he specifically discussed was Canon 32. Stetson, supra note
370, at 185.
374. Infra App. (Canon 32).
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conscience the ethical limits on challenging statutes: "He must also
observe and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until a
statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as
to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and
extent. '375 In this context, "conscientiously" refers to the lawyer's
innermost belief, his deepest and best moral judgment. And, in its
very last sentence, echoing the Boston Bar proposal, Canon 32
expresses the view that a lawyer's ultimate professional fulfillment
depends upon his personal integrity-the lawyer's duty to his client
"as an honest man"-and his civic virtue-his duty "as a patriotic and
loyal citizen": "But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as
an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen. 3 76
In sum, the Canons begin with the Alabama Code's recognition of
the importance of the lawyer's conscience and its rejection of Lord
Brougham's view of zealous representation, but the Canons expand
significantly upon those ideas, developing a much more extensive
vision of conscientious lawyering by strengthening and increasing
support for the lawyer's moral autonomy in the attorney-client
relationship. The Canons' goal is to improve the administration of
justice by making the lawyer, as an officer of the court with special
obligations for the administration of justice, more morally
accountable. That, in turn, is designed to enhance the prestige of
lawyers as a group, restoring the legal profession to its place as, in De
Toqueville's view, the American aristocracy.
B. The Implications of the Vision of Conscientious Lawyering
The above-described vision of conscientious lawyering established
in Canons 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 30, 31, and 32 had direct implications
for two ethical issues addressed in the Alabama Code: (1) the lawyer's
duty to represent a criminal defendant; and (2) the lawyer's duty to
avoid conflicts of interest. With respect to both issues, the Canons
adopted provisions that differed from the relevant provisions of the
Alabama Code in ways that reflected the Canons' greater emphasis on
and support for the lawyer's moral autonomy.
1. Defending a Criminal Defendant
Canons 15, 30, and 31 establish the lawyer's right to choose, based
upon his own views of right and wrong, which clients and causes to
represent, as well as the lawyer's obligation not to bring civil cases or
to assert defenses that, in his view, are not sufficiently meritorious to
375. Id.; see also supra notes 367-72 and accompanying text.
376. Infra App. (Canon 32).
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warrant judicial determination. The Canons emphasize the ethical
significance of those decisions by lawyers and the importance of a
lawyer's professional conscience in making them. The Canons'
approach of making lawyers morally accountable for their decisions
about which clients to represent, which cases to undertake, and which
rights and defenses to assert is directly implicated by the questions of
whether it is ethical to represent a person accused of a crime who the
lawyer knows or believes to be guilty as charged and, if so, how
zealously to represent him.
Both Canon 4 and Section 56 of the Alabama Code dealt with this
question in the particular circumstance of a court-appointed
representation of an indigent criminal defendant. Under both, the
court-appointed lawyer "ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial
reason." ''  The two provisions differ, however, in the attitude to be
taken towards the indigent prisoner. Section 56 provides that the
court-appointed lawyer "should always be a friend to the defen[s]eless
and oppressed.""37 In contrast, Canon 4 exhorts a more distanced and
professional stance: the court-appointed lawyer "should always exert
his best efforts in [the indigent prisoner's] behalf." '379
Section 13 of the Alabama Code addressed the issue of representing
a criminal defendant outside the context of a court-appointment:
An attorney cannot reject the defense of a person accused of a
criminal offense, because he knows or believes him guilty. It is his
duty by all fair and honorable means to present such defenses as the
law of the land permits, to the end that no one may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law. 38 0°
Section 13 was fully consistent with Sharswood's Ethics.3 1'
The members of the Committee disagreed over the issues posed by
Section 13. Howe presented comments supporting the retention of
Section 13's approach.3 2 Other Committee members disagreed.
377. Id. (Canon 4). Section 56 contains the same language, except that it uses the
word "light" instead of "trivial." 1907 Comm. Rep. 11, supra note 170, at 712.
378. 1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note 170, at 712.
379. Infra App. (Canon 4).
380. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 695. This provision was adopted
verbatim by two of the ten other bar associations that adopted ethics codes in the
twenty years before 1907. See id. Six bar associations adopted this provision with the
word "honorable" changed to "lawful." Id. The bar associations in Wisconsin and
Kentucky rejected Alabama's approach, changing the words obligating a lawyer-
"cannot reject the defense"-to read "is not bound to reject the defense." Id.
381. See Sharswood, supra note 129, at 90-92. David Mellinkoff views Alabama
Code Section 13 "as a clear distillate of Sharswood principle." Mellinkoff, supra note
272, at 177; see also supra text accompanying notes 206-09.
382. Howe summarized his view as follows:
It seems to be proper that a Code of Professional Ethics should recognize
the fact that a lawyer has the right and is even charged with the duty of
defending the criminal, provided always that he defend him without
misstating facts or misquoting law. He should be careful not to misrepresent
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Thayer believed that a lawyer has the "right," but not the "duty," to
represent a criminal defendant that he knows or believes to be guilty,
and that the lawyer who undertakes such a defense should have the
right, but not the duty, to decide whether to defend as zealously as he
would if he believed the accused to be innocent or if his guilt or
innocence were unclear.383
In the end, the Committee proposed, and the A.B.A. adopted, the
first paragraph of Canon 5, which represents a compromise between
these views:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person
accused of a crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt
of the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only of
suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having
undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound by all fair and
honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land
permits, to the end that no erson may be deprived of life or liberty,
but by due process of law. 38 4
Thus, Canon 5 gives the lawyer, in the exercise of his conscience, the
right to determine whether to defend an accused person, even if the
lawyer knows or believes him to be guilty. But it also imposes an
affirmative obligation upon the lawyer, if such a defense is
undertaken, to represent the accused as zealously as if the lawyer
believed him to be innocent.
The language of the second sentence of Canon 5 was taken almost
verbatim from Section 13 of the Alabama Code, upon which Canon 5
is based. The first sentence of Canon 5, however, marks a
significant change from Section 13. Section 13 prohibited an attorney
from "reject[ing] the defense of a person accused of a criminal
offense, because he knows or believes him guilty," 3 6 while the first
sentence of Canon 5 gives the lawyer the right, but not the duty, to
undertake the defense of a criminal defendant the lawyer knows or
the facts, nor to misquote the law; but, having these rules in mind, he may
defend the accused with all of his powers of argument and eloquence.
Red Book, supra note 136, at 27. Howe's comments were based upon a paper he
presented to the Indiana Bar Association in July 1899, which discussed at length the
relation of "the Moral Conscience to the duties of the advocate," particularly with
respect to the advocate's duty to "defend a man whom you believe to be guilty."
William Wirt Howe, Professional Ethics, 5 Va. L. Reg. 509, 513, 515 (1899).
383. Red Book, supra note 136, at 28-29.
384. Infra App. (Canon 5). The second paragraph of Canon 5, which was added
after the Committee sent out the preliminary draft of the Canons for comment, in
May 1908, provides: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting
of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible." Id. Compare Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 39
(May 1908 first draft of Canon 5), with infra App. (final version of Canon 5).
385. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 695.
386. Id.
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believes is guilty. That change was proposed by the Boston Bar
Association, even though Thayer, a member of that Association, had
dissented from that proposal.38 7
This change from Section 13 of the Alabama Code reflects the
Committee's greater concern for the lawyer's moral autonomy-his
right to determine, as a matter of personal conscience, whether to
represent a criminal defendant whom he knows or believes to be
guilty. This connection between giving lawyers the right, but not
imposing the duty, to defend a person accused of a crime, and
preserving a lawyer's moral autonomy, would have been known to the
Committee Members. In a 1902 book on legal ethics, George
Warvelle had stated his belief that a lawyer should not "decline a
retainer merely because he may believe the accused to be guilty," 38
but that to impose a duty on lawyers to defend an accused would
undermine their moral autonomy:
[A lawyer] is under no obligation to palliate and defend iniquity
of any kind in a court of justice, or to undertake a cause which his
soul abhors, and his condition would be that of an abject and
miserable slave if, as some would contend, he were to be at the
command of every miscreant who might choose to employ him.389
Thus, as David Mellinkoff later recognized, the Canons provide
lawyers with a double defense against public criticism in their dealings
with the criminally accused. First, Canon 5, coupled with the general
statement in Canon 31 that a lawyer "has a right to decline
employment," clearly supports the lawyer's right to decline to
represent a criminal defendant that a lawyer believes is guilty, even
though Canon 4 exhorts lawyers "assigned as counsel for an indigent
prisoner ... not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason.
Second, Canon 5 provides a moral justification for a lawyer who
agrees to represent a criminal defendant:
As a practical matter, Canon 5 was not intended to convince
lawyers to defend anyone who wanted a defense, but to remind non-
lawyers that a lawyer was not necessarily a moral delinquent if he
did. Occasionally lawyers would speak of a "right and obligation to
defend persons charged with crime." What they were really trying
to tell the world in Canon 5 was that lawyers had a right to defend,
regardless of what they or the community thought of an accused
man, and that a system of justice required at least that much. 9
In short, the change from Section 13 of the Alabama Code to
Canon 5 reflected the Committee's commitment to the lawyer's right,
387. Red Book, supra note 136, at 28-29.
388. George W. Warvelle, Essays in Legal Ethics 133 (2d ed. 1920).
389. Id. at 132.
390. Mellinkoff, supra note 272, at 178.
391. Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted).
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in the exercise of his moral autonomy, to choose whether to represent
an unassigned criminal defendant he knew or believed to be guilty.
At the same time, this change provided an ethical defense, based upon
the legitimate needs of the administration of justice, for those lawyers
whose conscience allowed them to represent criminal defendants that
they knew or believed to be guilty.
2. Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
Underlying the ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest is, among
other things, a view about the proper relationship between the lawyer
and his current and former clients. The attorney-client relationship is
generally considered to require (1) a lawyer's duty of loyalty to a
current client that, absent informed consent, permits no conflicting
interests, whether professional interests based upon obligations to
other clients or the lawyer's own personal, social, or business interests,
and (2) a lawyer's duty, absent informed consent, to preserve the
sanctity of confidential information imparted by a current or former
client. The degree of moral autonomy accorded in the attorney-client
relationship has implications for both the lawyer's duty of loyalty and
his duty of client confidentiality. Not surprisingly then, while the
Canons strengthened and increased support for the lawyer's moral
autonomy in comparison to the Alabama Code, the Canons show less
concern than the Alabama Code with conflicts of interest.
This diminished concern is reflected in the fact that of the thirty-two
Canons only Canon 6 concerns conflicts of interest, whereas five
sections of the Alabama Code-Sections 22, 23, 25, 31, and 34-deal
with that subject. 92  Nor is it possible to view Canon 6 as the
combination of those five sections of the Alabama Code. First, as the
Canons Committee acknowledges in its 1908 Report, Canon 6 is based
on Sections 22, 25, and 34 of the Alabama Code; it is not based upon
Section 23 or Section 31. 393 Moreover, as shown below, there are
392. This comparison does not include the conflict of interests inherent in business
transactions between lawyers and their clients. But, with respect to that sort of
conflict of interest as well, the Alabama Code shows greater concern than the Canons.
Section 38 of the Alabama Code focuses on a lawyer's business dealings with his
client: "Attorneys should, as far as possible, avoid becoming either borrowers or
creditors of their clients; and they ought scrupulously to refrain from bargaining about
the subject matter of their litigation, so long as the relation of attorney and client
continues." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 704. This provision was adopted
by nine other state bar associations in their ethics codes. Id. The Canons Committee
narrowed the focus of this provision, dealing in Canon 10 only with the conflict of
interest that develops when a lawyer acquires an interest in the "subject matter of the
litigation." Infra App. (Canon 10); see also infra notes 450-54 and accompanying text.
There is no attempt in the Canons to regulate other business dealings, such as loans or
other transactions, between the lawyer and his client, which is within the ambit of
Section 38. See infra App.
393. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
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issues dealt with in those five sections of the Alabama Code that do
not appear in Canon 6 at all.
Canon 6 contains three paragraphs:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any
interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed.394
Each of these three paragraphs is a shortened version of a section of
the Alabama Code.
The first paragraph of Canon 6 is based upon Section 34 of the
Alabama Code, which provided:
An attorney is in honor bound to disclose to the client at the time
of retainer, all the circumstances of his relation to the parties, or
interest or connection with the controversy, which might justly
influence the client in the selection of his attorney. He must decline
to appear in any cause where his obligations or relations to the
opposite parties will hinder or seriously embarrass the full and
fearless discharge of all his duties.
The first paragraph of Canon 6 is a slightly reworded version of the
first sentence of Section 34,396 but it does not include the second
sentence regarding the lawyer's obligation not to represent a client
because of personal or professional obligations to or relations with an
opposing party.397 The second paragraph of Canon 6 makes it
"unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,' 3 but that appears
to prohibit only the representation of conflicting client interests.
Thus, neither Canon 6, nor any of the other Canons, carries forward
the Alabama Code's prohibition of conflicts of interest caused by the
lawyer's non-representational relations with an adverse party in a
lawsuit or transaction, such as conflicts caused by a lawyer's personal,
394. Infra App. (Canon 6).
395. 1907 Comm. Rep. I, supra note 170, at 703.
396. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
397. See infra App. (Canon 6).
398. Id.
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social, or business interests. This is a significant omission, especially
since Section 34 was adopted by nine other state bar associations.399
The second paragraph of Canon 6 is based upon Section 25 of the
Alabama Code, which concerns concurrent client conflicts:
An attorney can never represent conflicting interests in the same
suit or transaction, except by express consent of all so concerned,
with full knowledge of the facts. Even then such a position is
embarrassing, and ought to be avoided. An attorney represents
conflicting interests within the meaning of this rule, when it is his
duty, in behalf of one of his clients, to contend for that which duty to
other clients in the transaction requires him to oppose.
411
The first and third sentences of this Section were substantially
adopted in paragraph two of Canon 6, but the second sentence of this
Section was eliminated for reasons that were unstated,4 1 even though
this Section was adopted verbatim by seven state bar associations and
in substance by three others.4 '2 In dropping that second sentence,
Canon 6 evidences some disregard for the problem of concurrent
client conflicts, since it neglects to carry forward the Alabama Code's
admonition to avoid concurrent conflicts of interest despite consent by
both parties after full disclosure.
The third paragraph of Canon 6 is based upon Section 22 of the
Alabama Code, which describes the impact of the duty of client
confidentiality4"3 for conflicts of interest involving former clients:
The duty not to divulge the secrets of clients extends further than
mere silence by the attorney, and forbids accepting retainers or
employment afterwards from others involving the client's interests,
in the matters about which the confidence was reposed. When the
secrets or confidence of a former client may be availed of or be
material, in a subsequent suit, as the basis of any judgment which
may injuriously affect his rights, the attorney cannot appear in such
cause, without the consent of his former client.4
This provision was adopted completely by eight other state bar
399. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 703.
400. Id. at 700.
401. See Red Book, supra note 136, at 50.
402. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 700.
403. Section 21 of the Alabama Code describes the lawyer's duty of client
confidentiality: "Communications and confidences between client and attorney are
the property and secrets of the client, and can not be divulged except at his instance;
even the death of the client does not absolve the attorney from his obligation of
secrecy." Id. at 698. This provision was adopted in the ethics codes of each of the
other ten state bar associations. Id. Thomas Goode Jones had adopted it from the
attorney's oath of office codified at Section 872 of the 1867 Alabama Code, which, in
turn, had been based upon the Field Code of Procedure proposed in New York
roughly twenty years earlier. Marston, supra note 14, at 499-500, 506. Despite the
widespread acceptance of Section 21, the Canons did not contain any specifically
prescribed duty of client confidentiality. See infra App.
404. 1907 Comm. Rep. I1, supra note 170, at 698-99.
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associations in their ethics codes, and the Missouri State Bar
Association adopted the first sentence. 40 5  Nonetheless, based
apparently on the recommendation of Committee member Dickinson
and the Boston Bar Association, Canon 6 eliminated the second
sentence of Section 22,406 which stated the reason for disqualification
and provided that the conflict of interest could be cured by client
consent.
Moreover, two sections of the Alabama Code concerning conflicts
of interest are not taken up at all in the Canons. First, Section 23 of
the Alabama Code describes the duty a lawyer owes not to undo his
own legal work on behalf of a former client:
An attorney can never attack an instrument or paper drawn by
him for any infirmity apparent on its face; nor for any other cause
where confidence has been reposed as to the facts concerning it.
Where the attorney acted as a mere conveyancer, and was not
consulted as to the facts, and unknown to him, the transaction
amounted to a violation of the criminal laws, he may assail it on that
ground, in suits between third persons, or between parties to the
instrument and strangers. °7
This provision was incorporated in the ethics codes of nine other state
bar associations,411  yet it was not carried forward in the Canons, 9
leaving them without any provision concerning the duty of loyalty
owed a former client. The only stated basis for the omission of a
provision based upon Section 23 was the comment of Elmer
McDonald, a lawyer from Minnesota, 1 who stated that Section 23
should not be adopted because the issue of whether to attack his own
instrument "should be left to the good judgment and wise, honest
discretion of the attorney." 411
Second, Section 31 of the Alabama Code gave priority to the oldest
client in a litigation between two current clients of a lawyer: "Where
an attorney has more than one regular client, the oldest client in the
absence of some agreement should have the preference of retaining
the attorney, as against his other clients in litigation between them. 41 z
Michigan adopted the same provision,413 but the Canons adopted no
preference for the oldest client. Two lawyers recommended that the
Canons Committee reject Section 31, contending that the attorney
should be disqualified from representing either client without the
405. Id. at 699.
406. Red Book, supra note 136, at 48.
407. 1907 Comm. Rep. ii, supra note 170, at 699.
408. Id.
409. See Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
410. Red Book, supra note 136, at 4.
411. Id. at48.
412. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 702.
413. Id.
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consent of both of them." One lawyer suggested that the lawyer
should have discretion as to which client to represent.4"5 Committee
member Dickinson also rejected Section 31, stating that the rule could
work a hardship on an attorney because it "might operate so as to give
one who brings him but little business the right to retain him as
against those whose business is far more lucrative."4"'
The elimination of some or all of the five sections of the Alabama
Code specifically concerning conflicts of interest suggests the Canons
Committee's lesser concern with such conflicts. In the twenty-first
century, when conflicts of interest make up such a large part of legal
ethics, the Canons' lack of emphasis on conflicts of interest may seem
particularly strange. However, such a de-emphasis on conflicts is
consistent with, if not the logical outcome of, an ethic for lawyers
whose fundamental vision of representation emphasizes the lawyer's
moral autonomy in the attorney-client relationship. In giving the
lawyer more control and discretion over the representation of a client,
the Canons legitimate a certain distance from the interests, emotions,
and concerns pressing upon the client. The Canons give the lawyer
the space-in fora conscientia-to decide for himself whether and in
what respect to accept, and how to deal most appropriately with, those
client interests, emotions, and concerns. By lessening the direct
impact of those interests, emotions, and concerns upon lawyers in
their representational capacity, the Canons logically push toward an
ethical view allowing lawyers to reconcile within their own
consciences the differing interests of their clients or even their own
differing interests with their clients.
This tension between the Canons' strong support for the lawyer's
moral autonomy in the attorney-client relationship, and a lessened
concern with conflicts of interest, is highlighted in Clyde Spillenger's
insightful exploration of the ethical issues raised about Louis
Brandeis's independent lawyering in the 1916 Senate Committee
hearings on Brandeis's nomination to the United States Supreme
Court ("1916 Hearings").4"7  Spillenger describes the lawyerly
independence Brandeis sought in his public representations as the
result of both his personal character and the Mugwump-Progressive
political culture to which he subscribed, rather than an explicit
commitment to any particular theory of lawyering." Nonetheless,
414. Red Book, supra note 136, at 55.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 54.
417. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's
Lawyer, 105 Yale L.J. 1445, 1498-1522 (1996).
418. Id.
For Brandeis, the habit of nonaffiliation did not emerge from a role-specific
conception of the lawyer's proper attitude, but in fact constituted an
essential element of his approach to political action of all kinds-one that
was well adapted to Mugwump-Progressive political culture, as well as
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that lawyerly independence, which Brandeis himself described in his
above-mentioned 1905 speech, The Opportunity in the Law, 419 bears a
great similarity to the moral autonomy envisioned in the Canons,
because both emphasized the sovereignty of personal conscience.421
For example, even when offered lucrative matters, Brandeis
apparently needed to satisfy himself, based upon his own moral and
political views, of the justness of the representation.421
In describing the 1916 Hearings, Spillinger investigates, among
other things, that aspect of the attack on Brandeis's fitness to become
a Supreme Court Justice that was based upon the contention that
Brandeis acted unethically because, in effect, he permitted his own
moral and political views to intrude improperly in the attorney-client
relationship. As Spillinger explains:
The 1916 hearings were virtually one long inquiry into claims
that, on various occasions, Brandeis had violated the ethical norms
of law practice. And almost all of the charges played on a common
theme-that Brandeis did not measure his duties as advocate
according to the interest of an individual client, to whom he owed
unqualified loyalty; in more modern terms, he had become
embroiled in conflicts of interests and had failed to pursue his
clients' interests with the zeal required by the canons of the bar. But
the "conflicts of interest" here were of an idiosyncratic kind:
responsive to his own preferred way of functioning in the world.
Id. at 1469. "[A]utonomy was not simply a lawyering ethic but was native to
Brandeis's character ..... Id. at 1449. "That aspiration to autonomy was not only
native to Brandeis's temperament, but also highly honored by the political culture of
his time." Id. at 1452. "[O]ne fundamental attribute of Mugwumpery that Brandeis
retained was an unqualified commitment to personal independence." Id. at 1454.
"The Mugwump... offered as his paradigm of citizen participation in
governance the hermetically sealed and uncompromisingly expressed conscience of
the upright individual." Id. at 1490. "[H]is style in ... lawyering had as much to do
with a chosen mode of self-presentation as with larger ideals of the good lawyer ... 
Id. at 1522.
419. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 67, 319-76 and accompanying text.
421. Spillenger, supra note 417, at 1475, describes the 1916 testimony of Waddill
Catchings, a lawyer from Sullivan & Cromwell representing the Harriman railroad
interests, who was surprised that when he sought to retain Brandeis to represent those
interests in connection with a proxy fight involving the Illinois Central Railroad,
Brandeis wanted to be persuaded of the "justness" of the client's cause before he
would take on the lucrative representation:
I ... had to lay the situation before Mr. Brandeis, and I may say that the
hardest interview I had during the whole campaign was with Mr. Brandeis in
convincing him of the justness of our cause, so to speak.
[H]e had to be satisfied of the justness of our position. It was an
unusual experience. I had occasion to retain other lawyers and no one ever
raised that question.
Id. (quoting 1 Ray M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein, The Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings and Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of
Supreme Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1916-1975, at 338, 344
(1977)).
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Brandeis was accused essentially of permitting his own vision to
interfere with what should have been a deferential loyalty to his
clients.... Austen G. Fox, who presented most of the evidence
against Brandeis during the hearings, suggested to Amos Pinchot
that "[t]he trouble with Mr. Brandeis is that he never loses his
judicial attitude toward his clients. He always acts the part of a
judge toward his clients instead of being his client's lawyer, which is
against the practices of the Bar."
4 22
Assuming that the ethical concerns of those elite lawyers who
lobbied against Brandeis's nomination were genuine and not merely a
pretext for other, less exalted reasons for their opposition, such as
anti-semitism, Spillinger's description of these ethical concerns can be
read in two interesting ways. On the one hand, what Spillinger has
described may be the elite bar's criticism of the conscientious
lawyering envisioned by the Canons from the standpoint of a more
client-dominated view of lawyering consistent, or at least more
consistent, with the view of zealous representation expressed in Lord
Brougham's speech. 23 From that perspective, Brandeis was being
called to account for the de-emphasis on conflicts of interest that is
implicit in any vision of independent lawyering that emphasizes, as do
the Canons, the lawyer's moral autonomy in the attorney-client
relationship.
On the other hand, if we assume that the elite lawyers raising those
ethical concerns embraced the Canons' vision of conscientious
lawyering, as other members of the A.B.A. did, then their ethical
concerns can be read as evidencing some limits on the privileged
status of the lawyer's conscience under the Canons. From that
perspective, the ethical concerns of those elite lawyers suggest that
even according to the Canons, the lawyer's conscience is only one
among four voices that needs to be taken into account in order to
fulfill a lawyer's ethical duties. In addition to a duty to his own moral
and political views, a lawyer has a duty to (1) the courts and the legal
422. Id. at 1500 (footnotes omitted).
423. Spillenger is somewhat ambiguous in his description of the view of lawyering
adopted by those critical of Brandeis. On the one hand, he describes them as lagging
behind Brandeis's more modern view of lawyering "that has partially supplanted the
image of lawyers as adversarial litigators that structured the set of legal-ethical norms
prevalent in Brandeis's day." Id. at 1523. This suggests that the critics adopted an
older, more traditional view of the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 1501 n.190. On
the other hand, he describes Austen Fox, for example, as "reflect[ing] the changed
self-image of the mainstream bar, from a nineteenth century conception of
representation as moral and public to one that regarded it as private and
professional." Id. at 1501. Such a statement reflects a more modern view of lawyering
as compared to Brandeis's more gentlemanly nineteenth-century view. See id. at 1492
n.167. The ambiguity in Spillinger's description may be a result of the existence, both
before and after 1916, of a tradition of lawyering consistent with Lord Brougham's
views. See supra notes 271-73, 292-96 and accompanying text; infra 524-32 and
accompanying text.
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system generally; (2) his client; and (3) his own economic self-
interest.424 Thus, the ethical concerns of those elite lawyers may
reflect their view that the Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering
requires a lawyer to integrate the duty to his conscience with three
other sets of obligations, and that in his practice Brandeis gave too
much priority to his own moral and political views and not enough to
the duty to his client.
C. The Canons' Attack on Commercialism
Just as Roosevelt considered wealth to have undermined the
independence of corporation lawyers, members of the Committee
viewed the increasing commercialism pervading the legal profession
as a general threat to the moral autonomy of the lawyer in the
attorney-client relationship.425 In essence, the lawyer's own economic
self-interest, heightened by the client's interests and emotions and
supported by the general commercialism of the times, could
undermine the autonomy of the lawyer's conscience. Consequently,
alongside the vision of conscientious lawyering, a second major
element of the Canons was to continue and expand upon the Alabama
Code's proscription of certain commercial practices and attitudes
among attorneys. That element did not just support the Canons'
vision of conscientious lawyering; it also emphasized the distinction
between a profession and a trade, which was important to maintaining
and enhancing the status of the profession and the personal self-
esteem of its members.426
424. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
425. The commercialism to which the members of the Canons Committee were
reacting had at least two sides: first, a concern about the increasingly powerful
presence of corporations, which, as reflected in Roosevelt's 1905 speech, were viewed
with hostility around the turn of the twentieth century because they threatened the
perceived public interest; and, second, a concern about the values of the mass of
private practitioners who, under the force of economic necessity, were imbued, as the
Committee's 1906 Report had stated, with less worthy motives and whose efforts to
attract clients resembled the practices of tradesmen. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
426. Sharswood's description of the decline of the legal profession in Rome from
an "honorable office to a money-making trade" emphasizes the class-based nature of
the decline. See Sharswood, supra note 129, at 142. He quotes from Gibbon: "The
noble art, which had once been preserved as the sacred inheritance of the patricians,
was fallen into the hands of the freedmen and plebians, who, with cunning rather than
with skill, exercised a sordid and pernicious trade." Id. at 141 (quoting 2 Edward
Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 214 (London,
Bohn 1854)). Similarly, in contrasting the rule prohibiting barristers from suing their
clients for a fee, with the lack of such prohibition applicable to the lower strata
comprised of attorneys and solicitors, id. at 142-44, Sharswood distinguishes the upper
strata of England's legal profession from its lesser counterpart and emphasizes that
lawyers who are themselves entitled to greater social status conduct themselves in
conformity with an anti-commercial ethos. His clear implication is that lawyers who
avoid too great a concern with money are entitled to consider themselves-and to be
considered by others-as gentlemanly members of an elite profession, while those
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The Canons distinguish the practice of law as a profession from the
practice of law as a trade, based in part on the role that lawyers and
judges play in the administration of justice. In its Preamble, in the
prominent positioning of the Canons regarding judges, and in the
numerous other Canons that link the conduct of ethical lawyers to the
goal of justice, the Canons trumpet that republican theme.427
The Canons' Preamble emphasizes the legal profession's role in the
administration of justice:
In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments
of government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly
essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be
developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that the
public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of its administration. The future of the republic, to a
great extent, depends upon our maintenance of justice pure and
unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the
motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the
approval of all just men.42
Although sharing that republican theme with the Preamble to the
Alabama Code of Ethics,429 the language of the Canons' Preamble,
especially its last two sentences, is drawn directly from the beginning
of the Canons Committee's 1906 Report and Lucien Alexander's 1905
paper.
430
The importance of this republican theme is evident also in the
prominence given to judges in the Canons. Perhaps following a
suggestion from Dean Costigan of the Nebraska Law School that the
lawyers who adopt a more commercial ethos are practitioners engaged in a lower-
class trade.
427. The republican theme running through the Canons is explored in Pearce,
Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 241. The importance of this republican theme
should not be underestimated, since it fulfilled many of the purposes underlying the
adoption of the Canons and some of the important goals implicit in the A.B.A.'s
professionalism project. On the basis of this republican theme: (1) the A.B.A. argued
to the lay public that lawyers and judges played a special political and social role in
American government and, therefore, that the legal profession should be held in high
esteem and accorded special privileges and prerogatives; (2) the A.B.A. explained to
the lay public, its members, and other lawyers why the adoption of the Canons was in
the public interest, why the lay public should care about and defer to them, and why
its members and other lawyers should live their professional lives in accordance with
the Canons' vision and requirements; and, (3) the A.B.A. provided its members and
other lawyers a sense of identity, self-esteem, and meaning in being a lawyer around
the turn of the twentieth century. In an earlier article, I underestimated the
continuing influence of republicanism around the turn of the twentieth century. See
Altman, supra note 174, at 1056,1059.
428. Infra App. (Preamble).
429. Cf 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 685-86 (Preamble to Alabama
Code).
430. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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first part of the Canons concern duties owed to the courts, judicial
officers, and jurors, 43' the first three Canons concern judges. Canon 1
describes the lawyer's duty to adopt a respectful attitude toward
judges. 4 2 Canon 2 describes the lawyer's duty to support the non-
partisan selection of independent and competent judges. 433 Canon 3
describes the lawyer's duty to exhibit a "self-respecting
independence" from judges. 434 Giving these duties priority of place,
the Canons emphasize the importance attached to fair and impartial
justice and the crucial role of lawyers and judges in the administration
of justice.
Finally, a number of other Canons also link the ethics of legal
practice with the goal of justice. Canon 5 makes it the primary duty of
the prosecutor "to see that justice is done. 435 Canon 15 acknowledges
the lawyer's concern with "the justice of [the client's] cause. 436
Canon 19 proscribes the lawyer from testifying "[e]xcept when
essential to the ends of justice. '437  Canon 20 condemns newspaper
publications by lawyers that "prejudice the due administration of
justice.""43 Canon 22 recognizes that "the lawyer [is charged] with the
duty of aiding in the administration of justice."'4319 Canon 29 imposes
upon the lawyer the duty "to improve not only the law but [also] the
administration of justice. ' 4411
An anti-commercial attitude consistent with both goals-supporting
the vision of conscientious lawyering and distinguishing law as a
profession from law as a trade-is evident in the Canons' treatment of
two major topics in legal ethics regarding the market for legal services:
431. See Red Book, supra note 136, at 129-30. The prominent position of these first
three Canons also may reflect the high proportion of judges or former judges on the
Committee.
432. Infra App. (Canon 1); see also infra notes 545-47 and accompanying text.
433. Infra App. (Canon 2); see also infra notes 548-50 and accompanying text.
434. Infra App. (Canon 3).
435. Id.; see also supra note 384.
436. Infra App. (Canon 15); see also supra notes 320-28 and accompanying text.
437. Infra App. (Canon 19).
438. Infra App. (Canon 20).
439. Infra App. (Canon 22); see also supra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
440. Infra App. (Canon 29); see also infra notes 534-541 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, the Canons Committee deliberately left out of Canon 29 the
explanation of the close interrelationship between the legal profession and the
administration of justice in Section 8 of the Alabama Code: "for [the legal profession]
is so interwoven with the administration of justice that whatever redounds to the good
of one advances the other; and the attorney thus discharges, not merely an obligation
to his brothers, but a high duty to the state and his fellowman." 1907 Comm. Rep. II,
supra note 170, at 692. This same explanation was included in the codes of ethics of
ten other state bar associations. Id. at 692-93. Although Canon 29 was based upon
Section 8 of the Alabama Code and incorporated the first clause of that section
almost verbatim, the Committee chose not to include this explanation. The omission
was suggested by Charles Boston, a New York lawyer quite well known for his work
in legal ethics, who believed the explanation was unnecessary. Red Book, supra note
136, at 20; Miller, supra note 143, at 394, 397-98.
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(1) the financial dimensions of an existing attorney-client relationship;
and (2) the efforts of lawyers to obtain clients. 4 '
1. The Financial Dimensions of the Attorney-Client Relationship
Paraphrasing various sections of the Alabama Code,442 Canon 12
concerns the lawyer's obligations in setting his fee:
In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate
their advice and services, as well as those which undervalue them[.]
A client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess of the value
of the service, though his poverty may require a less charge, or even
none at all. The reasonable requests of brother lawyers, and of their
widows and orphans without ample means, should receive special
and kindly consideration.
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider: (1)
the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the
cause; (2) whether the acceptance of employment in the particular
case will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely
to arise out of the transaction, and in which there is a reasonable
expectation that otherwise he would be employed, or will involve
the loss of other business while employed in the particular case or
antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar
for similar services; (4) the amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (5) the
contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the
441. Historian Jerold Auerbach has suggested that the Canons' anti-commercialism
also conceals an ethnic and class bias against the mass of private practitioners in
urban settings who tended to be Jewish or Catholic and from immigrant or lower class
backgrounds and whose clients tended to be blue-collar workers, new immigrants, or
members of the urban poor. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 50-52. Whether the
Committee's members harbored such motives in drafting the Canons is less clear than
the disparate impact Auerbach demonstrates regarding the effects of the Canons'
anti-commercial provisions on such private practitioners, as opposed to the elite
practitioners in corporate law firms, especially as the Canons were interpreted and
subsequently enforced by bar associations. That same disparate impact is described in
Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group
Moral Code, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 244, 254-66 (1968).
442. Canon 12 derives from Sections 48, 49, 50, and 52 of the Alabama Code. See
infra App. (Canon 12); 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 708-09 (Ala. Code).
The first two sentences of the first paragraph of Canon 12 paraphrase Section 48 of
the Alabama Code. Compare infra App. (Canon 12), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra
note 170, at 708 (Ala. Code § 48). The third sentence of the first paragraph of Canon
12 is drawn from Section 52 of the Alabama Code. Compare infra App. (Canon 12),
with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 710 (Ala. Code § 52). The second
paragraph of Canon 12 is based upon a combination of Sections 49 and 50 of the
Alabama Code. Compare infra App. (Canon 12), with 1907 Comm. Rep. 11, supra
note 170, at 709 (Ala. Code §§ 49-50). The third paragraph of Canon 12 is taken,
almost verbatim, from the last sentence of Section 50 of the Alabama Code. Compare
infra App. (Canon 12), with 1907 Comm. Rep. 1I, supra note 170, at 709 (Ala. Code §
50).
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character of the employment, whether casual or for an established
and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is
controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining the real value of
the service.
In fixing fees it should never be forgotten than the profession is a
branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-
getting trade.443
Separated from the second paragraph for special emphasis, 444 the
third paragraph of Canon 12 describes the lawyer's fundamental
orientation in his financial dealings with his client. It distinguishes the
legal profession, whose end is justice, from a trade, whose end is
"mere money-getting, ' '445 and it makes that distinction the overarching
principle regarding the financial relationship between a lawyer and his
client. In effect, the third paragraph of Canon 12 requires the lawyer
to employ the criteria enumerated in the second paragraph when
setting his fee, with that overarching principle in mind.
The last sentence of the second paragraph further defines the
nature of those enumerated criteria: they are "mere guides in
ascertaining the real value of the service." In focusing on the "value"
of the lawyer's legal services, Canon 12 adopts a way of thinking about
legal fees that incorporates both moral and market considerations.
The financial relationship with a client is not, strictly speaking, a
transaction for profit and it certainly is not viewed as an opportunity
to make as much money as the market will bear. Indeed, the first
paragraph of Canon 12 clearly states that "La] client's ability to pay
cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service." In
focusing on the "value" of the lawyer's legal services, the Canons
seem to contemplate an equal exchange, the giving of money equal in
value to the services rendered. Neither the lawyer, nor the client,
should take advantage of the other. The first paragraph of Canon 12
makes that explicit: "In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges
which overestimate their advice and services, as well as those which
undervalue them."
The lawyer's right not to be taken advantage of by his client is
reinforced by Canon 14, regarding disputes with clients over legal
fees: "Controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be
avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-
respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his
services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to
443. Infra App. (Canon 12).
444. The Canons Committee divided Section 50 of the Alabama Code into the
second and third paragraphs of Canon 12, giving the last sentence of Section 50
special prominence by making it an entirely separate paragraph and placing it last. See
supra note 442.
445. Infra App. (Canon 12).
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prevent injustice, imposition or fraud. ' 446  This provision also
combines both moral and market considerations. Although drawn
from Section 47 of the Alabama Code,447 Canon 14 goes beyond that
section in establishing the lawyer's "right to receive reasonable
recompense." No such "right" is stated in the Alabama Code. In
establishing such a "right," the Canons differentiate the American
lawyer from the English barrister who, at least in 1908, could not sue
to collect a fee because a barrister's legal fee was "strictly in the
nature of pure honoraria.""' In this respect, the Canons depart from
what Sharswood viewed as the purer professionalism of an earlier era,
when lawyers' fees generally retained their honorary character and
there were strict limitations on the circumstances when a lawyer could
sue a client to obtain his fee.449
A lawyer's conscience is a treacherous guide when the lawyer has a
personal financial stake in the outcome of a lawsuit. Consistent with
that observation and the longstanding rules against champerty,45
Canon 10 prohibits lawyers from "purchas[ing] any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.""45 Although
Canon 10 is related to the more general topic of business transactions
with clients discussed in Section 38 of the Alabama Code,452 the
Committee indicated that Canon 10 was not based upon Section 38,
but rather on Hoffman's Resolution XXIV,453 which deals at length
with a resolution "against purchasing, in whole or in part, my client's
rights, after the relation of client and counsel, in respect to it, has been
446. Id.
447. Id.; see also 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 708. The wording change
in Section 47 was based upon suggestions to the Committee by Simeon Baldwin and
Committee member Dickinson. Red Book, supra note 136, at 63.
448. See Red Book, supra note 136, at 68.
449. Sharswood explained that "at one time.. . an attorney could not recover,
without an express promise, anything beyond the trifling and totally inadequate sum
provided in the fee bill." Sharswood, supra note 129, at 145. Sharswood quotes
Coleridge's Table Talk, Vol. 2, regarding the connection between that "ancient rule"
and professionalism:
I should be sorry to see the honorary character of the fees of barristers ...
done away with. Though it seems to be a shadowy distinction, yet I believe
it to be beneficial in effect. It contributes to preserve the idea of a
profession, of a class which belongs to the public, in the employment and
remuneration of which no law interferes, but the citizen acts [as] he likes, in
"foro conscientiae."
Id. at 145 n.1.
450. See generally Max Radin, Maintenance By Champerty, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 48
(1935).
451. Infra App. (Canon 10).
452. Section 38 of the Alabama Code provided:
Attorneys should, as far as possible, avoid becoming either borrowers or
creditors of their clients; and they ought scrupulously to refrain from
bargaining about the subject matter of their litigation, so long as the relation
of attorney and client continues.
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 704; see also supra note 240.
453. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
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fully established. 454
For similar reasons, contingency fees were viewed as a serious
threat to the Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering. For example,
the Boston Bar Association advised the Committee that contingency
fees were antithetical to the lawyer's independence from his client,
because, in effect, the lawyer became the client's partner-in-interest:
By means of such a contract he may get more than his
professional services are worth. The excess is to be attributed to the
risk which he runs of getting little or nothing in return for his time
and trouble. To this extent his relation to the client is not that of a
legal adviser, but a partner in a business venture. The evil
tendencies of such dealings with the client are plain. They tend to
promote litigation and to degrade the practice of the law from an
honorable profession to a mere money-getting trade; they involve a
transaction between counsel and client in which their interests are
opposed, in which the lawyer's knowledge and experience give him
an advantage, and in which he is tempted to overreach the client; a
speedy settlement may yield the lawyer a return out of all
proportion to the labor expended, and this may tempt him to advise
such a settlement for his own benefit and against the real interest of
his client; moreover the lawyer becomes to all intents and purposes a
party in the cause which impairs his capacity to advise wisely and
exposes him to all the temptations to which parties are exposed to
be unfair or dishonorable in the preparation and trial of their
cases.
455
This view echoed Sharswood's earlier negative assessment of
contingency fees.456 Other commentators advised the Committee that
454. 1907 Comm. Rep. 11, supra note 170, at 725. Indeed, in the May 1908 first
draft, Canon 10 closely tracked the language of Section 38 of the Alabama Code.
Compare Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 40 (May 1908 first
draft), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 704 (Ala. Code § 38). The
Committee changed that language to conform more closely to Hoffman Resolution
XXIV in the version it proposed, and that was adopted, at the 1908 A.B.A. annual
meeting. Compare 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 724-25 (Hoffman
Resolution XXIV), with infra App. (final version of Canon 10). But see Marston,
supra note 14, at 505-06 (arguing that Canon 10 is based on Section 38 of the Alabama
Code).
455. Red Book, supra note 136, at 72-73.
456. Sharswood discountenanced contingent fees. Although he recognized their
legality and their utility, Sharswood, supra note 129, at 154-59, he regarded contingent
fee arrangements as "a very dangerous tendency" for the attorney's relationship with
his client, Sharswood, supra note 129, at 153, because "[tihey are no longer attorney
and client, but partners." Id. at 160-61.
[This] changes entirely the relation of counsel to the cause. It reduces him
from his high position of an officer of the court and a minister of justice, to
that of a party litigating his own claim. Having now a deep personal interest
in the event of the controversy, he will cease to consider himself subject to
the ordinary rules of professional conduct. He is tempted to make success,
at all hazards and by all means, the sole end of his exertions. He becomes
blind to the merits of the case, and would find it difficult to persuade
himself, no matter what state of facts might be developed in the progress of
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contingent fees encouraged other unethical conduct, such as
ambulance chasing, paying for the solicitation of cases, bringing
frivolous lawsuits, and suborning perjury.57 Alexander considered the
issue of contingent fees to raise "vital questions."45
While recognizing that contingency fees "lead to many abuses," the
Alabama Code merely expressed a distaste for such arrangements.45 9
As originally drafted by the Canons Committee, Canon 13 followed
Section 51 of the Alabama Code in recognizing their abuses, but it
sought to impose unprecedented judicial scrutiny over such
arrangements even where lawful: "Contingent fees lead to many
abuses, and where sanctioned by law should be under the supervision
of the Court."4 " Several commentators, including Committee
member Howe, proposed the idea of judicial supervision over
contingent fee arrangements.46'
Canon 13 was the most controversial Canon. It was the only Canon
about which the members of the Committee publicly disagreed. 62
Other members of the Committee, such as Thayer, also opposed
contingent fees on principle, but subscribed to the proposed Canon
because "more than one prominent member of [the] Committee said
that he had used them in his own practice."4"3 Of the more than one
the proceedings, as to the true character of the transaction, that it was his
duty to retire from it.
Sharswood, supra note 129, at 161. Sharswood also was concerned about the effect of
a contingent fee arrangement upon the lawyer's professional character: "It turns
lawyers into higglers with their clients." Id.
457. See, e.g., Red Book, supra note 136, at 73-76 (comments of the New York
State Bar Association), 77-81 (comments of an unnamed judge); see also Final
Report, supra note 1,33, at 571 (citing Report of the Special Committee on Contingent
Fees, 31 Rep. of the New York State Bar Ass'n 99-124 (1908)).
458. Red Book, supra note 136, at 81.
459. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 710. Section 51 of the Alabama Code
stated: "Contingent fees may be contracted for; but they lead to many abuses, and
certain compensation is to be preferred." Id.
460. Infra App. (Canon 13).
461. Red Book, supra note 136, at 70-81. Howe advised the Committee: "In my
opinion a contract for a contingent fee should be governed by some rule, should be
reported without delay to the court, and should be subject to its regulation and
approval, upon the same theory that is followed in some cases of probate and
receivership." Id. at 71. Many of the comments about the Canons' first draft
suggested that the nature of the proposed judicial supervision be defined, Final
Report, supra note 133, at 571, but the Committee refused the suggestion, explaining
in its 1908 Report that "[w]e have not attempted to particularize concerning the
proposed court control, as we believe that to be rather a matter for legislative and
judicial action than for incorporation into a canon of ethics." Id.
462. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
463. Letter from Thayer to George Nutter (May 29, 1908), in the Thayer Archives
at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at 393. The fact that Committee members
conducted themselves in practice in a manner contrary to the dictates of a proposed
Canon was considered very important by the Committee. In its meeting in
Washington in the spring of 1908, the Committee "decided ... that views of ethics
held even by a substantial minority of [the] committee were too respectable for the
committee to condemn." Letter from Thayer to Dickinson (July 1908), in the Thayer
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thousand replies to that preliminary draft, more than two hundred
concerned Canon 13 .44
During the discussion of the Canons at the A.B.A. Annual Meeting
in August 1908, "[t]he question of contingency fees provided the only
significant debate, '465 and Canon 13 was the only Canon modified as a
result of that discussion.466 The debate on Canon 13 was led by
Thomas J. Walsh, who later became a progressive senator from
Montana.467 He moved to strike Canon 13 on several grounds: (1) it
created two classes of lawyers-those who accepted contingent fee
cases and those who did not-and placed a stigma on those who did;
(2) it ignored the decisions of courts that contingent fee arrangements
were not only lawful, but laudatory; (3) it ignored the substantial
justice achieved by contingent fee arrangements in the context of
personal injury and death cases resulting from industrial and railroad
accidents affecting workers and people otherwise unable to retain
counsel; (4) it was based upon the view that contingent fee
arrangements lead to many abuses, yet the major abuse-ambulance
chasing-was the subject of a separate Canon, and another abuse-
perjured testimony-was likely to be more common among the
defendants in such cases than the plaintiffs; and, (5) it required
judicial supervision of such arrangements, which was both offensive to
any self-respecting lawyer and also unlikely to uncover any abuse.468
Although Walsh succeeded in eliminating the language in Canon 13
stating that "contingent fees lead to many abuses," he did not succeed
in convincing the A.B.A. delegates that judicial supervision over such
fee arrangements was, as he believed, unfair, unnecessary, and
discriminatory. In response to Walsh's presentation and a Minnesota
delegate's horror story about a lawyer's contingent fee of fifty percent
Archives at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 6, at 15. The Committee recognized
the futility of adopting Canons that "prescribe[d] a rule as to which honorable and
reputable attorneys are not in such accord as would insure general censure in case of
violation." Id.
Thayer also held the view, perhaps shared by others, that controversial or
unsettled ethical issues should not be the subject of the Code: "So far as the Code is
concerned I think it ought only to deal with matters which are pretty clear." Letter
from Thayer to George Nutter (May 29, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard
University Law School, Vol. 5, at 393. The Boston Bar Association agreed. Red
Book, supra note 136, at 93.
Thus, the Canons were deliberately conventional. They were drafted so as not
to conflict with the actual practice of the Committee members and, by extension,
other elite lawyers. In this respect, the Committee adopted the view that too
demanding an ethical standard would undermine the Canons' moral authority and
their efficacy. See infra note 532 and accompanying text.
464. Final Report, supra note 133, at 571.
465. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 3, at 245 n.24 (citing Sharswood, supra
note 129, at 61-85).
466. See infra notes 467-72 and accompanying text.
467. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 46.
468. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 61-75.
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and a runner's ten percent cut, which left a poor woman with little or
no recovery, 49 A.B.A. President Dickinson, also a Committee
member, proposed an amendment.47 ° As modified by Dickinson,
Canon 13 would continue to provide for judicial supervision, but the
reason for such supervision would be explained in terms of protecting
a client from a rapacious lawyer: "Contingent fees, where sanctioned
by law, should be under the supervision of the Court in order that
clients may be protected from unjust charges." '471 The delegates
adopted Canon 13 as modified by Dickinson's amendment.472
The strong emotions surrounding the issue of contingency fees are
reflected in the comments of Committee member Thayer, who wrote
to Alexander after the Canons had been adopted that "we are lucky
to get off as we did considering the place where the meeting was held.
If it had been on the Atlantic seaboard, it would have been a very
different thing. '473 Apparently, Thayer considered the elite lawyers in
Seattle and the Northwest to be much more supportive of contingent
fees than the A.B.A.'s members in Boston and the Northeast.
2. Advertising and Solicitation of Clients
How a lawyer comes to represent a client may have an impact on
the nature and development of the ensuing attorney-client
relationship. Thus, around the turn of the twentieth century, it was
commonly believed that a lawyer who acted like a tradesman in
getting a client-for example, by advertising his "wares,"
underbidding his competition, or exaggerating his experience or
competence-would be less likely to act "professionally" in
representing that client. 74  Having obtained the client through
commercial means, a lawyer might be less apt to view the attorney-
client relationship and his role within it as a morally autonomous and
469. Id. at 76-77.
470. Id. at 79-80.
471. Infra App. (Canon 13).
472. Discussion Upon Canons, supra note 1, at 80-85.
473. Letter from Thayer to Alexander (Sept. 14, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at
Harvard University Law School, Vol. 6, at 43.
474. The Committee on Legal Education of the Wisconsin State Bar Association,
which suggested the adoption of a code of ethics, quoted approvingly from a judicial
opinion which stated this point succinctly: "The ethics of the legal profession forbid
that an attorney should advertise his talents or his skill as a shop keeper advertises his
wares." Proceedings of the Wisconsin State Bar Association 11 (1900). In a letter to
the Canons Committee, the Boston Bar Association stated: "It can hardly be
expected that a lawyer who obtains his original employment by means of an abuse of
confidence will maintain throughout the litigation that fidelity to the interests of his
client which ought to characterize all a lawyer's dealings." Red Book, supra note 136,
at 45.
The concerns of elite lawyers that commercialism was undermining the
morality of lawyer conduct were mixed with other motives as well. See infra notes
496-500, 561-77 and accompanying text.
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fully accountable agent because the client had been viewed, at least
initially, simply as a revenue source.475
The Alabama Code considered certain efforts to solicit clients
unethical. Section 16 of the Alabama Code viewed as unprofessional
both the "special solicitation of particular individuals to become
clients" and the "[i]ndirect advertisement for business, by furnishing
or inspiring editorials or press notices, regarding causes in which the
attorney takes part. ' 476 Section 20 of the Alabama Code viewed it as
unprofessional "to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit" except in
situations when "ties of blood, relationship or trust, make it an
attorney's duty.
477
The Canons continued these prohibitions, but added new
prohibitions on client-getting activities. For example, Canon 27
continued the prohibition on personal solicitation in Section 16 of the
Alabama Code,47' but also established a new general prohibition on
lawyer advertising:
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome
of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary
simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews, not warranted by personal relations,
is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds
or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement
for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's positions, and all
other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of
our high calling, and are intolerable.479
In generally prohibiting lawyer advertising, Canon 27 marked a
major change in American legal ethics. Section 16 of the Alabama
Code and its counterpart in the codes of ethics of all the other state
475. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 601; see supra notes 443-72 and
accompanying text.
476. 1907 Comm. Rep. 11, supra note 170, at 696.
477. Id. at 698.
478. Canon 27 was based on Section 16 of the Alabama Code. Compare infra App.
(Canon 27), with 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 696. Section 16 stated that
"special solicitation of particular individuals to become clients ought to be avoided."
Id.
479. Infra App. (Canon 27).
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bar associations, except Kentucky, stated that "[n]ewspaper
advertisements [and] circulars... tendering professional services to
the general public, are proper."4 " The code of ethics of the Kentucky
Bar Association considered such lawyer advertising "not improper
[but] to be dealt in sparingly." '' Canon 27, on the other hand, makes
such lawyer advertising "unprofessional." Thus, the Alabama Code
and the Canons take diametrically opposing views on newspaper and
circular advertising to the public.482 None of the earlier well-known
sources on legal ethics had suggested such a general prohibition.
Indeed, certain lawyers who were regarded as exemplars of ethical
practice-for example, David Hoffman and Abraham Lincoln-were
known to have engaged in advertising.4"4
In establishing a prohibition on lawyer advertising, the Canons
adopted a position on advertising close to that governing the English
barrister . 8  This reinforced the American lawyer's association with
the views of English gentlemen that underlay the distinction between
a profession and a trade. Thus, Canon 27's reference to the
"traditions" and "tone of our high calling" is more of an appeal to that
480. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 696.
481. Id.
482. But see Marston, supra note 14, at 506 (noting that Canon 27's rule regarding
advertising is "clearly patterned on the Alabama Code").
483. For example, neither Hoffman's Resolutions nor Sharswood's Ethics dealt
with either advertising or solicitation. Id. at 502-03.
484. Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership,
and the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 9, 19 n.65 (1999) (citing
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed To Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Service, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084, 1085 n.2 (1983)) (noting
Hoffman's advertising in 1835 with a testimonial from Chief Justice John Marshall);
American Bar Association Commission on Advertising, Lawyer Advertising at the
Crossroads 31-32 (1995) (Lincoln's advertising). Lawyer advertising was common in
the nineteenth century. Id. at 30.
485. According to Edward S. Cox-Sinclair, an English barrister practicing in
London, "[t]he rule [of the Alabama Code] that newspaper advertisements, circulars,
and business cards tendering professional services to the general public are proper, is
precisely contrary to that in England." Red Book, supra note 136, at 3, 33. George P.
Costigan, Dean of the College of Law at the University of Nebraska, published a
February 1908 article, which ascribed the antipathy towards lawyer advertising to the
respected practice of English barristers:
The professional feeling against the solicitation of business seems to have
arisen from the distinction in England between attorneys and counselors on
the one hand, and barristers on the other. "The latter were to be sought
only because of their learning and skill, it being undignified to seek
employment in any manner." Being employed by the attorneys and
counselors, the barristers did not need to advertise; and the American
lawyer, who is attorney, counselor and barrister combined, has inherited the
prejudice against advertisement which governed barristers.
Id. at 32 (quoting Costigan, American Code, supra note 128). Costigan and other
commentators seem to suggest that some lawyers did advertise and that some thought
it appropriate; but others thought it inappropriate. Id. at 34-36.
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class-based distinction than a description of contemporary practice in
the American legal profession. '
Besides continuing Section 20's prohibition on volunteering legal
advice to bring a lawsuit,8 7 Canon 28 also established new
prohibitions on paying third parties to solicit cases or provide
favorable recommendations of counsel:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable
to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation
by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice,
in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services.4"'
In establishing these new prohibitions, the Canons were not
reversing the course of pre-existing ethical views, as they did with
respect to lawyer advertising; they were extending the anti-
commercialist attitude underlying the distinction between a profession
and a trade to proscribe conduct that previously had not been so
prevalent. Thus, in considering the issues posed by Section 20 of the
Alabama Code and Canon 28, Alexander remarked: "Hoffman is
silent on this subject-it is significant that when he wrote, early in the
nineteenth century, no canons on these points were deemed
486. The use of the term "calling" not only has overtones of the class-based
distinction between a profession and a trade, but also reverberates with religious
overtones. Although by the late nineteenth century the term "calling" was used to
refer generally to a person's occupation, it had a distinctly religious meaning in
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century continental Calvinism and English Puritanism. See
Baltzell, Puritan Boston, supra note 61, at 63-64, 74-76. William Perkins, an
influential seventeenth-century Puritan, explained that "God is the General,
appointing to every man his particular calling and as it were his standing: and in that
calling he assigns unto him his particular office; in performance whereof he is to live
and die." Id. at 75 (quoting Puritan Political Ideas, 1558-1794, at 37 (Edmund S.
Morgan ed., (1965)). Canon 32, which talks about lawyers as "minister[s]" of the law
echoes the religious metaphors of Tucker's 1905 presidential address and the Canons
Committee's 1906 Report. See supra notes 71-72, 100-05 and accompanying text. The
concept of a conscience also has a religious origin. See supra note 319 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the use of the term "Canons" to refer to a code of
ethics itself has a religious resonance. See Abel, supra note 4, at 686 n.257 (observing
that the term "Canons" has an "ecclesiastical ring").
487. Canon 28 was derived from Section 20 of the Alabama Code. 1907 Comm.
Rep. 1I, supra note 170, at 698.
488. Infra App. (Canon 28).
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necessary."4"9 The new prohibitions on runners and other paid agents
to solicit cases and recommend counsel were proposed by Committee
member Howe,49 and the Boston Bar Association. 49 Given its strong
prohibition against lawyers paying agents to solicit cases and
recommend them as counsel, Canon 28 was used, along with Canon
13, as the basis for the organized bar's subsequent attack in the early
twentieth century on personal injury lawyers. 92
Canon 7 attacked lawyers' efforts to steal clients from other
lawyers. The first two paragraphs of Canon 7, which concern
situations in which a client suggests hiring additional co-counsel and
differences of opinion subsequently arise between co-counsel, are
derived from Sections 39, 43, and 44 of the Alabama Code.493 The
489. Red Book, supra note 136, at 46.
490. Howe's proposal focused on "runners":
There is a ragged fringe to every learned profession, and the profession
of law is not exempt. Men are admitted to the bar and are tempted and
yield to temptation. They become, for example, what are called, for
convenience, 'shysters,' 'calaboose lawyers' and 'ambulance chasers.' They
promote suits for personal injuries and promote them in such a way as to
lead to scandal and perjury of the worst kind. It seems to me that a Code
of Professional Ethics might notice this fact, and denounce it as a modern
development of a very alarming kind. Such abuses should be dealt with by
bar associations or committees, and by the courts. It is well known that
many of these shysters, who bring personal injury suits, employ 'runners'
who at once pursue the injured person, induce him to put the case in the
hands of their employer and have it prosecuted upon a large contingent
fee, whether the real facts will maintain a claim or not. It makes little
difference whether the defendant is legally liable or not, the theory being
that if a judgment cannot be obtained, at least a compromise may be
induced. This whole business has grown to be a shameful abuse and might
be dealt with in some proper way by a Code of Professional Ethics.
Id. at 43-44.
491. The Boston Bar Association focused not only on the employment of
"runners," but also upon third parties whose character as paid agents for the lawyer to
whom the case is referred is concealed:
The other evil practice to which we refer is the practice of entering into a
partnership or arrangement with a physician, nurse, hospital attendant,
apothecary, hackman, policeman, railway employee, or other person who is
likely to be brought into contact with people who sustain personal injuries,
to give him some fee or reward in consideration of his steering the injured
person into the lawyer's office. This latter practice is even more
objectionable than the employment of runners, because the runner usually
approaches the injured person in his true character. A doctor or nurse, on
the other hand, pretends to give the injured person disinterested advice in
respect to the employment of counsel. His true character as an agent of the
lawyer is concealed from the injured person. It can hardly be expected that
a lawyer who obtains his original employment by means of an abuse of
confidence will maintain throughout the litigation that fidelity to the
interests of his client which ought to characterize all a lawyer's dealings.
This dirty practice ought, we think, to be stamped with the express
disapproval of the profession in any Code of Ethics which may be adopted.
Id. at 45.
492. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 41-50.
493. Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App. The Committee suggested that
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third paragraph of Canon 7, however, prohibits lawyers from
interfering with pre-existing attorney-client relationships with the
intent to steal another lawyer's client, a subject not dealt with by the
Alabama Code:
Efforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the
business of another lawyer, are unworthy of those who should be
brethren at the Bar; but, nevertheless, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel, generally after
communication with the lawyer of whom the complaint is made.494
The need for such a prohibition was suggested by Howe, who viewed
efforts by lawyers to steal away an already-existing client of another
lawyer as part of the increasing commercialism in the profession:
We are apt to speak of the old times as a kind of Golden Age, but
I really think that fifty years ago, when the Bar was less commercial
than it is now, there was much less effort to get away the business of
other lawyers and supersede them in their clientage than there is
now. It seems to me that at the present there are members of the
Bar who are altogether too active in trying to entice away clients
that belong to their brethren, and the moment they try such action
they are tempted to do many things that ought to be considered
unprofessional.
I think the Committee might well say that such an attempt to
obtain business-by enticing away the clients of other lawyers in an
underhand way, which is quite common nowadays-is thoroughly
unprofessional and ought to be forbidden in a Code of Ethics.
495
Thus, the Canons expanded the anti-commercialism in the Alabama
Code far beyond its prior limits: contingent fee arrangements were
allowed, but were now subjected to judicial supervision; personal
solicitation continued to be prohibited, but advertising generally
became unethical; payments to "runners" and other third parties to
solicit cases or favorable recommendations were now prohibited; and
poaching other attorneys' clients was also prohibited. Through these
changes in the normative standards of lawyering, the Canons
supported their vision of conscientious lawyering and both fostered
and responded to the distinction, expressed in both Section 50 of the
Alabama Code and Canon 12, between the law as a profession serving
justice and the law as a money-getting trade.
Canon 7 was based also upon Section 42 of the Code of Legal Ethics of the Georgia
Slate Bar Association. Id.
494. Infra App. (Canon 7). The Committee added this entire third paragraph after
sending out for comment the preliminary draft of the Canons in May 1908. Compare
Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 40 (May 1908 first draft of Canon
7), with infra App. (final version of Canon 7).
495. Red Book, supra note 136, at 127.
20031 2489
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
At the same time, however, the Canons' prohibition of lawyer
advertising and certain forms of client solicitation had a disparate
impact on different groups of lawyers. The Committee's members and
the other elite lawyers who were A.B.A. members did not depend for
their livelihood on advertising and personal or paid solicitation of
clients. Lawyers like Stetson, Dickinson, Thayer, and Howe already
had established reputations as superior practitioners among the
wealthy and influential business community. Clients sought them out;
they did not need to look for clients. But their professional situation
was very different from that of lawyers with immigrant backgrounds
or younger lawyers or even journeymen lawyers new to an urban
environment. For these practitioners occupying the bottom strata of
the legal profession, there was no guarantee of enough clients eager
and able to pay for their services and, therefore, earning a living as a
lawyer was a struggle. Affluent clients did not rush to seek their
assistance. Consequently, those practitioners were forced to initiate
efforts to attract such clients. Advertising and personal and paid
solicitation were ways to do so. In order to get paid for their legal
services on behalf of clients who had deserving cases, but lacked the
financial resources, those practitioners used contingent fee
arrangements. The Canons' prohibition of such "commercialism"
made their professional lives even more difficult.
Although some elite lawyers in the early twentieth century were
motivated by racial and ethnic prejudices in their actions to stamp out
commercialism in the legal profession," 6 and although the Canons'
attack on commercialism subsequently had a disparate impact on the
racial and ethnic minorities that occupied the lower strata of the legal
profession at the time,497 there is no direct evidence that the
Committee members were motivated by such prejudice. But despite
the Committee's genuine concern with the corrupting influence of
commercialism on the Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering,491 it
is undeniable that the Committee, and most likely the other elite
lawyers who were A.B.A. members, deliberately sought to
differentiate themselves from the lawyers at the lower rungs of the
profession who engaged in conduct, such as contingent fee
arrangements, advertising, and solicitation of clients, that was subject
to abuse and that sometimes ended in fraud and overreaching. 499 By
496. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 43-46, 48, 52; cf. id. at 94-101, 1.12-29
(discussing discriminatory intent in raising educational requirements for bar
admission in the early twentieth century).
497. Id. at 43-46, 48, 52.
498. See infra notes 561-64 and accompanying text; see also Michael Ariens, Know
the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 1003, 1026 (1994) ("For
many lawyers supporting the adoption of a code of ethics, the issue of contingent fees
was at least as much about professional independence as about the exclusion of Jews
(or Catholics or others) from the legal profession.").
499. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text; see also Auerbach, supra note
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condemning such commercialism as unethical, the Canons claimed for
the Committee and other elite lawyers the moral high ground. By
condemning such commercialism as trade-like behavior, the Canons
claimed for the Committee and other elite lawyers the status of
gentlemen engaged in a profession.50
D. Enforcement of the Canons
By the turn of the twentieth century, the system of lawyer discipline
had remained essentially the same for more than a century. Since
colonial times, virtually the only method of dealing with unethical
lawyers was through a disciplinary procedure modeled "close[ly] and
self-conscious[ly]" on English proceedings against barristers.""
Typically, the lawyer-respondent was served with an order to show
cause why the lawyer should not be disbarred for the offending
conduct described in the petition or accompanying affidavits.5 "2 The
petitioners generally were lawyers or judges who had witnessed the
allegedly wrongful conduct; bar associations and their standing
committees on professional discipline did not prosecute disciplinary
proceedings until the turn of the twentieth century." 3 Less frequently,
professional discipline was the result of a summary contempt
proceeding, generally used when the lawyer's offending conduct
occurred in the presence of the court itself." In both types of
proceedings, however, the usual sanction was disbarment.5 05
Sometimes suspensions were imposed in lieu of disbarment for less
offensive conduct, but "[l]esser sanctions were quite rare [and] some
courts den[ied] that they possessed the power to impose any sanction
less than suspension. ' 506
Before the advent of the 1908 Canons, a large percentage of the
cases in which lawyers actually were sanctioned were commenced only
after the lawyer-respondent was convicted of a crime." 7 Sometimes
lawyers were sanctioned in cases of otherwise outrageous behavior
where no conviction had been obtained. "  In some of those cases, the
grounds for discipline were based upon an informal understanding
among the legal community of proper lawyerly conduct:
12, at 50, 52.
500. See Max Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 587, 588 (1940)
(explaining that contingent fees were "deplored because tradesmen speculated, and
lawyers were gentlemen, and not tradesman").
501. Wolfram, Legal Ethics I, supra note 15, at 474 & n.28.
502. Id. at 474.
503. Id. at 476.
504. Id. at 475-77.
505. Id. at 475.
506. Id. at 475 & n.34.
507. Id. at 480-81.
508. Id. at 481-82.
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Reliance was placed primarily upon what the courts uniformly
projected as a community-wide sense of decorum and good
character, instead of the modern emphasis upon a codal formulation
of all grounds for lawyer discipline .... [F]or over a hundred years
after the revolution there were no 'codes' of prohibited and
permitted conduct. Courts would occasionally refer to the oath
required of lawyers on admission to the bar, but those oaths were
invariably quite general in form and could hardly have provided
either guidance to a questioning lawyer or restraint on a court
inclined otherwise to impose discipline. 5 9
In other cases, state statutes prohibiting the alleged conduct were
invoked, but almost always those statutory proscriptions were too
general to provide any meaningful guidance to the respondent
lawyer."( As a result, courts often seemed to rely, in the end, on an
informal understanding about what was proper lawyer conduct and
what was not."'
Not surprisingly, therefore, as the Canons project gathered steam,
lawyers besides the Committee members looked hopefully towards
the new A.B.A. code as the basis for improving the system of lawyer
discipline. 2 William Draper Lewis, Dean of the Department of Law
at the University of Pennsylvania," 3 observed that "[u]nder our
present system practically only those convicted of crime can be
disbarred, and disbarment is the only punishment that can be
given."5 4 He believed that "as long as our present Board of Censors
[of the Law Association of Philadelphia] can only move in open court
for a man's disbarment, a great many practices which undermine the
integrity of the members of our profession will go unpunished."5"5
Thus, he proposed, "the code should provide for a board to be
appointed by the judges or by a Bar Association designated by the
judges, which committee shall have power, subject to an appeal to the
509. Id. at 479 (footnotes omitted).
510. Id. at 479-80.
511. Id. Wolfram describes this informal understanding as follows:
Jurisdictions seem to have contented themselves with the position that no
more precise specification of prohibited wrongs was necessary because a
lawyer of suitable learning and character would be well aware of what was
permitted and prohibited. Proper professional deportment was something
that was thought to accompany virtue, or at least something to be learned
during apprenticeship to a reputable lawyer.
Id. at 479-80.
512. The Committee viewed the improvement of the lawyer disciplinary process as
one of the reasons why the A.B.A. should promulgate a code of ethics. See 1906
Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 602; see also supra notes 501-12 and accompanying
text.
513. Lewis is described supra note 145.
514. Red Book, supra note 136, at 124.
515. Id.
2492 [Vol. 71
THE A.B.A.'S 1908 CANONS OF ETHICS
court, to impose fines and permanent or temporary suspensions from
the right to practice in the courts." '516
Charles Boston"7 expressed a similar need for the Canons to
contain provisions regarding enforcement:
The code should not only be the expression of proper ideals of
professional practice, but should contain canons that would indicate
and insure the enforcement of its principles in practice. For that
reason, it should be not only the code of voluntary associations of
lawyers, similarly minded, but should be the law of the state, with
proper penal and disciplinary provisions; and then, too, there should
be means provided for making the enforcement of the law certain in
proper cases.:5 1
Boston went so far as to sketch out a proposal for something
approximating a bar association disciplinary committee.5 1 9
From the very beginning, the members of the Committee
recognized that the Canons, like any national code of legal ethics,
could not accomplish all of its purposes unless it was adopted by state
and local bar associations and supplemented with some form of
enforcement mechanism at the state or local level. As described
above, Tucker implied that idea in his 1.905 presidential address52" and
the Committee invited the adoption of disciplinary procedures based
on the Canons in its 1906 Report.52' In 1907, Justice Brewer wrote to
Committee Secretary Alexander that the ethical rules to be adopted
by the Committee should "be given operative and binding force by
legislation or action of the highest courts of the states. '522 But it was
Hubbard, in his 1903 lecture on legal ethics at Albany Law School,
who best explained the need for an enforcement mechanism to
counteract the leverage wielded by clients upon whom lawyers were
economically dependent for their livelihood.
516. Id.
517. Boston is described supra notes 143,440.
518. Red Book, supra note 136, at 120 (quoting Boston, supra note 123, at 229).
519. Boston proposed the following:
I would have a body, composed of practicing lawyers similar to a court for
the trial of impeachments, by which any complaint of any infraction of the
code could be heard summarily and a warning or reprimand administered,
and with the power, in flagrant cases, to recommend suspension or
disbarment, and pursuant to such recommendation, to become relator
against the accused is [sic] a proper judicial proceeding in which he would be
entitled to a full hearing de novo and without prejudice; and with the right to
review by certiorari its proceedings ending in a warning or reprimand.
Red Book, supra note 136, at 120 (quoting Boston, supra note 123, at 229).
520. Tucker, Address, supra note 54, at 387; see also supra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text.
521. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 602-03; see also supra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text.
522. 1907 Comm. Rep. 1, supra note 132, at 63. Brewer's suggestion concerned the
lawyer's oath, however, not the Canons. But cf Carle, supra note 13, at 9 (noting that
Brewer's comments concerned a code of ethics).
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Hubbard understood that the vision of conscientious lawyering that
he was proposing as the appropriate basis for legal ethics, and which
subsequently was adopted for the Canons, would be unpopular with
clients, because they would want their litigation and transactions
conducted, both procedurally and substantively, in accordance with
their partisan interests and personal wishes. "It is probable that clients
would dislike to have litigation determined and conducted in the
manner here suggested," he told the Albany Law School students. 23
At the same time, Hubbard acknowledged that his proposed ethics of
conscientious lawyering conflicted with much of current legal practice,
which, in his view, was permitted by the prevailing conception of legal
ethics.524
Agreeably to the ethics of the profession as now understood, the
lawyer may, and under penalty of losing his clients, must, take into
court such cases as the client directs. He may, and, at the same risk,
must, conduct them in court with all the temper, prejudice, and
personal rancor of the client. He must conduct them in substance
according to the wishes of the client. He may personate the client;
speak as he thinks the client would speak, or would like to have him
speak, and, discarding his own convictions and the restraints of his
own conscience, shape his conduct by what he assumes to be, yet
which may not be, the conscience of his client.525
Because his proposed view of conscientious lawyering conflicted with
how many lawyers understood the rules of legal ethics and how many
more actually practiced, Hubbard recognized that lawyers who sought
to practice in accordance with the ethics of conscientious lawyering
would be at a competitive disadvantage in the market for legal
services:
[l]f the lawyer refuses to bring a suit at the direction of the client, he
cannot be compelled by legal process to bring it. The process to
which the client resorts is to take his business to another lawyer.
And the ethics of the profession permit the second lawyer, as they
would have permitted the first, to commence the suit against his own
belief, or even knowledge, that it has no foundation in law or justice,
if the client insists that it shall be brought.
526
"The client's power to control.., is fortified by the circumstance that
he is the employer and the lawyer employee" and, thus, a lawyer who
practiced as Hubbard, and later the Canons, proposed, acted "under
penalty of losing his clients.
'52 7
523. Hubbard & Baldwin, Union Lectures, supra note 296, at 20.
524. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
525. Hubbard and Baldwin, Union Lectures, supra note 296, at 18 (emphasis
added).
526. Id. at 14-15.
527. Id. at 16.
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Hubbard concluded that the adoption of his view of conscientious
lawyering would not be successful just by convincing lawyers that it
was right, because clients would seek out lawyers who practiced in a
manner that gave them more control: "The change of methods here
urged will not be effected by the lawyer unaided. Many prefer the
existing methods. Those who do not are unable to adopt the better
method without consigning their clients to those who do. 528 After
rejecting public opinion and "adjudications... upon the relative rights
of lawyer and client" as ineffective mechanisms for implementing a
change to an ethics of conscientious lawyering,5 29 Hubbard proposed
the adoption of an "oath administered to the lawyer on his admission
to the bar and the enforcement of that oath by corresponding rules of
the court."53  Thus, Hubbard recognized that successful
implementation of the vision of conscientious lawyering required an
enforcement mechanism to combat the economic power of the client
in the market for legal services. The Committee heard the same
conclusion from other commentators.' Absent some new mechanism
to enforce the Canons' provisions, the market for legal services was
likely to undermine the Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering and
its anti-commercialism and create, with respect to ethical practice, a
"race to the bottom. '532
528. Id. at 21.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. See supra notes 512-19 and accompanying text.
532. See C.A. Kent, Legal Ethics, 6 Mich. L. Rev. 468, 475 (1908).
It is hard for him, as, indeed, for all men, to have a morality much higher
than that of their competitors. In general, he will think as those around him
think, or, at the most, as the best men around him think. If he has a morality
much higher he will be likely to lose all employment. Suitors will not retain
attorneys who are unwilling to use all means for success generally thought
reputable.
Id.; see Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, supra note 19, at 49 ("Once a number of
lawyers defy a code rule (or are believed by other lawyers to have taken a negative
stance), the rule will be widely ignored because of competitive pressures and a sense
of unfairness."). Id.
David Luban has formulated the problem in terms of a "Prisoner's Dilemma"
in which lawyers personally inclined to conduct themselves in accordance with more
stringent ethical standards are dissuaded from doing so by the knowledge that they
will be disadvantaged in the market for legal services by the presence of other lawyers
with less stringent ethical standards. David Luban, Professional Ethics: A New Code
for Lawyers?, Hastings Center Rep., June 1980, at 11, 15. This situation "tend[s] to
drive the behavior of the profession toward its lowest common denominator, more or
less independently of what lawyers really want." Id. at 15. From this perspective, says
Luban, the function of enforcing ethics codes is to "allow[] lawyers to behave 'well'
safely, without worrying that they will be punished for their restraint by other lawyers
unilaterally defecting from high standards." Id.
This same perspective counsels the drafters of normative statements about
lawyer conduct to make those norms within reach of most lawyers, lest those norms
be impossible to enforce. Id.; see also David Luban, Calming The Hearse Horse: A
Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 Md. L. Rev. 451, 461 (1981). In
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Not surprisingly, therefore, another important element of the
Canons consists of provisions relating to the profession's self-
regulation. Although, for the reasons stated by Tucker and others,
the Canons themselves did not describe the details of those
enforcement mechanisms,533 they did contain provisions intended to
make it a lawyer's obligation to take actions to enforce the Canons'
substantive provisions. Almost all of these provisions regarding the
profession's self-regulation marked an advance over the Alabama
Code.
Canon 29, entitled "Upholding the Honor of the Profession," is the
centerpiece of the Canon's concern with lawyers' self-regulation.
First, it states the general principle, already articulated in Section 8 of
the Alabama Code,534 that lawyers "should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice." '35
Second, Canon 29 establishes the lawyer's duty to assist in bar
admissions decisions by seeking to deny admission to those candidates
for licensure who are unfit in terms of their education or moral
character: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education.""53 The Alabama
Code was silent on the issue of a lawyer's duty with respect to bar
admissions.3  In making it a lawyer's ethical duty to assist in
restricting the admission of lawyers to those qualified by education
and moral character, Canon 29 supported the longstanding efforts of
the A.B.A. to bar entry to the profession to unfit candidates."'
keeping the Canons conventional, see supra note 463, the Canons Committee made
an effort to ensure that the Canons did not impose ethical standards that were too
high or unaccepted by elite lawyers.
The United States Supreme Court also has observed that unrestrained market
competition can have a demoralizing effect on professional conduct. See, e.g.,
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); United States v. Or. State Med.
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952); Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S.
608, 611-13 (1935).
533. See supra notes 78-79, 520-21 and accompanying text.
534. Section 8 of the Alabama Code provided:
An attorney should strive at all times, to uphold the honor, maintain the
dignity, and promote the usefulness of the profession; for it is so interwoven
with the administration of justice, that whatever redounds to the good of one
advances the other; and the attorney thus discharges, not merely an
obligation to his brothers, but a high duty to the state and his fellowman.
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 692.
535. Infra App. (Canon 29).
536. Id.
537. Neither Section 8, nor Section 11 of the Alabama Code, upon which Canon 29
is based, mentions bar admissions or a lawyer's duty regarding them. Index and
Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; 1907 Comm. Rep. It, supra note 170, at 692,694.
538. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, Canon 29's
"moral character" requirement was linked to similarly vague requirements in state
statutes regarding admission to the bar that were used later in the twentieth century as
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Third, Canon 29 paraphrases the lawyer's general obligation, stated
in Section 11 of the Alabama Code,539 to report unethical conduct by
other lawyers: "Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before
the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the
profession .... ,'40 Canon 29 then expands beyond the scope of
Section 11 by particularizing that duty with respect to perjury: "The
counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed
owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. 5 4'
Canon 28, which, as previously described,542 prohibits the use of
runners and other paid third parties that solicit cases and recommend
counsel, also imposes a specific duty upon lawyers to root out such
conduct: "A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon
every member of the Bar, having knowledge of such practices upon
the part of any practitioner, immediately to inform thereof to the end
that the offender may be disbarred. 5 43 This final sentence in Canon
28 imposes an obligation upon lawyers that did not previously exist
under state bar association codes. 44
Finally, Canons 1 and 2 establish that lawyers have special
obligations with respect to the administration of justice that transcend
those of other citizens. The last two sentences of Canon 1 state:
Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial
officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances
to the proper authorities. In such cases, but not otherwise, such
charges should be encouraged and the person making them should
be protected.545
Although Section 2 of the Alabama Code envisioned circumstances
when it would be appropriate for a lawyer to criticize judicial
a justification for admissions decisions that discriminated against members of ethnic
minorities and the lower class and those with less conventional lifestyles and political
views. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential,
94 Yale L.J. 491 (1985).
539. Section 11 of the Alabama Code provided: "Attorneys should fearlessly
expose before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession; and
there should never be any hesitancy in accepting employment against an attorney who
has wronged his client." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 694.
540. Infra App. (Canon 29).
541. Id.
542. See supra notes 487-92 and accompanying text.
543. Infra App. (Canon 28).
544. Canon 28 was derived from Section 20 of the Alabama Code, Index and
Synopsis of Canons, infra App., but Section 20 contains nothing about disciplinary
sanctions in general or disbarment in particular or a lawyer's obligation to report
misconduct of any sort by other lawyers, 1907 Comm. Rep. 1I, supra note 170, at 698.
545. Infra App. (Canon 1). The Committee added these two sentences after
sending out for comments the May 1908 first draft of the Canons. Compare id. (final
version of Canon 1) with Tenn. Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 153, at 38 (May
1908 draft of Canon 1).
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conduct, 46 Canon 1 makes it not only a lawyer's "right," but also his
"duty" to report improper judicial conduct "to the proper
authorities." No section of the Alabama Code imposed such a duty. 47
Canon 2 imposes special duties upon lawyers with respect to the
selection of judges:
It is the duty of the Bar to endeavor to prevent political
considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the selection of
Judges. It should protest earnestly and actively against the
appointment or election of those who are unsuitable for the Bench;
and it should strive to have elevated thereto only those willing to
forego other employments, whether of a business, political or other
character, which may embarrass their free and fair consideration of
questions before them for decision. 548
The Alabama Code does not deal at all with "the proper criteria for
the selection of judges, '54' and does not impose any duty on lawyers
with respect to such selection.
Thus, in seeking to regulate the legal profession in order to support
its vision of conscientious lawyering and its prohibition of certain
commercial practices and attitudes, the Canons go far beyond the
exhortation in Section 11 of the Alabama Code to "expose before the
proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession. 5'
The Canons imposed wholly new obligations upon lawyers to prevent
unfit candidates from becoming lawyers, to report perjury and the use
of runners and paid third parties that solicit cases and recommend
counsel, and to submit complaints about judicial misconduct. In
support of efforts to improve the administration of justice, the Canons
imposed on lawyers both the duty to help select competent,
independent judges and also to monitor the conduct of those who
occupied the judicial office. These new professional obligations on
lawyers marked a major change from the Alabama Code and the
546. Section 2 of the Alabama Code stated:
The proprieties of the judicial station, in a great measure disable the
judge from defending himself against strictures upon his official conduct.
For this reason, and because such criticism tends to impair public confidence
in the administration of justice, attorneys should, as a rule, refrain from
published criticism of judicial conduct, especially in reference to causes in
which they have been counsel, otherwise than in courts of review, or when
the conduct of a judge is necessarily involved in determining his removal
from or continuance in office.
1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 698.
547. Canon 1 also was based upon Sections 1 and 4 of the Alabama Code, Index
and Synopsis of Canons, infra App., but neither of those sections imposes such a duty
on lawyers. 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 689-90.
548. See infra App. (Canon 2).
549. Marston, supra note 14, at 505.
550. Canon 2 was not based upon any section of the Alabama Code; rather, it
derived from Section 55 of the Code of Ethics of the Kentucky Bar Association, 1907
Comm. Rep. I, supra note 170, at 713; Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
551. See supra notes 533-50 and accompanying text.
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ethical codes of the other state bar associations and foretold dramatic
changes in the American legal profession. Consequently, the Canons
were "[t]he first lawyer code with any possible disciplinary
relevance." '552 Although it would take decades before American
lawyers would become thoroughly and effectively regulated,553 the
Canons' concern with the regulation of lawyer conduct both at the bar
and on the bench symbolized a shift in professional self-consciousness
the effects of which continue to this day. 4
CONCLUSION
Underlying the A.B.A.'s three-year effort to draft and promulgate a
national code of legal ethics was the idea that it is possible to
articulate and maintain a level of lawyer conduct that is something
higher, something better, than the minimal normative standards
imposed by the criminal law or, what Benjamin Cardozo called twenty
years later, the "morals of the market place. '55 To lawyers in the
twenty-first century, for whom norms of lawyer conduct have become
"legalized,5 5 6 this may seem overly ambitious. But to members of the
Canons Committee, a normative statement regarding lawyer conduct
implied something imbued with morality and, in at least some
members' minds, religion as well. Although it is unlikely that any of
the Committee members was naive enough to believe that all lawyers
would lead their professional lives in conformity with such a
normative statement, it does not seem too great a stretch to suggest
that those men believed that: (1) gentlemen like themselves and other
elite practitioners could create a professional community whose
collective stature would be raised and whose individual self-esteem
would be enhanced by articulating and then hewing to a code of
conduct more elevated than commercial mores; and (2) by example
and perhaps also through formal enforcement proceedings against
552. Wolfram, Legal Ethics I, supra note 15, at 479.
553. "Only slowly did the Canons gain much currency as an enforceable
specification of explicit grounds for discipline." Id. at 485. "For some decades after
the A.B.A. promulgated the Canons, most decisions held that a... failure to abide by
one of the Canons was not a sufficient ground for disbarment." Id. at 485 n.91.
554. See generally Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 14 (arguing that
professionalism is an ideology that arose in the late nineteenth century and that
focuses on the bar's regulation of lawyer conduct in order to maintain the bar's socio-
political role as the governing class in American society).
555. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Cardozo, then Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, was referring to the fiduciary duty of
business partners, and emphasizing that "the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has]
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd." Id. Since lawyers are
fiduciaries for their clients, Cardozo's memorable phrase from Meinhard often has
been used to describe the level of conduct expected of lawyers also. See, e.g., In re
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) ("The attorney's obligations,
therefore, transcend those prevailing in the commercial market place.").
556. See supra note 4.
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non-conforming lawyers such a higher ethical standard would become
more widely observed.
In this respect, modern legal scholars have been somewhat
misleading about the purposes behind the A.B.A.'s efforts to make
normative statements about lawyer conduct, because they have
viewed those efforts through the prism of the A.B.A.'s efforts over the
last fifty years. Whereas the A.B.A.'s adoption of the Model Rules
did reflect a concern with warding off governmental regulation of the
legal profession, 7 that concern was entirely absent from the Canons
project. The Canons were adopted at a time when government
regulation of industry was in its infancy and there was no popular or
governmental initiative to regulate lawyer conduct or the market for
legal services."' Indeed, the A.B.A. sought to formulate a set of
standards for regulating the quality of lawyer conduct precisely
because, in its view, a need for such regulation had arisen559 and the
existing mechanisms of such control-the criminal law and sporadic
lawyer disciplinary proceedings-were inadequate.56"
The history and content of the Canons also fail to support the view
that the A.B.A.'s normative statements of lawyer conduct were
intended to achieve better financial rewards for lawyers. Consistent
with the vision of conscientious lawyering and the gentleman's
understanding of the nature of a profession (as opposed to a trade),
Canons 7, 10, 12, 13, 27, and 28, among others, express hostility
toward all methods and means of commercialism and competition in
the market for legal services and toward lawyers' motives of unbridled
or naked self-interest.' Those Canons were likely to have expressed
the genuine beliefs and values of the Committee members. Those
men, many of whose fathers were professionals before them, were old
enough, successful enough, and established enough in their careers
that their financial circumstances were unlikely to improve
measurably, if at all, as the result of the Canons' promulgation.562
557. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Why The ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective
on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 690, 714-20 (1981).
558. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics II, supra note 4, at 206 ("The early history of
American legal ethics gave no indication that lawyers would one day become a highly
regulated profession. For the most part, regulation was highly traditional, episodic,
and reactive, and was addressed primarily to pathological extremes of lawyer
behavior."). See generally Wolfram, Legal Ethics I, supra note 15 (describing lawyer
regulation before the twentieth century). As Nancy Moore has pointed out, "[t]he
professions have not always feared government regulation." Nancy J. Moore,
Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 773, 776 n.31 (1987)
("Indeed, at the earliest stages of professionalism, an occupation typically appeals to
the government for intervention in order to limit entrance to qualified individuals and
to prevent unauthorized practice.").
559. See supra text accompanying notes 106-31 and accompanying text.
560. See supra notes 501-22, 531-32 and accompanying text.
561. See supra Part III.C.
562. See supra text accompanying notes 495-500. For example, as a federal judge
with lifetime tenure, Justice Brewer's personal financial circumstances were unlikely
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Having achieved what the English gentleman viewed as a
"competence" -sufficient financial means to live like a gentleman563 -
what these men apparently cared about far more than money was
status or "honor"-respect in the eyes of others-and self-esteem. 64
Modern legal scholars are on more solid ground, however, in
viewing the Canons, like other A.B.A. normative statements about
lawyer conduct, at least partially as an effort at market control. The
Canons clearly aspired to regulate lawyers' conduct and motives. 66 In
that regard, the Canons could be construed as an effort to create a
standardized professional commodity- "ethical legal services"-sold
in the market for legal services.6 Yet, this sort of regulation did not
directly define the participants in the market for legal services. The
Canons did not create the standards for admission to the bar; those
were created by state statutes or court rules. 568 The Canons did not
to change at all as a consequence of the Canons' anti-commercialism, and the same
would have been true for the other federal judges on the Committee. Even those in
private practice at the time, such as Stetson, were unlikely to benefit, since by the
beginning of the twentieth century he was so successful that he refused to take on
cases unless his partners would be responsible for the work. Davis Polk Wardwell
Sunderland & Kiendl-A Background with Figures 42-43 (Davis Polk & Wardwell
1965). Moreover, the financial prospects of the Committee members who were at
least seventy years old in 1908, such as Howe, Hubbard, and Jenkins, see Carle, supra
note 13, at 38, were unlikely to be changed materially as the result of the passage of
the Canons.
563. Reader, supra note 111, at 3: see also Whewell, supra note 319, at 152
(defining "a Competence" as "so much property as may free a man from solicitude
respecting common needs and common enjoyments"). The Oxford English
Dictionary defines a "competence" as, among other things, "a sufficiency of means
for living comfortably." The Oxford English Dictionary 603 (2d ed. 1989).
564. See supra notes 99-110, 114-16 and accompanying text. Of course, in
promulgating Canons that adopted a critical attitude toward commercialism and the
acquisitive motives underlying it, these men were undertaking self-interested actions.
First, in denying the legitimacy of such conduct and motives, they presented their own
motives and conduct to others as morally "pure and unsullied." Second, to the extent
that other lawyers acted in accordance with the Canons' anti-commercial and anti-
acquisitive prescriptions, the members of the Canons Committee were protecting
themselves from economic challenge and enabling themselves more easily to maintain
a less economically competitive attitude as lawyers. Nevertheless, these self-
interested motives co-existed along with the stated interest in purifying the conduct
and motives of lawyers generally.
565. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 4, at 653-67; Rhode, supra note 557, at 702-06.
566. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
567. See Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological
Analysis 14-15 (1977) ("Inherent in professional codes of ethics is an effort to
standardize professional behavior.").
568. "Control over admission to practice has been exercised by the states since
colonial times." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36
Rec. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 77, 78 (1981). Hazard describes that
control over bar admissions during the nineteenth century as follows:
Comprehensive state control over admission to practice was first asserted
in the early nineteenth century, primarily with the purpose of overthrowing
the bar's monopolistic system of apprenticeship. The power to admit a
lawyer to practice was vested in the courts, thereby conferring ultimate
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create procedures for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law; those, too, were created by state statutes or court rules.69 The
Canons did not prohibit the practice of law by non-lawyers and, in
1908, the Canons contained no provision prohibiting lawyers from
assisting others in the unauthorized practice of law;57" to the extent
such prohibitions existed in 1908, they too were creatures of state
law.57' Although Canons 1, 2, 28, and 29 imposed ethical requirements
upon lawyers to help prevent unfit persons-for example, those who
did or would be likely to violate the Canons' substantive provisions-
from becoming or remaining lawyers and judges, 572 those Canons were
not self-sufficient; they depended upon other external enforcement
procedures or other bodies of law in order to be implemented.
Moreover, even after such enforcement procedures were adopted, the
enforcement of the Canons did not affect a sufficient number of
lawyers to have a meaningful impact on controlling access to the legal
services market. 573
authority over the profession in the judiciary as distinct from the bar. The
form of admission was the right of audience before the state's courts.
Admission to practice as an advocate carries with it authority to counsel and
assist clients in the professional functions associated with the office lawyer.
Id. Even today, "bar [admission] is largely the action of an agency of the state."
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, supra note 19, at 46.
569. See supra notes 501-11 and accompanying text.
570. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, 2583 (1999)
("[T]he first ABA Canons of Ethics adopted in 1908 said nothing about UPL."). It
was not until its annual meeting in 1937 that the A.B.A. adopted Canon 47, id. at 2584
& n.12, which prohibited lawyers from aiding the unauthorized practice of law. Supp.
Rep. of the Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 62 A.B.A. Rep.
761, 767 (1937). Canon 47 stated: "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or
his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law
by any lay agency, personal or corporate." Id.; see also Drinker, supra note 3, at 66.
571. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 159, 180 (1980) (stating that at least seventeen states had unauthorized
practice of law statutes dating from about 1870 to 1920); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing
the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1981) ("Although some states had enacted
unauthorized practice statues before the 1930s, most dealt only with nonlawyer
appearances in court or with legal activity by certain specified [court] officials such as
bailiffs, court clerks, and sheriffs."). The first bar association to seek to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law was the New York County Lawyers Association, which,
in 1914, "launched the first unauthorized practice campaign by forming an
unauthorized practice committee to curtail competition from title and trust
companies." Denckla, supra note 570, at 2583-84. The A.B.A. did not form its own
committee to prevent the unauthorized practice of law until 1930. Id. at 2584; Rhode,
supra at 8.
572. See supra notes 534-50 and accompanying text.
573. As recently as 1970, the system of lawyer discipline was seen as highly
ineffective and in need of major repairs. See A.B.A. Special Comm'n. on Evaluation
of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary
Enforcement (1970); see also Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 143-49 (1989)
(describing the inadequacy of disciplinary enforcement of the norms regarding lawyer
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As other commentators also have observed, the Canons
transformed the difference in lawyers' practices into a moral
distinction, a class division, and, therefore, a differentiation in social
rank.574 There is no doubt that the Committee and other elite lawyers
who were A.B.A. members intended the promulgation of the Canons
to elevate their stature both in the eyes of the public and the
profession. 75  As a consequence, the Canons enhanced the
stratification within the modern legal profession and gave it a moral
and social significance. 7 ' In effect, the Canons distinguished elite
lawyers from lawyers occupying the lower ranks of the profession.
Elite lawyers occupied the moral high ground. They practiced (or at
least aspired to practice) ethically-that is, in accordance with the
Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering. They did not stoop to
adopt the crass commercial methods of attracting paying clients to
support themselves; they did not need to do so. As gentlemen, they
practiced a learned profession. In significant ways, the Canons
implied, the elite lawyers were different from "the shyster, the
barratrously inclined, [and the] ambulance chaser." '77 Those lawyers
violated the Canons' vision of conscientious lawyering and acted
unethically by practicing in accordance with the morals of the
marketplace. They employed commercial methods to seek clients and
to get paid by them. They practiced law as lower or even middle-class
tradesmen.
In their focus on the A.B.A.'s Model Rules and the Model Code,
modern legal scholars have missed an important element of the
A.B.A.'s original normative statement about lawyer conduct-the
creation of a new normative realm regarding lawyer conduct.
Building on the works of Hoffman, Sharswood, and primarily the
ethics codes of state bar associations, this normative realm included a
broad range of values of varying kinds-moral principles, professional
conventions, gentlemanly ideals, and matters of social etiquette and
good manners. Some of the Canons, such as Canon 11, concerning a
lawyer's handling of trust property,5 7' and Canon 22, regarding the
conduct). Richard Abel acknowledges that the A.B.A.'s normative statements
regarding lawyer conduct do not have a significant direct bearing on the struggle for
market control and that market control is not a declared purpose of the A.B.A.
leaders who participate in the drafting and promulgation of such normative
statements. Abel, supra note 4, at 654.
574. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 12, at 50, 52; Shuchman, supra note 441, at 244.
575. See supra notes 99-110, 114-16, 564 and accompanying text.
576. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 6.
577. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 601.
578. Canon 11 provided: "Money of the client or other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be reported promptly, and except with the client's
knowledge and consent should not be commingled with his private property or be
used by him." Infra App. (Canon 11). That Canon is substantially the same as Section
37 of the Alabama Code, 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 704, from which it
was derived, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
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lawyer's duty of candor to the court, 57' embodied pure moral
principles, such as prohibitions against theft or lying. Other Canons,
such as Canon 20, regarding trial publicity,5"' and the Canons
establishing the vision of conscientious lawyering, 58' were designed to
achieve fairness in the adversary system and, more generally, in the
administration of justice. Some Canons, such as those attacking
commercialism,8 2 were intended to support the lawyer's moral
autonomy and to make the practice of law a gentlemanly profession
rather than a lowly trade. 3  Other Canons, including Canon 21,
regarding punctuality in court 5 4 and Canon 25, regarding lawyers'
dealings and agreements with opposing counsel,5s were simply
matters of etiquette and good manners, rules for gentlemen who
happen to be lawyers.
The Committee referred to all of these different sorts of norms
under the rubric of "professional ethics. 556 The Alabama Code had
used the terms "professional" and "unprofessional" in an evaluative
manner in a few of its provisions:517 The Committee expanded upon
579. See supra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
580. Canon 20 provided:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the
extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it
is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts
should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the
Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
Infra App. (Canon 20). That Canon was derived from Section 17 of the Alabama
Code, 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 696, and Section 17 of the code of
ethics of the Wisconsin Bar Association, 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 697;
see also Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
581. See supra notes 319-76 and accompanying text.
582. See supra notes 425-500 and accompanying text.
583. See supra notes 425-500 and accompanying text.
584. Canon 21 provided: "It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client, but also
to the Courts and to the public to be punctual in attendance, and to be concise and
direct in the trial and disposition of causes." Infra App. (Canon 21). The duty of
punctuality prescribed in the first part of that Canon is substantially the same as
Section 6 of the Alabama Code, 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 691, from
which it was derived, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
585. Canon 25 provided:
A lawyer should not ignore known customs or practice of the Bar or of a
particular Court, even when the law permits, without giving timely notice to
the opposing counsel. As far as possible, important agreements, affecting
the rights of clients, should be reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to
avoid performance of an agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to
writing, as required by the rules of Court.
Infra App. (Canon 25). That Canon is substantially the same as Sections 40 and 41 of
the Alabama Code, 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 705, from which it was
derived, Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.
586. 1906 Comm. Rep., supra note 21, at 602-04.
587. See, e.g., Sections 5, 17, and 20 of the Alabama Code, 1907 Comm. Rep. It,
supra note 170, at 690-91, 696, 698. The Canons that derived from those sections of
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that usage, changing the language of the Alabama Code sections
whose substantive content was adopted by using the terms
"professional" and "unprofessional" to indicate what lawyers should
do and what they should not do.5 8 Dickinson suggested that those
terms be used instead of expressing a norm in the older, perhaps more
puritan, language of a lawyer's "duty," or what in a more southern or
gentlemanly idiom was "honorable" or "dishonorable," or simply
what a lawyer "ought" to do or what was "proper" or "improper. '59
Indeed, Dickinson, among others, made an effort-albeit only
partially successful-to make consistent use of only one set of
evaluative terms,59 ' and "professional" and "unprofessional" were his
choice.591
the Alabama Code-Canons 22, 20, and 28, respectively-continue the usage of the
term "unprofessional." See infra App.
588. For example, Canon 6 makes it "unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests," but none of the sections of the Alabama Code upon which Canon 6 was
based-Sections 22, 25, and 34-used the term "unprofessional" or its opposite,
"professional." Index and Synopsis of Canons, infra App.; see also supra notes 392-
416 and accompanying text. Similarly, Canon 23 states that "all attempts to curry
favor with juries by [certain proscribed techniques] are unprofessional," see infra
App., instead of stating, as does Section 54 of the Alabama Code, that those
techniques "should be avoided." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 170, at 711. Canon
26, concerning conduct by lawyers acting as lobbyists, makes "unprofessional," see
infra App., the same conduct that Section 24 of the Alabama Code refers to as
"immoral and illegal." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 167, at 699. Canon 28
provides that "[s]tirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law," see infra App., substituting the term "unprofessional" for
the description of such conduct in Section 20 of the Alabama Code as "disreputable in
morals." 1907 Comm. Rep. II, supra note 167, at 698.
Canon 27 uses the terms "unprofessional" to prohibit lawyer advertising and
the use of "touters of any kind," see infra App., but this represents a substantive,
rather than a linguistic, change from Section 16 of the Alabama Code, which held
lawyer advertising generally to be "proper" and which said nothing about such
indirect procurement of clients, Id. at 696.
However, the Committee's preference for the term "unprofessional" was not
invariable. There were a few times when the Committee chose not to use the term
"unprofessional" in the Canons even though it was used in the Alabama Code. For
example, Section 28 of the Alabama Code used the term "unprofessional" with
reference to lawyers partaking of their client's ill-feeling towards the opposing party,
id. at 701, but Canon 17, which carried forward that idea, changes the grammatical
structure of Section 28's prohibition and does not use the term "unprofessional." See
infra App. Similarly, although employing the term "unprofessional" twice to
condemn other forms of lawyer advertising, Canon 27 does not continue the use of
that term to prohibit the indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper articles or press notices, id. as did Section 16 of the Alabama Code, 1907
Comm. Rep. 1I, supra note 167, at 696, perhaps because the term "unprofessional"
already has been used twice in that Canon.
589. See, e.g., Red Book, supra note 136, at 30, 33, 43, 49, 51.
590. Dickinson suggested to the Committee the consistent use of the term
"unprofessional": "1 think it better to adhere to one term in animadverting upon
wrongful things, and the word 'unprofessional' covers the whole field." Id. at 43.
Thayer too was concerned about the lack of uniformity in the expressions of
condemnation, subsequently sending a letter from Judge Lowell to both Alexander
and Dickinson that criticized such lack of uniformity. Letter of Thayer to Dickinson
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In this respect, the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics authoritatively
established the realm of what we now call legal professionalism. As
an A.B.A. member, a lawyer was expected to act in accordance with
the Canons, the A.B.A.'s national code of legal ethics. Under the
Canons, his conduct was expected to be "professional." Thus,
professionalism and legal ethics were inextricably intertwined: the
lawyer who acted as a member of the profession was a lawyer who
acted ethically and the lawyer who acted ethically was a true
"professional." The Canons made such legal professionalism a
morally robust concept. They proposed a view of lawyering that was
morally enriching and demanding: lawyers were morally accountable
for their actions, and their moral autonomy in the attorney-client
relationship was recognized and supported. Thus, as professionals
under the Canons, lawyers were neither hired guns, nor merely
competent craftsmen. Unlike Holmes's "bad man," they recognized,
respected, and acted in accordance with their innermost views of the
moral dimensions in the law.
If we think about the Canons in terms of the general wave of
professionalization that swept across the burgeoning national market
economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,592 then
the importance of this link between ethics and professionalism in the
law becomes clearer. By the early twentieth century, it had become
commonplace to view a code of ethics as a constitutive element of a
profession. 93 At that time, a normative code of conduct "higher" than
the morals of the marketplace was something that distinguished a
profession from a business.594
(June 16, 1908), in the Thayer Archives at Harvard University Law School, Vol. 5, at
429.
591. Red Book, supra note 136, at 43.
592. See generally Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism 80-128
(1976) (describing the rise of professionalism in the late nineteenth century); Larson,
supra note 567, at 104 (finding that "Ip]rofessions came of age in America after the
Civil War").
593. Modern sociologists and legal scholars have considered a code of ethics as a
defining element of a profession. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 567, at x, xiii, xviii, 131,
208; Wilbert E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules 113-16 (1970); Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics, supra note 19, at 48; Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical
Codes, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 7, 11 (1990). That view is widely accepted within the
legal profession. For example, in In Re Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 311 N.E.2d 480
(N.Y. 1974), the New York Court of Appeals distinguished a profession from a
business by, among other things, "a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively
and extensively beyond those that prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace." Id. at
483; see also Chase Sci. Res., Inc. v. NIA Group Inc., 749 N.E.2d 161,166 (N.Y. 2001).
That is surely the view of the A.B.A. See A.B.A. Comm'n on Professionalism, ".... In
the Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism 64 n.60 (1986). That view could be asserted as soon as the A.B.A.
adopted the Canons. See, e.g., John Wigmore, Introduction to Orrin N. Carter, Ethics
of the Legal Profession (1915).
594. Abel, supra note 4, at 644-45 ("[Ain essential claim of professions ... is that
they hold their members to a standard of conduct higher than that of the lay public.");
2506 [Vol. 71
THE A.B.A. 'S 1908 CANONS OF ETHICS
Professionalism in the law began in earnest after the Civil War,595 in
response to the breakdown of what Robert Wiebe has called the
"island communities ' 596 caused by the emergence of that national
market economy.5 97 Magali Larson described the situation facing
lawyers in the late nineteenth century:
[I]n the urban centers, the increase in numbers and in social
diversity of the professional population tended to destroy the
diffuse, extra-professional bases for agreement and control. The
resulting increase in dissension, unethical practices, and unseemly
competitiveness ... posed a threat to the collective image of th[is]
occupation[]. Thus, both the concern about their position in an
expanding market and the concern about collective status caused
professional leaders to press toward conformity in their exclusive
elite groups and associations.
5 9
Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 La. L. Rev. 577, 589
(1975) (noting that "an ethic.., morally binding on the conscience of the
professional" distinguishes him from a merchant "in an oriental bazaar"). But see
Potter Stewart, Professional Ethics for the Business Lawyer: The Morals of the Market
Place, 31 Bus. Law. 463 (1975).
595. Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times 254 (1953)
("T]he era of modern Bar Associations must be held to begin with the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York in 1870."); Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One:
The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers'
Practices: Transformation in the American Legal Profession 150 (Robert L. Nelson et
al. eds., 1992) (describing the "last quarter of the nineteenth century [as] the 'take-off'
period of professionalism [in the law] in the United States").
596. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920, at xiii (1967). Wiebe
describes "America during the nineteenth century [as] a society of island
communities":
Weak communication severely restricted the interaction among these islands
and dispersed the power to form opinion and enact public policy.
Education, both formal and informal, inhibited specialization and
discouraged the accumulation of knowledge. The heart of American
democracy was local autonomy .... Almost all of a community's affairs
were still arranged informally.
... The health of the nineteenth century community depended upon two
closely related conditions: its ability to manage the lives of its members, and
the belief among its members that the community had such powers. Already
by the 1870's the autonomy of the community was badly eroded.
Id.
597. Larson, supra note 567, at 13, 76, 103, 134, 137. According to Wiebe, the
national market system of industrial capitalism separated men "more by skill and
occupation than by community [so that] they identified themselves more by their
tasks in an urban-industrial society than by their reputations in a town or a city
neighborhood." Wiebe, supra note 596, at xiv. The tendency to identify oneself by
occupation obviously contributed to enhanced consciousness about oneself as a
member of a profession, thus laying the basis for the wave of professionalization that
swept across the country late in the nineteenth century, including professionalization
in the law. Id. at 111-13,116-17, 127-29.
598. Larson, supra note 567, at 134; see also Richard Hofstadter, The Age of
Reform 156-64 (1955) (describing the changing position of the legal profession at the
turn of the twentieth century).
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Like other professionals responding anxiously to their decreased
status and power in the national urban industrial economy at the
beginning of the twentieth century,599 members of the A.B.A.'s elite-
especially the Canons Committee -initiated and completed the
Canons Project. They drafted and promulgated the A.B.A.'s first
normative statement regarding lawyer conduct. Thus, the Canons
were the capstone of the A.B.A.'s professionalism project and a
significant milestone in the development of the modern legal
profession.
599. See Hofstadter, supra note 598, at 148-63 (describing the status anxiety of
professionals, including lawyers, as the result of the changed economic conditions at
the turn of thetwentieth century).
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APPENDIX
This appendix presents the finalized version of the Canons
of 1908 as promulgated by the A.B.A. Commission and
distributed to A.B.A. members in pamphlet form. An
original copy of this pamphlet is available in the Library of
Congress.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CANONS
OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
COPIES MAY BE HAD ON
APPLICATION TO
JOHN HINKLEY, SECRETARY
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
215 NORTH CHARLES ST.,
BALTIMORE, MD.
"There is certainly, without any exception, no profession in
which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line
of strict integrity, in which so many delicate and difficult questions
of duty are continually arising. There are pitfalls and mantraps at
every step, and the mere youth, at the very outset of his career,
needs often the prudence and self-denial as well as the moral cour-
age, which belong commonly to riper years. High moral principle
is the only safe guide, the only torch to light his way amidst dark-
ness and obstruction."-GEORGE SHARSWOOD.
"Craft is the vice, not the spirit, of the profession. Trick is
professional prostitution. Falsehood is professional apostasy.
The strength of a lawyer is in thorough knowledge of legal truth,
in thorough devotion to legal right. Truth and integrity can do
more in the profession than the subtlest and wiliest devices. The
power of integrity is the rule; the power of fraud is the exception.
Emulation and zeal lead lawyers astray; but the general law
of the profession is duty, not success. In it, as elsewhere, in
human life, the judgment of success is but the verdict of little
minds. Professional duty, faithfully and well performed, is
the lawyer's glory. This is equally true of the Bench and of
the Bar."-EDWARD G. RYAN.
"Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compro-
mise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner
is often a real loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time. As a
peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good
man. Never stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be
found than one who does this. Who can be more nearly a fiend
than he who habitually overhauls the register of deeds in search of
defects in titles, whereupon to stir up strife and put money in his
pocket? A moral tone ought to be enforced in the profession
which would drive such men out of it."-ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CANONS OF ETHICS
[NoTE.-The following Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted
by the American Bar Association at its thirty-first annual meeting at
Seattle, Washington, on August 27, 19o8.
The Canons were prepared by a committee composed of
Henry St. George Tucker, Virginia, Chairman.
Lucien Hugh Alexander, Pennsylvania, Secretary.
David J. Brewer, District of Columbia.
Frederick V. Brown, Minnesota.
J. M. Dickinson, Illinois.
Franklin Ferriss, Missouri.
William Wirt Howe, Louisiana.
Thomas H. Hubbard, New York.
James G. Jenkins, Wisconsin.
Thomas Goode Jones, Alabama.
Alton B. Parker, New York.
George R. Peck, Illinois.
Francis Lynde Stetson, New York.
Ezra R. Thayer, Massachusetts.]
I
PREAMBLE
In America, where the stability of Courts and of all depart-
ments of government rests upon the approval of the people, it
is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dis-
pensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and
so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of its administration. The
future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our
maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so
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maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members
of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just
men.
II
THE CANONS OF ETHICS*
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will par-
ticularize all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of
litigation or in all the relations of professional life. The fol-
lowing canons of ethics are adopted by the American Bar Asso-
ciation as a general guide, yet the enumeration of particular
duties should not be construed as a denial of the existence of
others equally imperative, though not specifically mentioned:
z. The Duty of the Lawyer to the Courts. It is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not
being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to
receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor.
Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judi-
cial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his griev-
ances to the proper authorities. In such cases, but not otherwise,
such charges should be encouraged and the person making them
should be protected.
2. The Selection of judges. It is the duty of the Bar to en-
deavor to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial
fitness in the selection of Judges. It should protest earnestly and
actively against the appointment or election of those who are
unsuitable for the Bench; and it should strive to have elevated
thereto only those willing to forego other employments, whether
of a business, political or other character, which may embarrass
their free and fair consideration of questions before them for decis-
ion. The aspiration of lawyers for judicial position should be
governed by an impartial estimate of their ability to add honor to
the office and not by a desire for the distinction the position may
bring to themselves.
3. Attempts to Exert Personal Influence on the Court.
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer
* For Index and Synopsis of Canons, see p. 15, infra.
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to a Judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties,
subject both the Judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of
motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate
or argue privately with the Judge as to the merits of a pending
cause, and he deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or
attempt to gain from a Judge special personal consideration or
favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of pro-
fessional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and
respect due the Judge's station, is the only proper foundation for
cordial personal and official relations between Bench and Bar.
4. When Counsel for an Indigent Prisoner. A lawyer
assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be
excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best
efforts in his behalf.
5. The Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of Crime.
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person
accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the
guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only of
suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having
undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound by all fair and hon-
orable means, to present every defense that the law of the land
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution
is not to convict, but to see that justice is done, The suppression
of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.
6. Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests. It is the
duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all
the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest
in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the
client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except
by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the sub-
sequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidence has been reposed.
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7. Professional Colleagues and Conflicts of Opinion. A
client's proffer of assistance of additional counsel should not be
regarded as evidence of want of confidence, but the matter should
be left to the determination of the client. A lawyer should decline
association as colleague if it is objectionable to the original
counsel, but if the lawyer first retained is relieved, another may
come into the case.
When lawyers jointly associated in a cause cannot agree as
to any matter vital to the interest of the client, the conflict of
opinion should be frankly stated to him for his final determination.
His decision should be accepted unless the nature of the difference
makes it impracticable for the lawyer whose judgment has been
overruled to co-operate effectively. In this event it is his duty to
ask the client to relieve him.
Efforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the
business of another lawyer, are unworthy of those who should be
brethren at the Bar; but, nevertheless, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel, generally after communi-
cation with the lawyer of whom the complaint is made.
8. Advising Upon the Merits of a Client's Cause. A lawyer
should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's cause
before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a candid opinion
of the merits and probable result of pending or contemplated liti-
gation. The miscarriages to which justice is subject, by reason of
surprises and disappointments in evidence and witnesses, and
through mistakes of juries and errors of Courts, even though only
occasional, admonish lawyers to beware of bold and confident
assurances to clients, especially where the employment may depend
upon such assurance. Whenever the controversy will admit of fair
adjustment, the client should be advised to avoid or to end the
litigation.
9. Negotiations With Opposite Party. A lawyer should not
in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only
with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particu-
larly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not rep-
resented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as
to the law.
io. Acquiring Interest in Litigation. The lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which
he is conducting.
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ix. Dealing With Trust Property. Money of the client or
other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported promptly, and except with the client's knowl-
edge and consent should not be commingled with his private prop-
erty or be used by him.
12. Fixing the Amount of the Fee. In fixing fees, lawyers
should avoid charges which overestimate their advice and services,
as well as those which undervalue them. A client's ability to pay
cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service, though
his poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all. The
reasonable requests of brother lawyers, and of their widows and
orphans without ample means, should receive special and kindly
consideration.
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider:
(i) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the cause;
(2) whether the acceptance of employment in the particular case
will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely to
arise out of the transaction, and in which there is a reasonable
expectation that otherwise he would be employed, or will involve
the loss of other business while employed in the particular case or
antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the
Bar for similar services; (4) the amount involved in the contro-
versy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (5)
the contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the
character of the employment, whether casual or for an established
and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is
controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining the real value
of the service.
In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession
is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-
getting trade.
13. Contingent Fees. Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law,
should be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may
be protected from unjust charges.
14. Suing a Client for a Fee. Controversies with clients con-
cerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as
shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to
receive reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits with
clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or
fraud.
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15. How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's
Cause. Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster
popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the
profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence
which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the
false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of ques-
tionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do what-
ever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause.
It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal
belief in his client's innocence or in the justice of his cause.
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the
judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not that
of his client.
16. Restraining Clients from Improprieties. A lawyer should
use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly
with reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial officers,
jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrong-doing
the lawyer should terminate their relation.
17. Ill Feeling and Personalities Between Advocates. Clients,
not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling
existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel
in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors
in the case. All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously
avoided. In the trial of a cause it is indecent to allude to the per-
sonal history or the personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of coun-
sel on the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel which
cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully
avoided.
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18. Treatment of Witnesses and Litigants. A lawyer should
always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and 'due con-
sideration, and he should never minister to the malevolence or preju-
dices of a client in the trial or conduct of a cause. The client cannot
be made the keeper of the lawyer's conscience in professional matters.
He has no right to demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite
party or indulge in offensive personalities. Improper speech is not
excusable on the ground that it is what the client would say if
speaking in his own behalf.
ig. Appearance of Lawyer as Witness for His Client. When
a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal mat-
ters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like,
he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when
essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in
Court in behalf of his client.
2o. Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation. News-
paper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litiga-
tion may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise
prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to
be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case
justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it
anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go
beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the Court;
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
21. Punctuality and Expedition. It is the duty of the lawyer
not only to 1, client, but also to the Courts and to the public to be
punctual in atendance, and to be concise and direct in the trial and
disposition of causes.
22. Candor and Fairness. The conduct of the lawyer before
the Court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor
and fairness.
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote
the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or
a text-book; or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority
a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed;
or in argument to assert as a fact that which has not been proved, or
in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing argu-
ments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions
in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing affi-
davits and other documents, and in the presentation of causes.
A lawyer should not offer evidence, which he knows the Court
should reject, in order to get the same before the jury by argument
for its admissibility, nor should he address to the Judge arguments
upon any point not properly calling for determination by him. Neither
should he introduce into an argument, addressed to the Court, remarks
or statements intended to influence the jury or bystanders.
These and all kindred practices are unprofessional and unworthy
of an officer of the law charged, as is the lawyer, with the duty of
aiding in the administration of justice.
23. Attitude Toward Jury. All attempts to curry favor with
juries by fawning, flattery or pretended solicitude for their personal
comfort are unprofessional. Suggestions of counsel, looking to the
comfort or convenience of jurors, and propositions to dispense with
argument, should be made to the Court out of the jury's hearing.
A lawyer must never converse privately with jurors about the case;
and both before and during the trial he should avoid communicating
with them, even as to matters foreign to the cause.
24. Right of Lawyer to Control the Incidents of the Trial.
As to incidental matters pending the trial, not affecting the merits
of the cause, or working substantial prejudice to the rights of the
client, such as forcing the opposite lawyer to trial when he is under
affliction or bereavement; forcing the trial on a particular day to
the injury of the opposite lawyer when no harm will result from a
trial at a different time; agreeing to an extension of time for sign-
ing a bill of exceptions, cross interrogatories and the like, the lawyer
must be allowed to judge. In such matters no client has a right to
demand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or that he do anything
therein repugnant to his own sense of honor and propriety.
25. Taking Technical Advantage of Opposite Counsel; Agree-
ments With Him. A lawyer should not ignore known customs
or practice of the Bar or of a particular Court, even when the law
permits, without giving timely notice to the opposing counsel. As
far as possible, important agreements, affecting the rights of clients,
should be reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to avoid per-
formance of an agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to
writing, as required by rules of Court.
26. Professional Advocacy Other Than Before Courts. A
lawyer openly, and in his true character may render professional
services before legislative or other bodies, regarding proposed legis-
lation and in advocacy of claims before departments of government,
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upon the same principles of ethics which justify his appearance before
the Courts; but it is unprofessional for a lawyer so engaged to con-
ceal his attorneyship, or to employ secret personal solicitations, or
to use means other than those addressed to the reason and under-
standing to influence action.
27. Advertising, Direct or Indirect. The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and espe-
cially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of conveni-
ence, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circu-
lars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews,
not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of
any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies adver-
tising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the
lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their conduct, the mag-
nitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's posi-
tions, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower
the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. Stirring up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents. It
is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law-
suit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable
to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having
any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward,
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of
such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attachis or others who may succeed,
under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing
the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek
his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the Bar, having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner, immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
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29. Upholding the Honor of the Profession. Lawyers should
expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or
dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept without
hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who has
wronged his client. The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which
perjury has been committed owe it to the profession and to the
public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting
authorities. The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the
dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.
30. Justifiable and Unjustifiable Litigations. The lawyer
must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the
opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. But otherwise it
is his right, and, having accepted retainer, it becomes his duty to
insist upon the judgment of the Court as to the legal merits of his
client's claim. His appearance in Court should be deemed equiva-
lent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client's case
is one proper for judicial determination.
31. Responsibility for Litigation. No lawyer is obliged to act
either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment.
Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what busi-
ness he will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court
for plaintiffs, what cases he will contest in Court for defendants.
The responsibility for advising questionable transactions, for
bringing questionable suits, for urging questionable defenses, is the
lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it by urging as an
excuse that he is only following his client's instructions.
32. The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis. No client, cor-
porate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or
political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should any
lawyer render, any service or advice involving disloyalty to the
law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office,
which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or per-
sons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or
betrayal of the public. When rendering any such improper service
or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemna-
tion. Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession
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and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives
advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking
exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He
must also observe and advise his client to observe the statute law,
though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted
by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to
its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its
just meaning and extent. But above all a lawyer will find his high-
est honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and
to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal
citizen.
III
OATH OF ADMISSION
The general principles which should ever control the law-
yer in the practice of his profession are clearly set forth in
the following Oath of Admission to the Bar, formulated upon
that in use in the State of Washington, and which conforms in
its main outlines to the "duties" of lawyers as defined by statu-
tory enactments in that and many other States of the Union*-
duties which they are sworn on admission to obey and for the
wilful violation of which disbarment is provided:
I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR:
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of .................................... ;
I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice and ju-
dicial officers;
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which
shall appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as
I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land;
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes con-
fided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and
*Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. The oaths administered on admis-
sion to the Bar in all the other States require the observance of the
highest moral principle in the practice of the profession, but the duties
of the lawyer are not as specifically defined by law as in the States
named.
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honor, and will never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any
artifice or false statement of fact or law;
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the
secrets of my client, and will accept no compensation in connec-
tion with his business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am
charged;
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's
cause for lucre or malice. SO HELP ME GOD.
We commend this form of oath for adoption by the proper
authorities in all the States and Territories.
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